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East Europe

FBIS-EEU-96-163
Wednesday
21 August 1996

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East Europe

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Albania: Military Unit Participates in U.S. Training Exercise

AU2108084796 Tirana ATA in English
1845 GMT 20 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, August 20 (ATA)—An Albanian military unit with two other units from the U.S. and Romania were trained on August 17, the first day for the first battalion, how to defend a town with snipers acting.

The training, held in the context of the military exercises in Camp Lejuene, U.S., was organised in a small town specially built for these military exercises and covering a 15-hectare area.

The unit was trained how to help and evacuate wounded civilians. They tried to act in true to life scenes, in a town reality, where "civilians" are walking or children playing with a ball.

Commander of North Atlantic Forces, Lieutenant General Wilhelm, during the inspection of the peacekeeping troops, highly estimated the rhythm and the seriousness of the Albanian military unit. He said the Albanian soldiers are well trained physically, act quickly, and like to learn. "I am very much impressed they have come to U.S. to participate in this exercises," said Wilhelm.

Albania: Berisha Comments on Kosovo, Elections

AU2108091196 Vienna DIE PRESSE in German
16 Aug 96 p 8

[Interview with Albanian President Sali Berisha by Andreas Unterberger; place and date not given: "Albania Will Not Accept Kosovo's Division"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Unterberger] Repression of the Albanian majority in Yugoslav Kosovo by the Serbs seems to have lessened somewhat. Do you agree with this impression?

[Berisha] The only redress was the abolition of exit visas. Travel from Kosovo to Albania is now possible without a visa. As for the rest, however, the contrary is true: There have again been arrests of intellectuals and mysterious murders. Since Dayton and Yugoslavia's recognition, the situation has deteriorated.

[Unterberger] Do you believe that these mysterious murders were organized by the Serb Government?

[Berisha] It is very likely that they were committed by extremist groups under Arkan or Seselj.

[Unterberger] How can Tirana help the Albanians in Kosovo?

[Berisha] We are trying to sensitize the community of states to their plight. If oppression by the Serbs is ignored, there will be unforeseeable consequences in the region.

[Unterberger] Does that mean that you expect an eruption of violence in the near future?

[Berisha] Nobody can rule that out. The current situation cannot continue for long.

[Unterberger] Would Albania help Kosovo in such a conflict?

[Berisha] Albania is doing everything to prevent a conflict. However, Albania will not tolerate a division and accept ethnic cleansing because the Albanians have lived there since time immemorial.

[Unterberger] To what division are you referring?

[Berisha] A further division of the region. That would be completely wrong. What is needed is the recognition of the human rights of the Albanians.

[Unterberger] Does that mean that you support Kosovo remaining part of Serbia?

[Berisha] Kosovo never was part of Serbia. Kosovo was part of the former Yugoslavia and had 95 percent of the rights of other republics. Kosovo cannot accept that its importance has diminished, especially now that it has become relatively big in relation to the federation, which has since gotten smaller. Two million Albanians are living there. Negotiations between Pristina and Belgrade should begin immediately in the presence of a third party.

[Unterberger] But you do not have a plan for a peaceful solution.

[Berisha] Commitments do not make sense. Negotiations also took place between the Czechs and the Slovaks, and although there had been a lot of trouble before, they separated in a very civilized way.

[Unterberger] Is there any pressure for Albania to unite with Kosovo?

[Berisha] Albania respects the borders. We support the Albanians in Kosovo and their leadership. Their efforts are important.

[Unterberger] The second largest Albanian group lives in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia]. Is their situation better there than in Kosovo?

[Berisha] There has been progress, but not enough. The Albanians there are behaving very responsibly. I am optimistic that further progress will be made. We are very interested in friendly relations with Macedonia.

[Unterberger] Albania will not be among the first countries admitted to NATO and the EU. Are you disappointed by that?

[Berisha] Albania started from a special position. We were the most collectivized and poorest European country with the infrastructure of a Third World country. Progress over the past four years shows that Albania can and will catch up very quickly regarding its integration into Europe and the Atlantic community.

[Unterberger] When will that happen?

[Berisha] Sooner than I think. Four years ago, I also would not have believed that Albania could achieve double-digit growth rates.

[Unterberger] Albania was the first to apply for NATO membership and yet, others have overtaken you.

[Berisha] It is true that we were the first. And it is true that we had very close relations with NATO and the United States at that time, especially during the NATO operation in Bosnia. At the same time, however, NATO has different geopolitical intentions.

[Unterberger] In your opinion, to which will you be admitted first—NATO or the EU?

[Berisha] We are working hard to get into the EU. We are the most Western country in the region. We are doing our utmost to demonstrate our commitment. We regard NATO as a mediator of stability and security; membership in it is a great objective for Albania on the road to the Western community, where it was born.

[Unterberger] You talk about getting into the EU and NATO earlier than expected, yet you have been vehemently criticized in the West because of the last election.

[Berisha] There are appearances, and there is reality. Reality will prevail. In the election campaign there were two minor incidents in 45 days. First, in Skoder, the citizens told the Socialist Party leader—a former interior minister who is responsible for four deaths and 89 injured people—that his safety could not be guaranteed, so he canceled a scheduled meeting. The second incident involved a roadblock by the police.

On election day there were only minor incidents. At 1800—four hours before the end of the election—the socialist leader gave the order: Abandon the election commissions because we are losing heavily.

[Unterberger] This is supposed to have suddenly occurred to him?

[Berisha] The whole thing was organized by Greek extremists in the United States. For years, they have tried to destabilize Albania. They have carried out terrorist acts, taken thousands of weapons to southern Albania, and tried everything to stop progress in our relations with Greece. And finally they used Albanian Stalinists for their purposes. I am not saying that there were no irregularities after their withdrawal. However, the other opposition parties remained in the election commissions. We are prepared to disclose all rules and regulations.

So far, nobody has placed any blame. I told the election commission that all votes contested by the opposition parties should be reviewed. This was not technically correct, but it was a political gesture on my part. Following a review of the opposition's objections, results in 17 election districts were changed. What aggravated the situation were the incidents on Skanderberg Square two days later. They were unfortunate, and I condemn them.

[Unterberger] Were they mistakes by the police?

[Berisha] Yes. The police made unacceptable mistakes, even though there were no serious injuries. They beat two or three well-known personalities of the opposition. As a result, we fired seven police officers.

[Unterberger] So, in your opinion, were the elections fair?

[Berisha] We have reports by the British Helsinki Commission which state that the elections were free and fair. Several European deputies confirmed the same. The American "Republican Institute" said that there were no widespread irregularities. Only the reports by the OSCE and two other institutions say that the law was not respected in 32 articles. However, not a word is mentioned about the boycott.

[Unterberger] But is it not true that the things that you call appearances have become fact for the West?

[Berisha] I do not think that history is written by the press. The truth will come to light.

[Unterberger] Your argument has a problem: In Russia there were also elections where the leftist opposition was beaten, yet it did not boycott the elections.

[Berisha] They did not cooperate with Greek extremists. In Albania, the Socialists told an EU ambassador even before the elections that they would not recognize the result.

[Unterberger] You now have a very large majority in the parliament. Will you push through the constitutional amendments that were rejected once in a referendum?

[Berisha] Morally, we are not authorized to do that without a referendum, even though we have 80 percent of the seats.

[Unterberger] Western businessmen are complaining about the high degree of corruption in Albania.

[Berisha] Up until 1990, everyone had to pay to have a television set and to purchase meat. Everything that belonged to the state was regarded as something that could be abused. Now we have a completely different system. No other country in the whole of Eastern Europe is as successful in the struggle against corruption. Officials on all levels have been punished.

[Unterberger] So there is no longer a problem?

[Berisha] Oh yes, there is still a problem, but one must speak of specific cases. And no foreigner reports them.

[Unterberger] Has the emigration of boat refugees to Italy decreased?

[Berisha] Compared with the past, the number of emigrants is very small. We are working closely with Italy and Greece to stop this flood. Both governments have promised us agreements for seasonal workers.

[Unterberger] How did you check up on this exodus?

[Berisha] By economic progress. A lot have come back. About 25 percent of the investments in Albania come from these people.

[Unterberger] However, Albania is not yet able to invite all to return?

[Berisha] Albania was the only country where there was virtually no emigration for 50 years. Most countries went through a period of emigration. The emigrants send money to their families, learn something, and many eventually return.

[Unterberger] Can Albania be called an Islamic country?

[Berisha] No, it is a secular country with religious tolerance. There are three religious communities.

Albania: Parties Issue Joint Statement, Call for Dialogue

*AU2108071396 Tirana ATA in English
1848 GMT 20 Aug 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, August 20 (ATA)—At the end of a meeting initiated by the Democratic Party [PD], eight parties represented in the local government have published a joint statement through which they show their determination to support the institution of dialogue and consider the boycott an expression of extremism.

The parties attending the meeting were, the Democratic Party, the Republican Party, the Social Democratic Union Party, the Christian Democratic Party, the Balli Kombetar [National Front] Party, the Human Right Union Party, the Levizja e Legalitetit [Legality Movement] Party, and the Albanian Democratic Union Party.

The main points of the statement are:

1. The present Law on Local Elections is considered a law of a good standard, but we agreed to reconsider some limitations in timing and some technical new elements, aiming an improvement of the election procedure.

The political parties call all institutions of the state to cooperate for a correct implementation of this law.

2. The political parties agree to support with determination the institution of dialogue and to consider the boycott in general as expression of extremism, fanaticism, dictatorial inspiration, and lack of tolerance which bears in itself failed intentions.

3. The political parties agree, not to abrogate the Anti-Genocide Law and the Law on the Scrutiny of Political Figures, but propose to parliament its amendment to exclude all members of councils of every level.

The Balli Kombetar Party was against this amendment.

4. The political parties agree to enter, incite, and continue the political public debate in the media and elsewhere.

Albania: 8 Parties View Coming Elections at Roundtable

*AU2008151396 Tirana ATA in English
1315 GMT 20 Aug 96*

[Report by Atlant Frasheri]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, August 20 (ATA)—The round table of eight Albanian political parties yesterday decided that members who leave the voting commissions as happened on May 26 this year with a part of Socialist Party [PS] commission members and of some other party will be punished by law.

"This will be punished by law," said Democratic Party's [PD] Tritan Shehu, "because in the moment one agrees to be present during the voting process as a commission member, he becomes a representative of the administration, recommended by his party. Withdrawal may be made before the voting process starts."

Along this, other questions discussed in the round table were some modalities of the Election Law, preparation for the election campaign, measures to be adopted for a calm election campaign, some amendments to the Election Law, control of senior official figures and the Anti-Genocide Law.

Present in the round table talks were, besides the Democratic Party, representatives of the Republican Party, the Balli Kombetar [National Front] Party, the Social Democratic Union Party, the Human Rights Union Party, the Legaliteti [Legality] Movement Party, the Christian Democratic Party, the Democratic Union Party. No reporters were present in the meeting.

Albania: PS Hopes To Preserve 'Unity' at 24 Aug Congress

AU2108120296 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 20 Aug 96

[Report on interview with Socialist Party Deputy Chairmen Servet Pellumbi and Namik Dokle by Marash Mirashi in Tirana on 20 August—read by announcer]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] As you have been informed in the previous newscasts, the Socialist Party [PS] Steering Committee held a meeting today, in which it discussed and approved the reports and documents that are to be submitted to the party congress, as well as proposals for amendments to the party program and status. The meeting lasted for about seven hours, with reporters not being allowed to attend. After the meeting was over, our correspondent Marash Mirashi and operator Muharrem Dhembi managed to interview some of the main PS leaders. [passage omitted]

[Mirashi] Mr. Pellumbi [PS Deputy Chairman], sorry for the trouble. We are from Albanian television. Can we please have your comments on today's meeting of the PS Steering Council?

[Pellumbi] The meeting today concerned the function of the congress that is to start on Saturday [24 August].

[Mirashi] What did you decide about the post of the PS secretary general?

[Pellumbi] The congress will decide all these issues. Today we approved the relevant documents only.

[Mirashi] Will there be another meeting before the congress?

[Pellumbi] There is no need for other meetings. Today we approved all the documents that are to be submitted to the congress.

[Mirashi] Do you think that your party's upcoming congress will be a congress of PS unity?

[Pellumbi] Every party intends to go to its congress with unity and leave with unity, too. I hope we, as well, will do the same thing. [end recording] [passage omitted]

[Mirashi] Mr. [Namik] Dokle [PS Deputy Chairman], can you tell us something about the proceedings of today's meeting?

[Dokle] The PS General Steering Committee today discussed three important documents that are to be submitted to the party congress—the political report, another report on amendments to the PS program, and a report on concrete proposals for statutory changes. Thus, the congress will ensure the final and resolute disassociation from Enver Hoxha's dictatorship and its Ramizist [reference to Hoxha's follower Ramiz Alia] continuity, particularly in respecting human rights and freedoms.

[Mirashi] There are rumors that there were strong encounters at the Tirana conference. Meanwhile, the press writes that various trends have started to be drawn in the bosom of your party. Is this true and did you discuss these problems today?

[Dokle] All those who talk about strong encounters at a conference where discussions and diversity of thoughts are heard suffer from the mentality of the past, when discussions were not allowed. That is why they call every discussion an encounter.

[Mirashi] Will there be another alternative report besides the one drafted by the PS presidency?

[Dokle] The report drafted and approved by the PS Steering Committee today is the report to be submitted at the congress, while any other document is not considered a PS Steering Committee report.

[Mirashi] Will there be other new delegates to attend your congress, or only those who were elected in the first phase?

[Dokle] There are very few new delegates. The majority are those of the first phase. For clear reasons, new delegates have been reelected in several districts.

[Mirashi] Thank you.

[Dokle] Thank you. [end recording]

Albania: Socialist Paper Assesses Party Reform

AU2008165896 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 20 Aug 96 p 3

[Article by Hamdi Jupe: "Testimony to the Socialist Party's Values"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Only a few days remain before the second phase of the Socialist Party [PS] Second Congress. The PS conferences in all the districts have been completed, and at its meeting today the General Management Committee will adopt the final form of the party's basic draft program, the draft statute, and the political report that will be submitted for approval by the congress. The period of preparation for this phase of the congress had its special features as a result of the political situation prevailing in the country following the affront to the people's votes on 26 May and the Democratic Party's [PD] new efforts to stage another electoral farce on 20 October. This called for the total political commitment of the entire party to confront the fraught political situation in the country and create a climate for the restoration of confidence in democratic values, which is only possible with the conducting of genuinely free and fair local elections.

Another feature of the congress preparations has been the party's involvement in a debate about its further reform. This was dictated by the need to strengthen the party's social-democratic image and to improve the party's response to the challenges of the political struggle in the country. The entire party has taken part in this debate on reform. There is not a single PS member who has not taken an active part in the discussion of such issues as what the PS must look like in the future, how the party documents can and must change, what the party's structures and political stands should be, how the party can become capable of preventing such events as those of 26 May, what attitude the party should take toward certain issues of the past, and so forth. This was an open and public debate that invigorated all the party's structures. Such a debate can only be organized and confronted by a party with great regenerative strength, which is not frightened of debate and respects freedom of thought. It is a characteristic of truly democratic parties. The motion and the messages sent by party chairman Fatos Nano also added to the strength and vigor of this debate, bringing the discussion of internal party problems out of the party meetings and forums into the pages of the free press. The party conferences in the districts, which have just come to an end, confirmed once again these values of the party. There was a pervasive concern that any change to the party should go toward improving its capacity for militancy in the currently fraught political situation, with the aim of ensuring that the main opposition party makes its contribution toward extracting the country from its crisis.

These conferences demonstrated the maturity of the party members and their total commitment tin the service of the party's political struggle. The new elections for the party's leading forums were an expression of this maturity. They were marked by the selection of the most able people who are the most honest and the most devoted to the party's work. The forthcoming party congress is also expected to be pervaded by his spirit of maturity and dedication. It will show that there is no reason or place for division in the party, and that the PS also has the strength to confront even greater challenges in its renovation process.

The preparation of the current party congress also involved a kind of sense of shock and distress among a section of the party membership and the members of its forums. This was for several reasons. First, it was the first time that the debate on the internal affairs of a party had been organized in this way, and of course all new methods of this kind at first naturally cause people to become confused and disoriented. Second, the current debate in the party took place immediately after the theft of the people's free vote in the farcical elections of 26 May. People are still indignant and in despair over what happened, and thus every move by the party to look within itself was at first considered by some of the party's members and supporters as a move to the regime's benefit and to the detriment of the party and democracy in general. The fact that the date of the congress was approaching made it inevitable that a debate should be inaugurated at just this time, and thus must be understood. The matters requiring urgent solution by the congress cannot be left for solution after it ends. Third, it was not possible that the debate on the reform of the party should not, within a large party like the PS, also involve misunderstandings and distortions of certain kinds. This is because there is no way that you can make the great majority of the PS stand to attention, and nobody can deny the members the right to think and express themselves "differently." Thus efforts at reform sometimes took the form of attempts to disparage one person or another or groups in the party. There were others who thought that the time had come to realize their careerist ambitions in dishonest ways. Others, who should have been the very objects of reform in the PS because of their pasts, hastened to seize the banner of reform. There were also members of the party and its forums who were scared by this situation and passively stood aside, waiting for calmer times.

It must be stressed that a section of the press also intensified the climate of shock, confusion, and misunderstanding. The progovernment press attempted to interpret the open debate within the PS as an suitable opportunity to mount a diversion against the largest opposition party. However, part of the independent press, too, unused to such events in the life of political party, often generated fog and confusion over what was happening inside the PS, even including things in its pages that were not true.

In short, Albanian society, with its shortcomings and limitations in the field of democracy, also played its role in what has been called the shock and confusion that the current process of renewing the PS has involved. There have also therefore been misunderstandings and erroneous interpretations that could have been avoided in all this period of open debate, but this has nevertheless been no great disaster for the party. What is left after this debate with all its discussion and misunderstanding is a will on the part of the party's members and supporters and also all genuine democrats to see a stronger PS. Everything else will be quickly forgotten after the congress.

We say this because the various alternatives and changes to the political program, the statute, and the party's leading structures have now been clearly put forward. Nobody any longer doubts that we must finally and decisively dissociate ourselves from references to Marx and from the statist concepts in the party program. In connection with the new statute, all the ideas that have been advanced are now well known. They have become the object of debate, and the discussion at the congress will shape them into a final form that will be approved by a free ballot of the congress delegates. Such a way of discussing and approving the party's basic documents is a novelty for any Albanian political party.

The issue that remains to be discussed at the congress, and which looks to be the most complicated, is the election of the party's management bodies. Everyone is now concerned about bringing into the new leadership people who will be able to successfully lead the party into the next four years of its life. The delegates have not only long been concerned about this issue, but are also aware of the candidates for the new party leadership. They also possess the capacity to select among these candidates, because the PS now possesses political personalities who have been tested in so many political battles during the last five years. Under these conditions, there are many reasons to claim that the party congress will once again demonstrate the party's maturity. Every delegate that votes for the new leadership and every individual who sees himself as part of this leadership must trust in the values of the representatives of the broad masses of the party and welcome the decisions that the delegates will make. Occasional incidents that have been observed involving attempts to make unnatural impositions on the party representatives in order to eliminate any doubt about a person's election to the management bodies are unnecessary and inadmissible in a serious party like the PS. They merely damage in the eyes of the party and the public at large the worth and reputation that the people who behave in this way in fact possess.

Albania: Trial of Former Communist Officials Continues

AU2108074396 Tirana ATA in English 1847 GMT 20 Aug 96

[Report by A. Frasheri]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, August 19 (ATA)—The trial for nine former senior officials of the Party of Labour of Albania (PLA) and the communist state charged with crimes against humanity, continued Monday [19 August] in a session of hearing the witnesses.

A panel of judges of the Tirana Court was presided by Judge Mehmet Bicaj.

The defendants are Lenka Cuko, Llambi Gegprifti, and Irakli Vero, ex-chairmen of the Executive Committees in Lushnje, Tirana, and Fier respectively; Idajet Beqiri, ex-chairman of Kruje Court; Agron Tafa, Veiz Haderi, and Sulejman Abazi, ex-chairmen of Secret Police in Kruje, Sarande, and Tropoje; Nazmi Domi, ex-director of Directory for T[illegible]a Interior Ministry; and Shkelzen Bajraktari, ex-dir[illegible] of the Eighth Directory in Interior ministry.

Witnesses answering to the questions, said they have been interned for political motives, taken by numerous police forces and were personally introduced with none of the defendants. They said they had taken no court decision for their punishment but only some small pieces of paper.

Genocide and crimes against humanity, considered grave crimes according to Articles 73, 67, and 25 of the Penal Code envisage sentences ranging from 15 years in jail to death penalty.

As some witnesses fail to be present, the panel of judges decided to continue trial on August 27 by questioning other witnesses.

Albania: Rally Protests Reduced Sentences for Ex-Communists

AU2008151296 Tirana ATA in English 1325 GMT 20 Aug 96

[Report by M. Malaj]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Shkoder, August 19 (ATA)—The Anticommunist and Democratic Association of the Formerly Politically Persecuted held a rally of protest in the Renaj cemetery of Shkoder city, where the communist dictatorship killed scores of innocent people. The rally was held to protest the decisions of the Appeal Court for some former ex-senior functionaries.

"We protest today resolutely to the decision of the Appeal Court for lighter sentences for representatives of the ex-communist dictatorship and moreover for the release of Haxhi Lleshi, Manush Myftiu, and Foto Cami," said the chairman of the Association Gjon Shllaku. He added that "They were not rank and file people but ex-senior communist leaders, who launched the idea of and inspired crime in Albania. They are the main people responsible for thousand victims who were jailed, interned, and killed, for thousands of persecuted people," said Shllaku.

Five former communist chiefs, three of whom were given capital punishment in May this year, were received lighter sentences by the Appeal Court, directed by the chairman of the court Prele Martini in Tirana.

Zylyftar Ramizi, deputy interior minister, had his capital punishment replaced with life sentence, Aranit Cela and Rrapi Mino, respectively chairman of the Supreme Court and attorney general in the time of Enver Hoxha and Ramiz Alia, had their capital punishment reduced to 25 years in prison. Two other leaders, sentenced to 25 years in jail during the same trial in May, will be released.

Whereas Manush Myftiu and Haxhi Lleshi, respectively former deputy prime minister and former parliament speaker, had their sentence reduced to five year probation.

About 400 people present in the rally supported a demand of the association that the former persecutors should by no means be released from jail.

Albania: Commission To Rehabilitate Victims of Dictatorship

AU2108072396 Tirana ATA in English 1846 GMT 20 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, August 20 (ATA)—President of Republic of Albania Sali Berisha decided Tuesday [20 August] the creation of a commission to deal with complete rehabilitation of all fighters, who were punished by the dictatorship during and after the war for political motives.

A statement of the Press and Information Office close to President said that the rehabilitation will be for those people who were not implicated in crimes against humanity and Albanian people.

Berisha stresses that the rehabilitation of such figures, complete rehabilitation of hundreds and hundreds of commanders and fighters, is a moral duty for the Albanian society today not only for the contribution they offered, their sacrifices in the defence of freedom and national dignity, but even for the great courage they showed for their social democratic ideals and the values of liberty.

This commission made up by historians and war veterans will be headed by Defence Minister Safet Zhulali.

Albania: Financial Cooperation Agreement Signed With FRG

AU2008152196 Tirana ATA in English 1311 GMT 20 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] An agreement on "Fund of Studies and Specialists" was signed between Albania and Germany at the Ministry of Transport, Industry, and Trade, yesterday [19 August]. The agreement signed by the heads of the two delegations, Minister Suzana Panariti and the ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany to Albania, Hanspeter Diesdorn, is part of the framework of the annual protocols of financial and technical cooperation between the two countries.

Under the agreement, DM [German marks] four million have been earmarked for various studies and projects on development of infrastructure and other studies.

Within the framework of the protocol on financial and technical cooperation for the year 1996 signed in Tirana, in May 1996 the German side has allocated a total sum of DM 86.85 million for technical cooperation. The funds are non-refundable grants and soft credits to be repaid after 40 years at an annual interest rate of 0.75 percent. Repayment starts after 16 years.

Other agreements will be signed this year within the framework of the protocols of financial and technical cooperation between the two countries.

Albania: Sea Transport, Exchange With Greece Increases

AU2008150196 Tirana ATA in English 1330 GMT 20 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Albania and Greece are increasing communication by sea in a near future. Work to improve the sea port of Sarande in the south of Albania and reopening the sea port of Himare will facilitate ties between the two neighbouring countries in addition to two present border crossings, which will soon be added to by another three check points on the Albanian-Greek land border in three regions of Albania and Greece.

Signs testifying to growing sea transport between the two countries embodied in increased volume of handling operations in the sea port of Sarande have grown recently. At the same port, another three passenger sea lines with three new ferry boats have been added to the three ferry boats plying between the Greek island of Corfu and the Albanian coastal town of Sarande. In the future, another two ferry boats will also be used for foreign holiday makers. Apart from the coastline of the neighbouring country, tourists are also preferring the Albanian southern coastline to pass their holidays or to visit ancient and historic sites.

The sea port of Sarande is expected to be improved under a EU Crossborder project.

At a joint meeting in Ioannina not long ago, Albanian and Greek specialists held discussions about the deadline of the implementation of the projects and the funds needed for the purpose.

In the meantime the Albanian Government has decided to reopen another sea port at Himare in the south of Albania.

The port, closed down some 50 years ago, will go through several phases of construction to be carried out by Albanian structures. The exploitation of the new port will help greatly improve domestic sea transport and increase trade exchanges between Albania and Greece.

Bulgaria: Zhelev, Videnov Said To Clash Over Army

AU2108113696 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 21 Aug 96 p 11

[Article by Lyuboslav Kirov: "Zhelev, Videnov Clash Over Military Intelligence"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Military Intelligence is the new bone of contention between Videnov and Zhelev.

The scandal had been smoldering for almost a year, but it erupted with greater force on Sunday [18 August], when the president returned for the second time the cabinet's proposal to move Lieutenant General Angel Katsarov, chief of the General Staff Military Intelligence Administration, to the newly established Inspectorate of the Ministry of Defense.

The "Katsarov" case is not part of the conflict between the Ministry of Defense and the Presidency over the composition of the new Army control organ. It belongs to another category.

So far the arguments of each side remain unknown. However, according to General Stefan Dimitrov, aide to the president, the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] is trying to establish control over Military Intelligence, by appointing its man to General Katsarov's post.

The Ministry of Defense is keeping silent. It has not proposed a new candidate for the post of the current Military Intelligence chief.

Zhelev's thesis is that Gen. Katsarov is a very good professional, who has passed through all command levels, and served as commander of the ground troops. Thus, there is no reason to replace him.

According to former employees of Military Intelligence, Katsarov will be replaced by Colonel Dacho Dachev, military attache in Athens. Dachev also has great experience in the branch, and in the past was for a while Military Intelligence deputy chief. In 1990, he was dismissed by General Chavdar Chervenkov immediately after his appointment as Military Intelligence chief.

Former Military Intelligence agents claim that the Premyanov family is behind Dachev's presence. It is no secret that one of the two brothers of the leader of the Democratic Left parliamentary faction [Premyanov] has been an employee of the Military Intelligence and worked in one of its cover companies. He was dismissed by former Defense Minister Dimitur Ludzhev.

It is assumed that Premyanov's brother and Dachev have common business interests in the county and abroad. We have received confirmation from three different sources that the Premyanov brothers are behind the idea to appoint Col. Dachev Military Intelligence chief.

The scheme is rather simple. Dimitur Pavlov became minister of defense through the solid support of Krasimir Premyanov. Both come from the same city. The former Komsomol leader [Premyanov] had to make great efforts to impose the appointment of Mityo the Good [Pavlov's nickname], who at the time was completely unknown, first to the post of deputy minister of defense, and then as minister of defense.

This was not effected because of the positive qualities Dimitur Pavlov demonstrated later as minister of defense, but because of that powerful shoulder, without which no one, absolutely no one, could make the great breakthrough in big politics.

Margaret Thatcher used to say "there are no free lunches." According to this logic, Pavlov has been compelled to repay Premyanov for the favor by facilitating the inclusion of Col. Dachev in the game. The newly established Inspectorate came in handy in this respect. In the commotion created by Zhelev's objection to establishing the Army control organ, the idea to appoint Gen. Katsarov as its deputy chief was not supposed to attract much attention.

In the spring, Col. Dachev received a proposal to return to Sofia as Gen. Katsarov's deputy, but he refused the offer because he already served in this capacity. In addition, who is crazy to relinquish a salary of $1,500 for $150?

What are Zhelev's people trying to conceal?

First of all is the fact that Gen. Katsarov was appointed Military Intelligence chief personally by the president. This took place during the brief period of Reneta Indzhova's caretaker cabinet.

It is an open secret that Gen. Katsarov has close contacts with Gen. Stefan Dimitrov, Zhelev's military aide, and consults with him on almost every issue. This fact explains the negative attitude of General Staff Chief General Tsvetan Totomirov to moving Katsarov to the Inspectorate.

Reportedly, Gen. Katsarov's service allows itself strange liberties. According to reliable information, on 1 May 1995 an inspection was carried out at an intelligence unit in southern Bulgaria without the presence of the General Staff chief, and without notifying the head of the Military Intelligence Agents' Department. During the inspection, Gen. Katsarov suddenly demanded to receive the names and addressees of all our agents in Turkey, as well as the unit's plan of actions in wartime.

This information is classified and can be obtained only through an established procedure. None of Gen. Katsarov predecessors in Military Intelligence allowed himself something like this. The subsequent scandal which exploded was quickly covered up.

In addition, it was during the tenure of Mrs. Indzhova's caretaker cabinet that the idea was born to unite all security services under the hat of the National Intelligence Service. Military Intelligence employees claim today that this would have finally destroyed our Military Intelligence.

In the final analysis, the clash regarding Military Intelligence is at a stalemate. The government can propose as many decrees as it wants—Zhelev will return them without a signature. Thus the president continues to be in a better position, because through Gen. Katsarov he is controlling Military Intelligence. As a result, all important information, domestic or international, lands first on Zhelev's desk and then, at his discretion, on other desks.

The BSP will have to reconcile itself to this situation. The only solution is to wait for the presidential elections. Then Zhelev will by all means leave the Presidency, although it is not clear who will replace him.

Only our Military Intelligence loses from this stalemate. As if the massacre conducted by former Defense Minister Ludzhev in this service was not enough! Then dozens of spies, planted for years in circles which served as sources of excellent information for our national security, were thrown out on the street. Today the quarrel as to who should lead the Military Intelligence is shaking the already collapsing structure. Instead of strengthening the structure the rulers are aggravating the situation through their party battles.

Bulgaria: Involvement in Greek-Turkish Conflict Viewed

AU2108112496 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 21 Aug 96 p 7

[Commentary by Nina Stefanova: "How Could Bulgaria Be Dragged Into Turkish-Greek Conflict?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bulgaria could involuntarily be dragged into a possible Greek-Turkish military conflict over Cyprus.

According to unofficial information, about 2,000 Bulgarian emigrants are living in the Turkish part of the island. Those are Bulgarian Turks who already are Turkish citizens, but still keep their Bulgarian passports.

The men are subject to mobilization if a military conflict erupts. Thus a situation could emerge in which Bulgarian citizens would be fighting against Greece. This would drag Bulgaria into the conflict.

The tension between Greeks and Turks in Cyprus has been constantly growing over the last two weeks. There were bloody clashes in the buffer zone that divides the island into two parts. Greek Prime Minister Simitis and Turkish Deputy Prime Minister Ciller have exchanged threats. The Greek intelligence EIP [expansion unknown] even predicted a war in September.

What are our citizens doing in the Northern Cypriot Turkish Republic? Many of them went to Cyprus because it was easier to emigrate to the British Commonwealth from there, after obtaining Cypriot citizenship and a passport.

This is how Nasko Kekhayov [Nazmi Chaush), wanted for murder in Kurdzhali, disappeared. After a road accident in which one person was killed, he succeeded in reaching Great Britain after obtaining a Cypriot passport. He even won the main prize in the British lottery.

About 2,000 Bulgarians obtained Cypriot passports after it became clear that Turkey would not cancel its strict visa restrictions. Until two months ago, those who wanted to emigrate to Cyprus used to submit the relevant documents and then returned to Bulgaria, from where they followed, through their relatives, the progress of processing their citizenship applications.

However, those who succeeded in obtaining Cypriot citizenship continued to be considered Bulgarian citizens.

The Bulgarian Citizenship Law does not automatically cancel their right to keep their Bulgarian passport if they become citizens of another state.

Ramadan Karakash, leader of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms [DPS] in Kurdzhali, told STANDART NEWS that Turks with dual Bulgarian-Cypriot citizenship would not return to Bulgaria even if the situation on the island deteriorated. It is more likely that they would respond to their mobilization call. Former Kurdzhali citizens now living in Cyprus said that men with Cypriot citizenship had been summoned to military camps. In this context, the Greeks recently filed a protest and announced that they would investigate. Reportedly, Athens is irritated by the summoning of immigrants to military camps in Cyprus.

However, Bulgarian passports could also drag Bulgaria into other international scandals.

Many of those holding dual citizenship have several Bulgarian passports. They sell them for DM2,000, mostly in Germany. Those who purchase them are most often criminals, our policemen report. When one of those criminals is involved in illegal activities abroad and is arrested, Bulgaria's image is hurt. The Kurdzhali Regional Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs intends to propose to the Ministry of Internal Affairs to tighten the regime of replacing lost passports, Lieutenant Colonel Stoyan Damyanov, a police spokesman, reports. The current minimal fines encourage those who are interested in such business to acquire as many passports as possible.

Czech Republic: Deputy on EU Entry, Czech-German Declaration

AU2008143796 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 20 Aug 96 p 3

[Interview with Jiri Payne, member of the Chamber of Deputies Foreign Committee and chairman of the permanent mission to the North Atlantic Assembly, by Nikola Nikolova; place and date not given]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Nikolova] About a month ago, the Czech Republic sent off the completed EU questionnaire, which should be one step in its integration into the EU. What else do we have to do to be admitted?

[Payne] The EU is in a very difficult situation right now. During the Cold War, the United States paid most of the costs of maintaining a defense against the common enemy. To a certain degree, Europe benefited from this situation and experienced a period of unbelievable prosperity. However, the new stage after the fall of the Iron Curtain has brought new risks and problems. Of course, this situation has been projected onto the economic prosperity of Western Europe. Under these conditions, EU expansion certainly is a problematic issue because it will cost something. At the same time, it is obvious that the candidate countries are not completely ready. There are several levels of preparation. One is the legislation, where we can expedite the process by a political decision, and another level is preparing qualified people, which requires more time. An entirely different level is the creation of a social standard for our citizens that would be comparable to Western Europe so that the entire integration process runs smoothly.

[Nikolova] Specifically, what does that mean for us?

[Payne] For example, we will have to see to it that our average wages are not significantly lower than the average wages of some European countries. That does not necessarily mean that the entire social sphere would be completely harmonized. Our reformed social system certainly offers good conditions for this harmonization, so the fine-tuning should not be very difficult. I believe our concept is a good step on the road toward European integration.

[Nikolova] Would it be more advantageous for us to join the EU independently or to join with other Central European countries?

[Payne] According to some studies, these countries will be ready for admission in 10 or 15 years. That means we must decide if we want to wait for the slower countries. That could mean waiting 10-15 years before realistic talks about our admission would start. Personally, I believe the talks could start much sooner, even if I do not endorse the rush optimism, according to which we could be in the Union by the end of the millennium. Of course, it is in our interest that this process does not take too long because the more we delay it, the more likely we are to miss the train. It would be good if we were a member already and if we had already had an impact on various decisions so we could steer the train and not just run after it.

[Nikolova] Will significant changes be made in spheres other than the social one?

[Payne] If Europe is to have any demands on us, it will be mostly in the economic sphere, particularly regarding GDP growth. Nevertheless, there will also be some demands concerning the morality. It is not usual in the EU for criminals who committed crimes several dozen years ago to move freely around Europe. We will have to be much more consistent in closing the chapter of settling with the past. We will not be able to join the EU until we have taken that step. Some Czech political parties deliberately keep quiet about it because that is where the EU measures will affect them.

[Nikolova] How will preparations for the Czech-German Declaration proceed?

[Payne] The concept selected is based on the idea that the parliament will approve a document identical for both sides, which should be a political statement closing our joint past. Such a document would have no legal effect. It would only be a political declaration of political views, and its validity would depend on both parties understanding it as politically binding and adopting it as a point of departure for future policy in their mutual relations. This concept originated quite some time ago, and it is a question of whether it can be adopted by both sides with a clear, binding effect on both sides. Nevertheless, this declaration has the advantage that it has been previously discussed, so we could achieve results relatively quickly. It depends on whether there is political willingness on the Czech and German sides.

[Nikolova] Will the declaration contain a passage apologizing to the Sudeten Germans?

[Payne] The text could include an idea that has been voiced repeatedly from our side; specifically, that we are sorry for the excesses that took place during the transfer. Of course, we are aware of the fact that this information is not sufficient for some activists of Czech origin. Nevertheless, we will probably never be able to completely survey the spectrum of views on this topic. I am convinced that no further yield would be acceptable for the Czech side. Moreover, if I am properly informed, many other politicians feel this way. So, it would be useless to wait for a breakthrough in this matter on the Czech side.

[Nikolova] Are there any approximate dates for completing the declaration, and will this date be realistically discussed?

[Payne] It is difficult to plan because the declaration is based on input from a number of sources, and it cannot all be programmed beforehand. After all, it is a matter of bilateral willingness, and goodwill does not necessarily exist on both sides at the same time.

Czech Republic: Klaus Discusses Issues Within ODS

AU2008161296 Prague RESPEKT in Czech 19-25 Aug 96 No 34, p 12

[Interview with Vaclav Klaus, Czech prime minister and ODS chairman, by Vladimir Mlynar; place and date not given]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Mlynar] What is the new government's chance of surviving the coming parliamentary debate on health-care legislation and the vote on the budget?

[Klaus] It is inconceivable that I would think anything but that the chance exists. As prime minister, I can only proceed from the premise that the present government will serve its regular term. If I were to toy with a different premise, I would not be able to work normally.

[Mlynar] In your opinion, where is the weakest spot in cooperation between the government and parliament?

[Klaus] I do not think it concerns individual issues such as the budget, health care, and the like. I would not say that relations between the government and parliament will be determined by a single issue. The problem of the existence of a minority government is a more general one. But Milos Zeman is not the chief of 101 deputies, only of 61, and I think he is starting to realize that. And this realization will influence his conduct.

[Mlynar] What would the parliamentary opposition have to accomplish for the government to tender its resignation? Would it be sufficient, for instance, for the Czech Social Democratic Party [CSSD] to enforce a reduction of the retirement age or a revision of the payment of child allowances?

[Klaus] The factors you mentioned certainly exist, but I would be acting against myself if I enumerated them now before you. I would only be advising the Social Democrats on what they should try to achieve, and you cannot possibly expect me to do that.

[Mlynar] Immediately after the elections, the discussion about the majority electoral system started in the press again. Politicians, especially from the smaller parties, have resolutely rejected the idea. What is your opinion?

[Klaus] I am realistic when it comes to these matters. I have absolutely no experience with the majority political system, and I "admire" some politicians and journalists who pronounce absolutely self-assured verdicts on these issues as if they had gone through a dozen elections under the majority system. I cannot predict how they would end. I do not know how today's Czech voter would behave if the electoral system changed. The tradition in our country as well as those around us in Europe is a number of smaller parties, complicated coalition governments, and the like. While the Anglo-American world, including its majority system, is more congenial to my nature, I am not sure whether that would be the right path in our case. That is why I say we will be wiser after the Senate elections.

I Fared Worse Than I Expected

[Mlynar] Were the last parliamentary elections a success or a setback for the Civic Democratic Party [ODS]?

[Klaus] It certainly was not a success. Nonetheless, in the previous elections the ODS had won 66 seats, and now it has two more. It would, of course, be ideal if we had another five or 10 seats. But we won 29.66 percent of the vote, which is more than the majority of preelection polls had been giving us. Unfortunately, we thought that percentage would translate differently into the number of seats.

[Mlynar] But, under the proportional electoral system, a political party's success is not directly proportional to the percentage of votes obtained. Viewed from that perspective, the smaller coalition parties improved their position in these elections, while the ODS lost.

[Klaus] Indeed, but that is a different discussion. The peculiar feature of a coalition government is that it disproportionately favors the smaller partners. If the situation were reversed and the ODS were in the position of a smaller coalition party, it too would obtain a larger number of seats in the Cabinet than corresponded to its electoral gain. What you are talking about is not the product of ODS incompetence but the problem of any coalition government.

[Mlynar] How do you explain that in north Moravia, where both you and Milos Zeman were running, he received 7 percent more votes than you did? Do you perceive this as a personal defeat?

[Klaus] I am not able to assess this issue well. I do not know whether I perceive it as a personal defeat. The voter structure in a number of places in north Moravia is complex and in many ways atypical, and I am not able to assess how many votes some other ODS politician would have won there. But I do not conceal the fact that this is a worse result than I had expected.

I would not even say that the CSSD's relative success in north Moravia is the positive work of Milos Zeman. Personally, I believe the decisive factor was that the consolidated Social Democracy simply soaked up the votes of people who do not feel that, in terms of their personal lives, they are on the victorious side of the post-November transformation process. Such a party did not exist in 1992, so these people had no one to vote for then.

Factions Yes, but What Kind?

[Mlynar] In his recent interview for MLADA FRONTA DNES, [Foreign Minister and ODS Deputy Chairman] Josef Zieleniec said that, from now on, the internal party discussion about the nature of ODS policy should be public and various streams of opinion should exist within the party. In your first reaction, you rejected this idea. What is bad about the existence of opinion platforms or factions within the framework of a political party?

[Klaus] Streams of opinion are natural human phenomena, and naturally I do not claim that this is nonsense, a contradiction, or something terrible. It seems natural to me that people within a political party present their specific views on a problem or a set of problems and that people who view matters in the same or a very similar way form groups. I also understand that, under certain circumstances, such an implicit group can evolve into something more formal. This is a legitimate model. Nonetheless, this process must start with the presentation of different opinions on this or that issue. It cannot start with the declaration that it would be good to have platforms or factions—or, more precisely, it can, but I think that in that case the contents are missing—without any prior discussion about what these platforms or factions want to do and why.

[Mlynar] Does that mean you would not oppose the institutionalization of party factions similar to those existing, for example, in the CDU [German Christian Democratic Union], in which there are groups of businessmen, trade unionists, young people, and so forth?

[Klaus] In this sense, Germany is for me nothing that I would consider worthy of emulation; it probably comes closest to what is being called the corporatist-syndicalist state. The party factions you are referring to very strongly resemble some kind of utilitarian interest and pressure groups, which is a phenomenon I would combat in the ODS at any price. I would view factions in a political party in terms of basic ideological differences within the broader ideological confines of this or that political party—that is, in someone being more to the left or the right in the party. There is no doubt that such differences also exist within the ODS.

[Mlynar] And what about Zieleniec's idea that the internal party discussion of ODS policies should have a public character?

[Klaus] There has never been polemics against public discussion from my side. As far as Jozef Zieleniec's statements are concerned, my (and not just my) objections were directed more against their form and timing, not against their public presentation. In the British Conservative Party, for instance, Euroskeptics and Euro-optimists are at daggers drawn and publicly fight one another in the media. We could talk about whether this is to the benefit of the party and its voter potential, but that is the reality.

[Mlynar] And you think a public discussion about disagreements within the ODS would be to the party's benefit?

[Klaus] The debate about whether the party would benefit from this is an artificial one. If different views on practical issues of ODS policy really existed in the party, there is not the slightest reason not to discuss them aloud.

[Mlynar] By the way, did you take Josef Zieleniec's interview personally?

[Klaus] I do not want to discuss this. The Executive Council perceived it as a practical problem, not a personal one, and I conduct myself accordingly. I have nothing to add to that.

We Are Waiting for Phase Three

[Mlynar] If you were to formulate the problems of the present ODS, what would they be?

[Klaus] That is such a broad question that I do not know where to start. I would probably see the ODS's main problem in that, similar to other parties, the membership base is still made up of people who actively joined politics in the relatively early post-November era. The overwhelming majority of society now says to itself that we live in a normal world and prefers to devote itself to business, family, or sports rather than to politics. That is why I believe the absolutely dominant problem is that we are not succeeding in more distinctly increasing and, in part, renewing and activating the membership base. As a matter of fact, I spoke about this repeatedly at the ODS congress.

[Mlynar] What is the main reason people have lost interest in involvement in politics?

[Klaus] Czech society is in a peculiar intermediate phase: The primary effect of the change of regime has been exhausted, yet the social structures that would make it possible for people to devote themselves to politics in a standard fashion have not yet been established.

[Mlynar] What can be done about it?

[Klaus] I do not know how to overcome it directly. What I do know is that an artificial attempt to move society as a whole from one development phase to another, an attempt to overcome this with something like a party recruitment drive, would be counterproductive. I see it as a matter of development. Czech society "survived" or, if you prefer, "overcame" or "endured" the first inevitable post-November phase and has more or less absorbed what I would call the "collapse effect," including a drop in living standards. In the past two years, we have experienced an upward movement—I would call it the "liberalization" effect—and now we are waiting for the positive effects of the normal functioning of society, which is a quiet phase.

As regards political parties, we can, of course, expedite a few things by functioning better and presenting them better. But the basic change—the moment when people will again say to themselves that, if they want to influence politics in the country, they cannot just read newspapers and go to the polls but must join a political party—this basic change should come naturally.

Someone Must Lead the Party

[Mlynar] Even before Libor Novak's resignation as ODS deputy executive chairman, a proposal was made to abolish the post. Do you agree with this proposal?

[Klaus] This is a marginal issue for me. I do not have a strong opinion on it.

[Mlynar] I am asking because you must from time to time feel the conflict between being head of government and party chairman. You can devote yourself 100 percent either to the party or to the post of prime minister.

[Klaus] Without a doubt, the prime minister cannot be the executive functionary of a political party who sits in the party headquarters and does it as his job. It is also beyond dispute that a person who does it as his job must exist.

[Mlynar] So you do not support the idea of replacing such a person by a hired manager who would be in charge of only the party's economic and administrative affairs?

[Klaus] I do not have a strong opinion on this issue. There is an internal party commission that is to propose alternative solutions to the congress. We shall see.

I Wanted To Get Rid of Intrusive Questions

[Mlynar] How do you explain that recently, to an even greater extent than in the past, the media have been interpreting your statements differently from the way you intended them?

[Klaus] I do not know. Immediately after the elections, this was not the case, but apparently we are returning to the old rut again. The latest example from last week took my breath away. In an interview for Radiozurnal, I was asked whether it was realistic to expect to win 40 percent of the vote. I said, roughly, that it would be possible to achieve such a percentage if there were a single right-wing party. This was interpreted as if I had offered a merger with the Civic Democratic Alliance [ODA]. The distortion is the responsibility of a specific journalist. CTK issued a miniquote and gave it a headline that did not correspond in the least to what I said. Subsequently, commentators and politicians were reacting only to this CTK report. I do not know how to stop these things from happening.

[Mlynar] One more question in this context. Last week you said after the Cabinet meeting that you "do not even know" Libor Grygarek, the dismissed supreme state attorney, and that you "have never spoken" with him. Why did you say that when everyone knows that one year ago you invited Grygarek to your office, in the presence of journalists, to discuss more severe punishments for racially motivated crimes?

[Klaus] You see, I forgot that completely. I said it only to get rid of intrusive questions such as: What do you think of Grygarek's work, what do you think of Kalvoda dismissing him, and so forth. I said that I consider this matter to be fully within the jurisdiction of Minister Kalvoda, and the additional half-sentence, which I could have denied myself, was only meant to indicate that I do not have the least personal interest in the matter.

[Mlynar] Have you ever thought about what will become of the ODS after you quit politics.

[Klaus] I have.

[Mlynar] And what was your conclusion?

[Klaus] For the time being, I will keep it to myself.

Czech Republic: Poll Shows CSSD Closing Gap Behind ODS

AU2008160796 Prague PRAVO in Czech 20 Aug 96 p 2

[Article by "(rea)": "The ODS Is Losing Its Lead Over the CSSD"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—The Civic Democratic Party [ODS] almost lost its July lead in the opinion polls in August. According to the Institute for Public Opinion Research [IVVM], Klaus's party received 28 percent (30 percent previously), while the Czech Social Democratic Party [CSSD] has closed the gap behind it with 26 percent (23 percent in July).

The survey was carried out after the Chamber of Deputies expressed confidence in the new government. The Social Democrats had supported it indirectly by leaving the Chamber.

The two parties are still hovering close to their election result: The ODS won 29.6 percent of the vote, and the CSSD won 26.4 percent.

Of the other parliamentary parties, only the Civic Democratic Alliance with 8.0 percent (7.0 percent in July; 6.4 percent in the elections) has improved. Support for the Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party has slipped to 7.5 percent (9.0 percent in July; 8.1 percent in the elections). Support for the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia has fallen to 7.0 percent (9.0 percent in July; 10.3 percent in the elections).

The Association for the Republic-Republican Party of Czechoslovakia with 5.0 percent (5.0 percent in July) would still cross the 5-percent threshold necessary for admission to the Chamber. Compared with the elections, the Republicans have lost 3.0 percent. The August poll was conducted about two weeks after Miroslav Sladek made a racist speech in the Chamber.

Two nonparliamentary parties have also recorded a decline. The Free Democrats-Liberal National Social Party [SD-LSNS] and the Pensioners for a Secure Life (DZJ) would each receive 0.5 percent of the vote (1.5 percent in July). In the elections, the DZJ won 3.1 percent of the vote, and the SD-LSNS won 2.1 percent.

The Democratic Union would win 1.0 percent of the vote (1.0 percent in July). The IVVM does not survey support for the other parties.

According to the IVVM, almost three-quarters of the population (73 percent) would go to the polls in August. It was 78 percent in July.

Slovakia: SNS Criticizes Kovac's Presence at Hungarian Event

AU2008122096 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 20 Aug 96 p 2

[TASR report: "By His Conduct, the President Has Slighted Slovaks as a Nation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The Slovak National Party [SNS] deems it necessary to point out two significant things in connection with President Michal Kovac's participation in a reception held to mark the Hungarian Republic's national holiday on 15 August. This information is contained in a statement that SNS Chairman Jan Slota gave to TASR yesterday.

The party says in it: "One of the reasons for holding the reception was the anniversary of the bloody incursion into our territory by ancient Magyar nomads, an anniversary that, in its invitation, the Hungarian side innocently called 'the 1,100th anniversary of the arrival of the Hungarians in their homeland.'"

As the SNS says in its statement, "the participation of the Slovak president in this reception must also be viewed as a manifestation of agreement with and acceptance of what accompanied the incursion of the barbarian Asiatic hordes into the Carpathian basin. This means the pillaging of our territory, the murdering of our forebears, the killing of priests, and the destruction of Christian tabernacles." According to the SNS, the president's conduct has no parallel in Europe. It is utterly incomprehensible to anyone who acknowledges traditional Slovak and Christian values. By his conduct, the president has slighted every Slovak and the Slovaks as a nation.

The SNS also states that it considers the form chosen by the Hungarian Embassy for the reception to be a serious political provocation that in no way corresponds to the Hungarian side's proclaimed interest in good mutual relations.

Slovakia: SNS Commemorates 'Victims' of Magyar 'Incursion'

AU2108114296 Bratislava SME in Slovak 21 Aug 96 p 2

[Unattributed report: "The SNS Has Remembered"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Slovak National Party (SNS) organized a "commemoration devoted to the victims of the incursion by ancient Magyar nomads into Central Europe" in Bratislava yesterday on the right bank of the Danube. At the same time, the SNS issued a statement in which it says that, in connection with the celebrations held to mark the 1,100th anniversary of the arrival of the Hungarians, it considers it to be its moral duty to point out to the European public the inhumane nature of these celebrations. "Any violence, barbarity, and devastation inflicted by any civilization has to be condemned regardless of when they were inflicted," says the SNS in its statement.

Slovakia: Article Claims South Slovakia Undergoing 'Magyarization'

AU2108122196 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 21 Aug 96 p 5

[Article by Jan Podolak, director of the Slovak Heritage Foundation's Center for Ethnic Relations and a member of the Slovak Heritage Foundation Committee: "The Magyarization of Southern Slovakia Continues"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In terms of the extent and quality of extended rights, the position of the Hungarian ethnic minority in Slovakia has for decades exceeded the European standard. This is confirmed by the attained level of the system of ethnic education, by the development of culture and the arts, by the participation of Hungarian minority members in the administration of public affairs (at the community level as well as in parliament), but also by the high level of awareness of belonging to the Hungarian ethnic group. In spite of this, in their complaints and statements addressed to various international forums, the political representatives of this minority claim that, if the Slovak Government's "discriminatory" policy against minorities does not change, Hungarians in Slovakia will face the threat of ethnic assimilation. We will demonstrate, with the help of specific data, what the real situation in the development of the ethnic structure in southern Slovakia is like, particularly which ethnic group is becoming more numerous and which is becoming ethnically assimilated and is thereby losing its ethnic identity.

According to the 1991 census, 566,741 (10.7 percent) people in Slovakia declared themselves to be of Hungarian nationality. Leaving aside Bratislava and Kosice (where their number does not exceed 5 percent of the population), members of the Hungarian minority are concentrated in 13 districts of southern Slovakia. In the Bratislava Environs and Nitra districts, the share of ethnic Hungarian inhabitants did not exceed 8 percent of the districts' total population, in the Dunajska Streda and Komarno districts, it exceeded 50 percent, and in the remaining nine districts the proportion of ethnic Hungarians ranged from 16.4 percent (Kosice Environs) to 46.5 percent (Rimavska Sobota).

In the 30 years between 1961 and 1991, the 11 ethnically mixed districts of southern Slovakia (that is, those where the proportion of ethnic Hungarians ranges from 16.4

to 87.23 percent), underwent a remarkable development in terms of their ethnic structure. In those 30 years, the number of ethnic Hungarians in Galanta district increased by 4,668, in Nove Zamky district by 4,019, in Kosice Environs district by 3,862, in Trebisov district by 4,257, and in Dunajska Streda district by as many as 19,239. Overall, the number of ethnic Hungarians went up by 37,717 in 30 years (between the 1961 and 1991 censuses). The number of Hungarians in Slovakia is increasing despite the fact that their natural increase is almost 50 percent lower than that of Slovaks.

The declining proportion of Slovaks and the increasing number of Hungarians in individual ethnically mixed districts manifests itself even more strikingly when analyzing demographic development in the 10-year period between the censuses of 1981 and 1991. In Trebisov district, for instance, the percentile share of Slovaks dropped in this period from 60.3 to 57.1 (while the share of ethnic Hungarians increased from 38.9 to 39.3), in Kosice Environs from 85.3 to 77.2 (the Hungarians' share went up from 13.9 to 16.4), in Nove Zamky district from 57.8 to 56.8 percent (accompanied by an increase in the proportion of Hungarians from 41.3 to 41.7 percent), and in Komarno district the proportion of Slovaks declined from 27.1 to 25.8 percent of the district's total population (while the Hungarians' share increased from 71.9 to 72.3 percent). The continuous reduction of the proportion of Slovaks has been registered in other districts as well. In Lucenec district, for instance, it declined from 75.2 to 73.8 percent, in Roznava district from 72.8 to 68.8 percent, in Rimavska Sobota district from 51.6 to 49.9 percent, and so forth. An outright catastrophic demographic development in Slovaks' disfavor is under way in individual villages and towns of the ethnically mixed areas. Statistical data demonstrate that, in dozens of towns and villages, the number of Hungarians is growing while the proportion of their Slovak and Romany residents is declining.

European analyses of demographic development confirm that, for reasons of a low birth rate, the Hungarians have the lowest natural increase of the population among all the Central European nations. The number of Hungarians in all countries, including the Hungarian Republic, is declining every year (in the last 10 years, the population of the Hungarian Republic declined by over 330,000). A comparison reveals that the Slovak Republic is at present the only country in the world in which the number of Hungarians is growing. This is the best proof of the real position of the Hungarian minority in the Slovak Republic.

If the natural increase of Hungarians, as a result of their low birth rate also in Slovakia, is almost 50 percent lower than the natural increase of Slovaks and if, in defiance of this, the number of Hungarians is growing in absolute terms and the number of Slovaks in the ethnically mixed areas is declining, it bears witness to the assimilation of the non-Hungarian population in southern Slovakia. The paradoxical situation is thus occurring in our country, a situation that is unique in Europe, that members of the majority nation are assimilating in their own state into the environment of an ethnic minority.

This is one of the consequences and, simultaneously, a proof of the longstanding discrimination of Slovaks in the ethnically mixed areas of southern Slovakia.

Slovakia: Meciar: Ruling Coalition Controls Regional Apparatus

LD2108121396 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1600 GMT 19 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Chairmen of the political parties of the ruling coalition Vladimir Meciar [from the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia—HZDS], Pavel Delinga [from the Farmers Party of Slovakia], Jan Luptak [from the Association of Workers in Slovakia—ZRS], and Jan Slota [from the Slovak National Party—SNS] today held coalition talks in the Slovak Government hospitality house in Banska Bystrica. Political representatives of their parties in the regions and all eight heads of the newly established regional authorities were also present. After the coalition talks, Slovak radio editor Lubos Krno asked, first of all, the HZDS chairman [and prime minister] Vladimir Meciar, for an interview.

[Begin recording] [Krno] Prime Minister, what was the objective of the coalition talks today?

[Meciar] Our talks today were influenced by the appointment of the heads of district and regional offices on Friday [16 August]. Naturally, they need political backing so that they can carry out their complex tasks. The heads of regional offices, all chairmen of ruling coalition parties or representatives of individual districts attended the talks today, so that we could agree on the basic issues that will have to be resolved within the next fortnight.

These include a number of organizational and technical issues—the latter concerns buildings. Assistance will have to be rendered in the sphere of human resources and in training and selection. We also had to reach an agreement with the political parties on joint policies until the end of this year and on the preparations for launching the independent accounting system in 1997.

The positive balance of the meeting was that all sides reached an agreement. Further talks will be carried out basically on a day-to-day basis until the state administration and all state bodies become fully operational.

[Krno] Have you also discussed personnel appointments to the posts of deputy heads of regional administration and heads of individual departments?

[Meciar] I can assure you that no names have been mentioned. We analyzed the organizational structure of all regional offices, but names were not on this meeting's agenda.

[Krno] The reason for my asking this question is that according to certain reports, statutory representatives at three regional offices should be from the SNS and statutory representatives at five regional offices should be from the ZRS. The head of the office is from the HZDS, of course.

[Meciar] This report is correct.

[Krno] What about appointments to individual departments in regional offices?

[Meciar] The issue of appointments to individual departments is not up to us and we cannot deal with it. But in any case, we had to set ourselves two criteria—either political affiliation or expert knowledge. The conclusion is straightforward: If the heads of regional offices are not surrounded by a well-qualified and highly efficient apparatus, there will be no chance of success.

Furthermore, the principle of [?self-appointment has another snag], which is that every appointment requires a comment by the relevant minister. But these have been in fact only the first talks during which we discussed the ways of carrying this out and not personnel appointments. [end recording]

[Krno] It was literally right at the end that I managed to catch the SNS chairman, Jan Slota. I asked him whether he was satisfied with the outcome of the coalition talks today.

[Begin recording] [Slota] I think that all coalition partners reached a 100 percent agreement regarding their assessment of and the course of action taken in setting up regional and district authorities.

[Krno] Did you also discuss further cooperation within the government coalition?

[Slota] All of those who took part in this meeting were, indeed, pleasantly surprised at the hugely accommodating attitude displayed by our strongest coalition partner [HZDS], embodied by the prime minister. All of us were almost caught unawares, as it were, by this accommodating attitude, which was possibly [word indistinct] and which had even been difficult to cope with.

[Krno] So, are things cosy again?

[Slota] Absolutely cosy, I think. [end recording]

Slovakia: Coalition Leaders Discuss Administrative Arrangement

AU2008134096 Bratislava SME in Slovak 20 Aug 96 p 2

[TASR and CTK report: "J. Slota Claims the Attitude of the HZDS Is Now Accommodating"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Banska Bystrica—Coalition talks involving representatives from the ruling political parties were held in Banska Bystrica yesterday—in the presence of the leaders of the regional authorities and the plenipotentiaries for the individual regions—on the further implementation of the plan for the Slovak Republic's territorial and administrative arrangement. "We agreed on the basic issues that have to be dealt with during the next 14 days," said Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] Chairman V. Meciar. Association of Workers of Slovakia [ZRS] Chairman Jan Luptak and Slovak National Party [SNS] Chairman Jan Slota also took part in the talks. According to V. Meciar, Friday's [16 August] appointment of the leaders of the regional and district authorities influenced the nature of the talks. He added that the consultative meeting was good in the sense that all of the entities agreed with one another and that more talks will be held almost on a daily basis until the complete commencement of the state administration. According to V. Meciar, it was necessary to agree with the political parties on a joint policy course of action until the end of the year and on the preparations for the start of independent accounts in 1997. According to him, "everyone went away satisfied, because it is clear to all that the plan is ready and that we have assumed the political responsibility for its implementation. Political courage was also necessary to initiate this. I think that the optimum period is now, so that its implementation culminates in the next elections in 1998." "As far as personnel matters are concerned, they were not on the agenda. However, we had to establish the criteria: Whether political commitment or expertise," added V. Meciar. The upshot, according to him, is unequivocal: If the authority leaders are not surrounded by a qualified, highly efficient apparatus, they will have no chance of success. SNS Chairman Jan Slota also expressed his 100-percent satisfaction with the talks. "Everyone who took part in this meeting was pleasantly surprised by the HZDS's utmost accommodating attitude," he commented. V. Meciar confirmed for Radiozurnal that the eight leaders of the new regional authorities belong to the HZDS. They will have deputies, however, and the SNS will hold three of these posts and the ZRS will hold five of them.

Slovakia: Prosecutor General Responds to President's Criticism

AU2008122796 Bratislava PRACA in Slovak 20 Aug 96 p 2

[Article by "(red)": "The Dispute Is Not Good for Slovakia's Image"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—We carried an interview with President Michal Kovac on 14 August 1996. This is Prosecutor General Michal Valo's response to it:

"I take great exception to the false claims by the Slovak president who, in an attempt to manipulate public opinion and detract attention from his own unethical course of action, declares that the Prosecutor General's Office takes action based on who is the stronger and not based on upholding the law and legality. It is very sad and dangerous for democratic development if the president, as the Republic's supreme representative, begins to place his personal interests before the interests of the state he represents It is morally intolerable when, in an attempt to detract attention from his own unethical decisions, he accuses other state bodies of illegal conduct.

"It is not easy to say this, but, paraphrasing the president's remarks, not doing anything would mean tacitly tolerating this course of action and taking the risk that it could spread en masse as under the former totalitarian regime. Although it is very unpleasant for me, because this dispute really is not good for the Slovak Republic's image, I thought that the lesser evil would be to try and convince the public that no matter who is involved, although it is the president's son and his fellow accused, the state bodies, not excepting the president, have to proceed impartially in harmony with the law."

Slovakia: Russians Reportedly Training SIS

96P20492B Prague CESKY TYDENIK in Czech 16-18 Jul 96 No 160, p 14

[Article by Ivan Vilcek: "Secret Service Tying Slovakia to Russia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ivan Lexa, a favorite of Prime Minister Meciar, has been chief of the Slovak Information Service [SIS] since October 1994, when parliamentary elections were held. During the time he has been its leader, the SIS has been suspected of shadowing some members of the political opposition, and it is also believed that SIS agents were involved in the abduction of President Michal Kovac's son to Austria. It is for this kind of activity that the SIS has turned to highly qualified professional teachers—members of Russia's intelligence services.

During the past week, a number of Russian intelligence officers trained SIS specialists right at SIS headquarters in Bratislava. Incidentally, this was not the first common undertaking between the SIS and the Russian Federation's secret services. At the beginning of this year, a group of SIS officers embarked on a secret trip to Moscow, where the SIS has its only officially acknowledged representative abroad. Under former SIS leadership, Slovak intelligence officers were trained by the British MI5 along with the services of other post-communist countries closely collaborating with NATO intelligence agencies. But today Western diplomats are extremely distressed by SIS collaboration with the Russian secret services. Ivan Lexa was not even invited to the regular conference of leaders of the Visegrad Four intelligence services, which took place in Slovenia. It is because of the close relationship with Russia that Western intelligence agencies are reconsidering their contacts with the SIS. In other words, today's orientation of Slovakia is changing even in this regard, notwithstanding the programmatic declaration of Meciar's government, which stresses the Slovak Republic's interest in integration into Western economic and military structures. The steps that are being undertaken by the SIS are proof of the fact that the Slovak Government is changing the orientation of its foreign policy.

Not so long ago, Meciar responded to multiple Western demarches with the following words: "If the West does not want us, we will turn to the East." The visit of the Russian intelligence services coincided with the funeral of Robert Remias, the former police officer who three months ago was the victim of a car bomb. Remias was a close friend of Oscar Fegyveres, the state's witness in the kidnapping of Michal Kovac Jr. Remias made contact possible between Fegyveres and his family after Fegyveres was forced to hide abroad, having testified about SIS participation in Kovac Jr.'s kidnapping.

Remias's funeral turned into a silent protest against the practices of the current government. Many speakers at the funeral pointed out that Meciar's and Kovac's hands are stained with the blood of an innocent human being. In his eulogy, Remias's parish priest, Father Pavol Flajzik, appealed to the members of the SIS who were present at the funeral to keep in mind who they serve and what the consequences for Slovakia might be. Unfortunately, everything points to the fact that the decision about the change in orientation of our Eastern neighbor has been decided.

Hungary: Opinions of Government Improve Slightly

AU1608173296 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 16 Aug 96 pp 1, 4

[Unattributed report: "Moderate Improvement in Views of the Government—Szonda-Ipsos Survey"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A moderate improvement can be seen in opinions of the ministries and their leaders in the first half of the year. Both indicators increased by about five points in the period from January to July. The cabinet's total confidence index was a little over 50 percent, while the average of the ministries' indicators was slightly below the mean.

On MAGYAR HIRLAP 's commission, Szonda Ipsos carries out a public opinion survey every month on the population's confidence in the government members and their satisfaction with the ministries. We will report on the major changes of the first six months, also taking into account the results of the July survey.

Compared to the previous month, in July we report some improvement in opinions on the ministries' activities and the suitability of the ministers. The average of the government members' suitability indicators increased to 51.7 points from that of June, 50.7; and the satisfaction index of ministries increased from June's 45.3 points to 46.5 points in July.

This moderate improvement fits in with the tendency of changes of opinion on ministries and their leaders so far this year. In the period from January to July, both indicators increased by nearly five points: the cabinet's total confidence index increased by 4.8 points from 46.9 points and the index of satisfaction with the ministries increased by an average of 4.78 points from 41.8 pints.

Medgyessy Helped

Looking at the suitability indicators of the various ministers, the most spectacular change can be seen in the population's views on the head of the Finance Ministry, which is evidently due to the replacement of the minister in March. While Lajos Bokros, at the beginning of the year, received 26 points, Peter Medgyessy's latest suitability index reached 57 points. Therefore, the increase of the finance minister's confidence index amounted to no less than 31 points, which contributed much to the improvement of the government's average score. The change probably also affected opinions on the Finance Ministry's activities because it also significantly improved its position (18 points): In January, it still occupied the last position with 25 points but it came to the eighth position by July with 43 points.

The prime minister also had a significant increase of points. Horn's confidence index increased by seven points (from 42 to 49) in the first half of 1996. Opinions on Balint Magyar, head of the Ministry of Education and Culture, also improved similarly and, with his 57 points, he is at the same level as the finance minister. It is also worth mentioning the population's constantly improving opinion on Environment Minister Ferenc Baja: His suitability index increased by six points in the past half year. However, some ministers did not go higher. Welfare Minister Gyorgy Szabo is one of them, his January index was the same as in July (38 points), and he ended up in last place, instead of the 12th place of January. Although the justice minister increased his points a little (from 52 to 55), his colleagues' higher increases made him drop from the fourth to the seventh position.

The Finance and Cultural Ministries Have Improved

Looking at the changes in the views on the various ministries, in addition to the Finance Ministry, the 10-point confidence increase (from 37 to 47) of the Cultural Ministry is worth noting; which brought it up from the ninth place at the beginning of 1996 to sixth place. The satisfaction index of the Environment Ministry also increased significantly, by six points. Its current 52-point score is only exceeded by the Foreign and Defense Ministries, and the four-point increase in this ministry's satisfaction index last month played a major role in this. None of the ministries had a decrease in their index during this year, but it might be a waning that the Justice and Agricultural Ministries only just managed to hold on to their January points in these six months.

Suitability Index of Government Members in Jan and Jul 1996

	Jan	Jul
Gyula Horn	42	49
Laszlo Kovacs	65	69
Gyorgy Keleti	62	61
Gabor Kuncze	57	59
Balint Magyar	50	57
L. Bokros/Peter Medgyessy	26	57
Ferenc Baja	50	56
Pal Vastagh	52	55

	Jan	Jul
Karoly Lotz	49	54
Istvan Nikolits	46	46
Laszlo Lakos	46	45
Imre Dunai	39	44
Peter Kiss	39	43
Tamas Suchman	37	40
Gyorgy Szabo	38	38

	Suitability	Change	Recognition	Satisfaction With Ministry	Change
	Percent				
Kovacs	69	2	82	64	3
Keleti	61	3	87	57	3
Kuncze	59	- 1	92	50	2
Magyar	57	2	81	47	2
Medgyessy	57	1	89	43	3
Baja	56	2	78	52	4
Vastagh	55	0	74	46	- 2
Lotz	54	0	76	51	2
Horn	49	1	94	—	—
Nikolits	46	2	43	—	—
Lakos	46	- 1	73	38	- 2
Dunai	45	3	68	42	0
Kiss	44	1	69	36	0
Suchman	43	0	78	—	—
Szabo	40	0	78	32	0

Hungary: Former MSZOSZ Chairman Nagy Interviewed

AU2108082396 Budapest 168 ORA in Hungarian 13 Aug 96 pp 8-10

[Interview with former MSZOSZ Chairman Sandor Nagy by Benedek F. Toth; place and date not given: "Trend and Society"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Toth] Many people say that you have fallen on the ground between two chairs.

[Nagy] Which two chairs?

[Toth] The chairman's chair at the National Federation of Hungarian Trade Unions [MSZOSZ] and the ministerial chair.

[Nagy] I resigned from the former and the latter did not even exist. Therefore, I could not have fallen on the ground. [passage omitted]

[Toth] Did you not have any more goals in the MSZOSZ?

[Nagy] The explanation is simple: I felt that the time had come for a change, because I might not have been able to continue as chairman the same way as before. [passage omitted]

[Toth] You surprised the country with Trend [Nagy's company].

[Nagy] I did not intend it as a surprise. A few of us decided to set up an economic and social research and counseling company. [passage omitted]

[Toth] With what goals?

[Nagy] We deal with economic, social, and social policy issues, even on commission. I know that the country already has many similar workshops, but our primary goal is analysis.

[Toth] In other words, your company commissions other economic research companies and summarizes the results for decisionmakers. It is as if you wedged your organization between the government and the economy's actors.

[Nagy] Perhaps this is what some people think, but I never planned or offered to do this. It is not our goal. If we are able to produce results, then we will pass these on to the decisionmakers. All similar companies do the same. There is nothing unusual about this.

[Toth] Except for the fact that you managed to get rather big names for Trend: Sandor Csanyi (National Savings Bank), Andras Derzsi (Hungarian Airlines), Tamas Erdei (Foreign Trade Bank), Gabor Princz (Post Office Bank), Gabor Szeles (Videoton, National Association of Manufacturers), Erno Kemenes (Deloitte and Touche), Andras Sugar (Westel), Andras Vertes (Economic Research Corporation), Tibor Palankai (economist), Jozsef Vertess (university lecturer), Tamas Sarkozi (professor), Gabor Kovacs (Banker Ltd.) Mihaly Patai (Hungaria Insurance Company), and I could go on. You seem to have gathered the elite in one place.

[Nagy] I do not think that our country's elite consists of so few people. Our intention was for Trend's counseling team to consist of competent and recognized experts. From this viewpoint, the above list of names is not a disadvantage.

[Toth] But it is heads and shoulders above the expert team of a ministry.

[Nagy] What can I say? This is a private company which was set up with the capital of its members. This is all there is to it.

[Toth] So it is not at all an invisible economic ministry?

[Nagy] It is people's sovereign right to think and freely express their views, and to gather the views of various people and try to assess them. However, this does not mean that we wish to replace any kind of already existing structure.

[Toth] To whom does Trend give advice?

[Nagy] To all who want it. [passage omitted]

[Toth] Even to the government?

[Nagy] We do not seek out anyone in particular. When we complete a piece of work, we present it to all those who—in our view—can use it. My experience is that we, Hungarians, are very good at situation analysis. However, this is the easy job. It is much more interesting and difficult to provide answers to the complex and challenging questions. I wonder about people who make astonishingly self-confident statements and claim alone to have the correct answer, and when things do not happen the way predicted, blame mistakes on real life processes.

[Toth] Is this a criticism of the economic policy?

[Nagy] This is the criticism of a style. The question is whether there is a truly considered economic policy which concentrates on the fundamental issues, rather than whether the economic policy is simply good or bad. [passage omitted]

[Toth] What relationship do you have with the prime minister?

[Nagy] The same as before. We meet occasionally.

[Toth] I only ask because you, after all, were a victim of coalition peace.

[Nagy] It is unimportant what situation I was put in because of the coalition partner's stance. It is much more important to what extent the governmental structure and Parliament are able to take on important initiatives and opinions, and how they can assess these. The outcome, not the participants, is what is important.

[Toth] Are you not worried that many people see this as political submissiveness?

[Nagy] I do not think so, because the point is that I will not give up my views on some fundamental issues for the sake of a position. I believe that a country in which a few people are rising very quickly and others are dreadfully falling behind cannot succeed in the long run. I also find it impossible for Hungary to be able to join the European Union as an equal partner if the eastern and western parts of the country are developing at different rates. I believe that the biggest challenge might be to prevent lethargy and apathy. This does not only depend on finances. All these and some others are issues of key importance fo me. [passage omitted]

B-H: U.S. Balkans Involvement, Options Discussed

AU2008175296 Sarajevo HRVATSKA RIJEC in Serbo-Croatian 10 Aug 96 p 7

[Commentary by Adnan Buturovic: "Only a Croatian-Muslim Agreement Can Prevent Dangerous Interference From Abroad"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Has the U.S. business in the triangle of Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Serbia—which started as early as in 1993, when Bill Clinton became president—come to an end? Almost all serious political analysts claim that Washington will, by exerting pressure, succeed in stabilizing the situation in the territory of the former Yugoslavia for a relatively long time to come, as NATO will probably remain there also in 1997, and maybe even for several decades. Nobody has asked himself, however, whether the United States of America will withdraw politically from this region after the probable electoral victory of the Democratic presidential candidate Clinton, leaving—after having materialized its really minor interests as a peacemaker—internal chaos behind, especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which will be controlled by the military presence of NATO in order to prevent a possible war. The United States of America would in this way satisfy its appetites, leaving the "Bosnia-Herzegovina pot" to boil on the big flame created by clashes within political parties because of various attitudes toward a future profile of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and excusing itself at the same time with the argument that it was Clinton who made the framework for the internal constitution of the state in a series of Dayton and post-Dayton legislative documents.

U.S. Strategy

By now, it has proven to be completely true that the U.S. Administration has thoroughly prepared its plan according to which it has stepped up its pressure with the aim to materialize its aims: First, to convince itself which political forces in Zagreb, Sarajevo, and Belgrade have been pulling the strings; second, to bring the war to an end by the creation of a pat position for all parties; third, to make the arbitration between key politicians in peace negotiations; and fourth, to prepare the circumstances for the what is probably the most spectacular point in Clinton's foreign policy, by exerting the greatest pressure so far—pressure for the September elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina—so that Clinton can address his voters with the words: "You can see what the United States has accomplished in southeastern Europe!" The fact is, however, that the United States has only opened new painful processes—political, military, social, and financial—which can develop in the negative direction if Washington and the international community turn their heads away next year from the results they have achieved. If, for example, the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, or between Croatia and Serbia, grows into a crisis, Washington will again be the "savior" and "solve the problem" by exerting pressure on all sides. If these assessments are incorrect, why is there that much fuss about the achievement of United States' global aims, and why are all the controversial requirements made by Sarajevo, Zagreb, and Belgrade being analyzed?

Who is to blame for the establishment of such a model of political relations between foreign factors and domestic political circles negotiating with them? If we consider what has happened during the last more than 20 days, during which the United States has "cleaned the house" with open blackmail, it is clear that the hosts are to blame, as they needed pressure from abroad for every political arrangement and compromise. The federal partners in Bosnia-Herzegovina should ponder themselves now, and should think about why they did not have a mutual solution to the functioning of the Federation in 1994, when the Washington agreement was signed, and why they needed the United States and the European Union instead, which imposed their solutions, which first of all protect the interests of the powerful and are used "as a means of payment" in compromises between the West and the East (this will hopefully be discussed in the announced meeting between the SDA [Party of Democratic Action] and the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union], which will require a lot of self-criticism too). This became clear only after the solutions offered by international factors began working against the interests of all, the Croats, the Bosniaks, and the Serbs, after no one was pleased with the political games imposed from abroad.

Richard Holbrooke went first to the Serbian president in order to ask him how much the removal of Karadzic would cost. He was removed after that, but—according to the OSCE and Steiner—this criminal still seems to be in charge in Pale. For the public, Karadzic has been removed, and he at least does not participate in the active competition any longer, and the story is complete. After that, Mr. Franjo Tudjman went to the United States upon Clinton's invitation. There followed a meeting between the Croatian and the Serbian presidents in Athens, which was mediated by Greece. Although the circles in Sarajevo interpreted the latter as unfavorable for Bosnia-Herzegovina, it was later on established that Bosnia-Herzegovina was not discussed at all; on the contrary, the modalities for bilateral recognition between the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were the topic of discussion in Athens. If anyone is in a position at the moment to make agreements against Bosnia-Herzegovina's interests, these are international factors that can in the present situation do literally what they want. Parallel to the meeting in Athens, President Alija Izetbegovic was invited to Ankara by Suleyman Demirel. Demirel probably wanted to suggest to Izetbegovic that "if the ball was calmed" in Athens and the interests of Presidents Tudjman and Milosevic balanced, he would agree to full recognition of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and tell him which concessions Belgrade should make to Sarajevo if Bosnia-Herzegovina were to give up its legal actions against Serbia and Montenegro before the International Court in The Hague.

It must be admitted that U.S. foreign politics are fascinatingly imaginative, as it has made a bridge between its military allies Greece and Turkey, otherwise hostile toward each other. The two countries are mediating in the process for the general stabilization of relations between Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is an ally of Turkey, and Serbia, which is a Greek protege.

What Does the Formula of Pressure Mean?

The pressure exerted by Washington both during and after the war is characterized by a mixture of political and financial blackmailing; the parties have been threatened with various sorts of embargo and the refusal of financial means, which is the most shocking element in the situation of low social standards characteristic of the independent states that waged a war. The pressure has two aims visible up to now: The first one is the retention of the U.S. dominance in Europe and the struggle for its own interests, and the other is the induction of internal cooperation between political parties, especially within the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which should enable them to make joint decisions independently rather than with support from abroad.

The formula of exerting pressure with which the U.S. establishment engaged itself in the territory of the former Yugoslavia possibly puts at stake Bosnia-Herzegovina's and Croatia's vital interests. How? It can be see from the meetings in Athens and Ankara that the United States is still asking the presidents of all three states for their opinion: "What are your requirements, gentlemen?" The solution is, however, made by the arbitrator, who in this way practically controls the policies of single states. Will Washington one day establish the dictate rather than delegating it, as many political analysts have been warning in Croatia for a long time? Still, much more in Bosnia-Herzegovina than in Croatia, there is a situation in which the ruling policy and the opposition are already asking themselves whether there is something like a future vital interest for both the Republic and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Formally, there are laws, the parliament, and compromises, but there is the impression that the state does not function in any respect.

Therefore the federal partners still have time to make a compromise if they want to avoid foreign domination over their own destiny. If the joint Croatian-Bosniak federal concept does not prove to be ready to reject foreign arbitration, the international community will continue to exert pressure on Croatia through conflicts in the Federation, and in further combinations it will probably play the card of making concessions to Serbia, which would be the worst version for both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia.

B-H: Delayed Delivery of Foreign Reconstruction Aid Viewed

AU2108123596 Hanau NOVA BOSNA in Serbo-Croatian 20 Aug 96 p 5

[Article by M.S.: "EU Reluctant To Loose Purse Strings"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The data issued by the Foreign Ministry with regard to our country's reconstruction show that in the last seven months of this year only 30 percent of the promised economic aid has been delivered. Of the announced aid amounting to $1.957 billion, projects worth $593 million are being implemented. It is becoming increasingly eye-catching that donations are linked to political conditions. In view of the aid delivered, the United States has been the major donor in the past period. The United States has signed contracts for the execution of projects worth $94 million, which is one-third of the announced aid. France, Malaysia, the Republic of Korea, and Hungary are the only countries for the time being that have lived up to their promises in full. Germany has fulfilled 97 percent of its commitments, Great Britain 75 percent, and Japan 27 percent. An extremely low level in the fulfillment of commitments is noticed with the EU. Of the announced $358 million, only 15 percent has been delivered for realization, which can be explained by the fact that Italy, the country that chaired over the EU until recently, has fulfilled only 12 percent of its promises. Ireland, that is currently chairing the EU, has so far delivered several percent more aid to Bosnia than Italy. In segments that are not burdened with political interests, as is the case with the World Bank, projects are developing according to plan. The engagement of the World Bank is insufficient to speed up the process of reconstruction in our country. The agreed structure of financing Bosnia-Herzegovina's reconstruction anticipates that donors provide $3 for every dollar provided by the World Bank for the country's reconstruction. However, nothing has come of that as yet, and, consequently, the reconstruction is lagging.

B-H: Senior SDA, HDZ Officials Hold Talks on Federation

AU2008182696 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 20 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The top representatives of the Party of Democratic Action [SDA] and the Croatian Democratic Union [HDZ] of Bosnia-Herzegovina met in Sarajevo today. Among other things, they discussed the implementation of the Geneva agreement, the extinction of the so-called Herzeg-Bosnia, and the future makeup of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Here is a report by Jasminko Krehic:

[Begin recording] [Krehic] Today's talks by the representatives of the SDA and HDZ, as SDA Vice President Edhem Bicakcic and HDZ President Bozo Rajic subsequently told journalists, yielded numerous results, although the journalists failed to discover anything especially new on which agreements have not been reached earlier. The main thing that Rajic and Bicakcic stressed after today's talks was full support for the Geneva agreements. There are differences regarding the deadlines, but, in the sea of numerous other problems, the representatives of SDA and HDZ do not ascribe too great importance to this. HDZ President Bozo Rajic stressed the importance of the full constitution of the Federation.

[Rajic] The entire project of the Federation [words indistinct] Geneva agreement [words indistinct]. We reached a consensus today to carry out immediately the constitution of all [word indistinct], that is, cantonal governments and all municipal transitional bodies in those parts of the Federation where this has not been realized completely yet. This, naturally, does not mean only the constitution, but the assumption of full responsibility for the life of the peoples on the territories controlled by the cantons and municipalities.

[Krehic] SDA Vice President Edhem Bicakcic again stressed the importance of strengthening the Federation, primarily through the extinction of the administrative arrangement that is Herzeg-Bosnia. This, too, was discussed in Sarajevo today.

[Bicakcic] Herzeg-Bosnia will be extinguished and the federal government will be strengthened; the positions of the government of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the government of the Federation will be fully separated, pursuant to the Dayton decisions, and, on this basis, all political differences that have so far been interpreted variously will, I believe, [word indistinct].

[Krehic] The representatives of the HDZ and SDA also discussed the forthcoming elections today. It was agreed that the SDA and other parties from the Federation's territory should gain access to the Herzeg-Bosnian media. Electoral rallies will also be facilitated on these territories, also by the SDA, among others. The first opportunity to put this agreement to the test will arise on 24 August, when the SDA is supposed to hold an electoral rally in Capljina.

Also discussed today was the cantonal constitution of Sarajevo and the insignia of the Federation. [end recording]

B-H: Presidency Member Discusses Elections With Czech Envoy

AU2008145796 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 20 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Ivo Komsic, member of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, received the ambassador of the Czech Republic to our country, (?Aundre Haven). Komsic pointed out that one of the major problems in the Federation is that decisionmaking on all public questions is [word indistinct] to official representatives of the Federation, so it is necessary that the government of the Federation takes over all the jurisdiction it is entitled to as soon as possible. Speaking about the elections, Komsic pointed out that the nonexistence of freedom of movement, freedom of political action, and media freedom during the election campaign can directly influence the election results. The role of the OSCE in overseeing the elections was particularly emphasized. Ambassador (?Haven) promised extensive assistance on the part of his government.

B-H: Komsic Assesses Talks With Christopher, Election Campaign

AU2008171996 Sarajevo NTV99 Television in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 19 Aug 96

[Interview with Ivo Komsic, chairman of the Croatian Peasants' Party and member of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, by an unidentified NTV99 Television correspondent on the "Oko 22" program in Sarajevo; date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Correspondent] Taking into account the fact that the media have not devoted much attention to the recent visit by U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher and his talks with some opposition parties from the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Serb Republic [RS], we are going to try and find out more from Mr. Ivo Komsic, presidency member and Joint List candidate. How do you see Mr. Christopher's visit? He invited you for talks. Do you see it as a political move made too late or as a mere protocol act?

[Komsic] It certainly was not a protocol act since Mr. Christopher and his delegation were interested in the conditions surrounding the election campaign and the conditions for holding the elections at all levels. We do not have all the conditions for democratic and fair elections if they were to be held now. We told him that we were not satisfied, and we even asked for the annulment of the registration of voters by Form P-2, that is, the registration of voters to vote in their temporary place of residence, in places where they are now occupying somebody else's homes and property, since this would legalize ethnic cleansing.

The second problem we pointed to is that of free media. We told him that we do not have free media to cover us properly during our campaign, and I mentioned our campaign, the campaign of the Joint List, which is not covered by the state media at all. The state media did not even report on our first promotion news conference here, in Sarajevo. We also pointed to the obstruction of our campaign, to all the events that have taken place in the meantime. However, we can see that this has had no effect. Our rallies are still being obstructed. We see now that the Liberals have also had problems. We believe that everyone who tries to present a different view will have problems, everyone who tries to present any program other than a nationalistic one. The fourth problem we stressed is that of the local elections, in which only one party, or a satellite of a party, is running.

B-H: HSS's Komsic Accuses SDA of 'Internal Aggression'

AU2008171296 Sarajevo TVX Television in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 19 Aug 96

[Interview with Ivo Komsic, chairman of the Croatian Peasants' Party and member of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, by Milenko Vockic on the "Slobodna Evropa" program; place and date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Vockic] The serious incidents at promotion rallies are continuing to occur. They occur both on the territory of the Serb Republic and on the parts of the Federation territory controlled by the Croatian Defense Council, but also on the parts of the Federation controlled by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army. The Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities and the Party of Democratic Action [SDA] have been the loudest in promising full freedom for the political activities of the parties in the preelection campaigning period. It is their members that have been taking part in the incidents, however, while the leaders of that party have been mostly minimizing such incidents in official statements.

Mr. Komsic, you were in Gradacac, you witnessed the events in western Mostar on the eve of the local elections in that city about a month ago when great pressure was exerted on the Joint List there. I also remember the problems that the Croatian Peasants' Party [HSS] had in Livno. How do you explain the continuation of this practice now, one month before the elections, and particularly the attitude of the authorities and the ruling parties toward this issue?

[Komsic] We did not expect to have problems during the election campaign since, during the war, when we were defending this country against aggression, the ruling party in the area under the control of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army was full of talk about democracy. Then, at the time, it was not visible, since all the relations here were determined by the war; they were formed under the pressure of aggression, of shells, and snipers. Now that we have started our election campaign, we are facing great problems, and these problems have reached the stage where we have to interrupt our rallies. The only problem is not in the fact that they are sending us their party brutes, who are well organized and instructed to obstruct our rallies, but also in the fact that they are being very shameless about doing so. They have even said that we are doing it ourselves. This reminds me of the statements made by Radovan Karadzic at the time when we were being slaughtered in Sarajevo and Tuzla by his shells, when he said that we were doing it to ourselves.

[Vockic] I would like to ask you to comment on the SDA statement regarding this incidents, the statement that minimizes this incident and accuses you of taking advantage of it in your campaign.

[Komsic] Not only are they minimizing the incident, they are also contradicting themselves since first they give statements to the effect that nothing serious happened, that the men instructed by them did not beat us up, and then they say that we should have prepared a group like that ourselves to oppose their people at our rallies. One of the leading officials of their party said so himself two nights ago on television. After all this, they say that we are doing it to ourselves. You see, we do not wish to form party gangs. We wish to go through this campaign in a democratic atmosphere and create such an atmosphere for the elections. We do not want to fight with their groups, which are so well instructed and trained that they know exactly what to shout and when to interrupt our rallies. We are not going to fight with them because this would lead to violence at these rallies, which is exactly what they want, so that they can accuse us again of being provocative.

Unfortunately, I have to say here that I am astonished. In 1993, when the SDA leaders were saying that a Muslim state should be formed on the territory controlled by the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, I did not believe it. I thought that this was only the view of certain individuals in that party. However, now when I review the entire situation, it becomes clear why the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army was cleansed of the Serbs and Croats after 1992. Do not forget that, at the end of 1992, the army was over 20 percent Croat and about 13 percent Serb. [passage omitted] Are Stjepan Kljuic, myself, Selim Beslagic, Zlatko Lagumdzija, and others, who were active in the legal bodies of authority of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, traitors? Who is calling us traitors? So far, we have been traitors for those who were tearing Bosnia-Herzegovina apart, and now we seem to be traitors for the SDA as well. We have to get this out into the open. We did not bring this up while the war was still raging, since we were defending the country from outside aggression, but now there are attempts to carry out an aggression against Bosnia-Herzegovina from within, with religious and party passions, with religious, party, and nationalistic ideology. We are telling them that they will not succeed. We will know how to defend Bosnia. We knew how to defend it from outside, and we will know how to defend it from internal aggression.

[Vc[illegible]kic] Mr. Komsic, apart from these problems, the Joint List has also had many objections to the media coverage of activities. The last such case was the nonreporting by Radio Television Bosnia-Herzegovina of the presentation of the candidates of the Joint List. You reacted very fiercely then. How do you see the treatment of the Joint List and other parties by the state television and radio?

[Komsic] The state television and radio have been party media for a long time now. It is not, as is often said, a Muslim television. It is a party television, completely under the control of the ruling party. They have not covered a single rally of ours, not even our first news conference, when we presented out logo, our jingles, and our candidates. They have not carried a single sentence about our last five rallies, which were all well attended and took place abroad. So the situation is very clear, and their political goals at the elections are also very clear.

B-H: Joint List Criticizes SDA Campaign Tactic

AU2108070996 Paris AFP in English
2138 GMT 20 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Aug 20 (AFP)—The ruling Muslim Party of Democratic Action (SDA) believes it is showing voters the road into a better future—literally—by painting its logos on the country's war-battered roads.

With just three weeks to go to Bosnia's first post-war general elections few signs of campaigning are visible except for the initials of the SDA painted in huge white letters over the weekend on roads throughout the capital Sarajevo.

But travellers to the southern city of Mostar, 150 kilometres (100 miles) from Sarajevo, will also learn during the trip—if they had any doubts before—who really run the Bosnian government-controlled part of the country.

And if they fail to spot the ubiquitous SDA logo on the road they cannot fail to notice those plastered over roadside walls, or vice-versa.

The SDA firmly controls all state institutions in the third of the country directly controlled by the Sarajevo government.

But the United List of five opposition parties protested here Tuesday [20 August] that the SDA had used tonnes of paint to cover streets and roads with its logo instead of using it to repair shell-scared roads throughout the country, and freshen up faded pedestrian crossings and other road markings.

"With astonishment the United List observes yet another abuse of power by the SDA," the coalition said in a statement faxed to AFP.

"We are all the more astonished that all this was done during the curfew, which seems to be necessary only to the ruling party for its pre-election campaign," the coalition added.

Government-controlled parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina are still under the curfew that lasts from 11:00 p.m. to 5:00 a.m. (2100-0300 GMT). The authorities justify the retention of the dawn to dusk curfew by citing the security situation, but have failed to elaborate.

B-H: Federation Army Exercise Camp Opens Near Tesanj

AU1908155996 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian
1239 GMT 19 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 19 Aug (BETA)—At the former picnic site of Kiseljak near Tesanj, a military exercise camp for training soldiers in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation Army has been opened, the Sarajevo-based ONASA news agency reports.

Opening the camp, General Rasim Delic, commander of the General Staff of the Bosnia-Herzegovina army, told soldiers and people gathering there that the war was behind them, but that fact "must not deceive, or lull them into feeling safe."

"Any army that does not think about war is no army, and therefore we have to be ready at any moment, as a factor of deterrence and struggle for the integration of Bosnia-Herzegovina if it does not succeed in a peaceful way," Gen. Delic emphasized.

B-H: Zubak Briefs OSCE's Cotti on Meeting Election Conditions

LD2008202296 Sarajevo Televizija Bosne i Hercegovine in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 20 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Flavio Cotti, OSCE chairman and Swiss minister of foreign affairs, paid a visit to Sarajevo today. The elections, freedom of movement, and current federal issues were the topics of his talks with Kresimir Zubak, president of the Muslim-Croat federation.

[Correspondent] President Zubak briefed Cotti about his personal assessment of the current situation in the federation in connection with the elections to be held on 14 September, particularly when it comes to freedom of movement and media freedom. After the talks Zubak and Cotti made brief statements:

[Begin recording] [Zubak] I said that the federation would create all the conditions necessary for fair and democratic elections and that this was certain to be done.

[Cotti, in English with superimposed Serbo-Croatian translation] Mr. Zubak said that many things would be clearer after a meeting today between the Party of Democratic Action and the Croatian Democratic Union, and that freedom of movement and full security of the population would definitely be created in the forthcoming period. [passage omitted] [end recording]

B-H: OSCE's Cotti Concerned About 'Lack of Freedom of Movement'

AU2008162096 Paris AFP in English 1554 GMT 20 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Aug 20 (AFP)—With just three weeks to go to Bosnia's first post-war general elections the lack of freedom of movement around the Balkan state remains a major concern, the head of the western organisation supervising the polls said Tuesday.

"I have a most central concern three weeks before the elections, and this concern is the question of the free movement of persons" around Bosnia, Flavio Cotti, chairman of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), said. Guaranteeing freedom of movement between the Muslim-Croat federation and the Serb Republic which make up Bosnia, was "the main condition" for free and fair elections set for September 14, said Cotti. "More progress will have to be made" he said here after a brief meeting with Kresimir Zubak, president of Muslim-Croat federation. "But we hope that that will be the case also else where, specifically in the Serb Republic," he added.

An OSCE official said Monday that the body was considering erecting polling stations on the former frontline because of fears for Muslims crossing into Serb territory. The option, one of two being considered for Muslims and Croats who want to vote in Serb-held territory, was being discussed because of fears that hardline Bosnian Serb nationalists would disrupt attempts by Muslims and Croats to vote, said Jeff Fischer, OSCE director general for the Bosnian elections.

Under the Dayton peace accords for Bosnia refugees can vote in territories where they used to live in 1991, before war broke out in Bosnia.

Cotti, who is also the Swiss Foreign Minister, said during this "probably last visit to Sarajevo before the elections" that he was pleased to hear Zubak's assurances that free movement would be guaranteed in the federation.

Freedom of movement is guaranteed by the Dayton accord but on the ground it has been frequently blocked, particularly by the Bosnian Serbs, who want their entity to become an independent state. "If the authorities want, they will be able to realize freedom of movement even on the day of the elections," said Cotti, "it depends on their will."

Cotti is due to leave Sarajevo Tuesday evening after meeting officials from the OSCE and the NATO-led peace force.

B-H: OSCE Threatens To Cancel Elections

LD2008175296 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1737 GMT 20 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Banja Luka, Aug. 20 (TANJUG)—The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe will cancel the poll, including the election of certain candidates, if it ascertained there had been systematic obstruction of democratic freedoms, an OSCE statement said Tuesday.

Head of the OSCE mission in Bosnia Robert Frowick said he was very worried that government authorities in certain municipalities had failed to secure the conditions for free and fair elections.

The statement said the authorities had been hindering the development of democratic conditions, discouraging freedom of movement, the return of refugees, freedom of speech and the press and free association. These were obligations under Annex 3 of the Dayton peace accord, said the statement.

Frowick said these problems had occurred in Capljina, Bugojno, Drvar, Sanski Most and Stolac in the Muslim-Croat Federation, and Doboj, Lopare, Prijedor, Teslic and Zvornik in Republika Srpska. A continuation of this obstructive policy will incur serious consequences for the responsible organs, he said.

OSCE will have examined the methods employed by government officials in these municipalities by Sept. 14, said Frowick. Unless better conditions were provided for the return of displaced persons and other democratic freedoms secured, the OSCE would take this into consideration during vote controls, said Frowick.

B-H: Frowick Sees 'Considerable Progress' Toward Free Elections

AU2108114396 Vienna Oesterreich Eins Radio Network in German 1000 GMT 21 Aug 96

[Report by Christian Lininger on press conference by OSCE Bosnia Mission Chief Robert Frowick in Vienna on 21 August—recorded; Frowick speaks in English with superimposed translation into German]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Lininiger] Robert Frowick, the head of the OSCE mission in Bosnia, is more optimistic than he was in the past. Much has happened over the past few weeks that could make the election process in Bosnia comparatively fair and free.

[Frowick] There has been considerable progress on both sides, both in the Serb Republic and the Federation, to improve the situation by election day.

[Lininiger] Frowick pointed out that in the Serb-controlled part of Bosnia, Radovan Karadzic has been removed from all his political offices. In Mostar, where elections were held at the end of June, a government has finally been formed following the initial conflicts between the Muslims and Croats. And an agreement has been reached on dissolving the illegal Croatian ministate of Herzeg-Bosna by the end of the month. Frowick regards the view that free and fair elections are impossible despite this progress as somewhat exaggerated.

[Frowick] We have always said that these will be imperfect elections. There are problems both formally and with regard to the contents. But the picture must be taken on both sides, the negative and the positive, so that a balanced judgment can be made.

[Lininiger] The criticism of the election process has not only come from independent human rights organizations, but also from the United Nations, and from among members of Frowick's organization, the OSCE. They say that opposition candidates are being obstructed and threatened, most of the media are still controlled by the three governing nationalist parties, which does not give the population a chance to inform themselves about the opposition. Freedom of movement is still so limited that it is not clear whether all the voters will be able to get to the polling stations. And there have also been irregularities in drawing up the lists of voters. These are the biggest problems. Also, Karadzic, who has been charged by the The Hague War Crimes Tribunal, is still at large; and even if he no longer officially holds any political office, he still pulls the strings in the background. Frowick also considers it unlikely that Karadzic could be arrested before the elections.

[Frowick] It does not seem as if the NATO Council is planning to authorize the IFOR troops to arrest Karadzic. There may be discussions going on, I do not know. But I would not expect the solution of the problem to come from there.

[Lininiger] That are a great number of problems, which will probably result in the three nationalist parties of the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims winning the elections. That means that the distribution of power in Bosnia will largely remain unaltered. Frowick also admits that. But he thinks that the opposition stands some chance in the Serb-controlled areas, despite the predominance of Karadzic's former party. He does not think much of the proposal by several independent groups of observers to postpone the elections.

[Frowick] If we were to decide to postpone the elections, what would happen? We cannot expect the full strength of the IFOR troops to remain in Bosnia. The troops' strength is to be reduced from September onward. That means that the basis of stability will become weaker, and the OSCE at the same time. That is why the preconditions for elections would be even more problematic at a later date.

B-H: SPP Wants 'Tougher Action' Over Election Violation

AU2008111596 Sarajevo ONASA in English 19 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zenica, central Bosnia, August 19 (ONASA) — The election subcommission must take tougher action regarding incidents which might occur during pre-election rallies, the Bosnian opposition Party of Economic Prosperity (SPP) said in an appeal to the OSCE mission.

"The municipalities where incidents take place should be punished by removing complete candidate list for the municipal council and by removing the local police chief," the SPP said.

The party said it believes that this is the only way to prevent conflicts in the pre-election meetings and to ensure fair and democratic elections.

"Otherwise, the Provisional Election Commission (PEC) may announce that the ruling parties have won the elections," the appeal said.

B-H: Liberals' Kadic Denies Being Izetbegovic's 'Successor'

AU2008164596 Sarajevo Radio Slobodni Izbori Network in Serbo-Croatian 1030 GMT 20 Aug 96

[Interview with Rasim Kadic, chairman of the Liberal Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina, by Borka Rudic in Sarajevo on the "Portret stanke" program; date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Rudic] What can the Liberal Party [LS] achieve in the current political conditions in Bosnia-Herzegovina? Let me add that these conditions are not significantly different than those of 1990.

[Kadic] What we can say is that there is a problem with the conditions for the elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina. We are in favor of holding the elections, but there are many complications here, too. The war criminals have not been arrested, and that for us is the key to the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina. We are perfectly aware of the fact t[illegible] they are not arrested, Bosnia-Herzegovina wil[illegible]wn the path toward dissolution after these electi[illegible] which will make the process legal. We will also have to face the horrible truth when, for example, in the Serb Republic the chetniks are replaced by the democrats, who will not think any differently, and who will only then democratically move the motion for a referendum and the right of the Serb people to self-determination and secession. If the war criminals are not arrested, and if the United States do not take on the decisive role in the preservation of the integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina, we could again have Badinter hanging over our heads.

The Liberals, at the moment, as the latest opinion polls show, have between 3 to 7 percent of the vote at the state level, and we will be very satisfied if we reach a figure anywhere between these two. At some local levels that percentage will probably be higher, and we can realistically expect that in some municipalities we could take second place. As for the overall political results, although this may seem slightly paradoxical and unrealistic, for us the conditions for the elections are as important as their results. For us two elements are important—the conditions and stability of Bosnia-Herzegovina. If we have that, then the percentages that the party gets are important, of course, but not if we end up having a Bosnia that is completely unstable.

[Rudic] What is characteristic for the Bosnia-Herzegovina Liberals is their closeness to the ruling party. For some that closeness was too much, and they even said that you were the natural successor to Alija Izetbegovic, while others saw you as pure liberals and the only true opposition in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly.

[Kadic] That is a serious accusation. Zhelyu Zhelev is the president of Bulgaria and a liberal at the same time. That does not matter. Rasim Kadic can run for president and be a liberal. The LS published its political manifesto six months before the Party of Democratic Action [SDA] was formed. The fact is that we are a party that had, or has, built throughout this war a more sensitive attitude toward ethnicity as a political issue in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In addition, because we could no longer tolerate poor judgment and the conservative way of thinking characteristic of the ex-communists in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and have separated ourselves from the left and moved to a political center—all this has given rise to assertions by some leftist parties that because we are not with them, we must be with the SDA. Unfortunately, this is a consequences of a communist way of thinking; they cannot understand that someone can be in between. They can only understand the either-them-or-us. [passage omitted]

Bosnia-Herzegovina has for 800 years had the either-us-or-them option. Over the last four years this has produced a lot of bloodshed. Bosnia definitely deserves to get something in between. The Liberals are a party that is between two conflicting political blocks, between hard-line nationalists that constantly want to divide Bosnia in the name of their people, regardless of the price, and nostalgic ex-communists who do not realize that tectonic changes have occurred here, and are trying to bring back the values of the communist past as new values for the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina. We do not support either of the blocs. We are a middle-of-the-road party, a party that believes that it is possible to build something in Bosnia that will take into account the past in the sense of the possibility of coexistence, but also take into account the newly created realities of the ethnic revival of the citizens, and accept this and make a harmonious community that has not existed here before.

[Rudic] What should Bosnia-Herzegovina look like in order to avoid the constant polarization between the civic and the nationalistic? How can one reconcile that?

[Kadic] In Banja Luka there is the Social Liberal Party of the Serb Republic, which was a part of the LS of

Bosnia-Herzegovina before the war. This is the only party that is not committed to an independent state of the Serb Republic. It is softer than all the other nationalists over there. In Sarajevo, that is, on the Federation territory, there is the LS, which is one of the few parties that is ready to accept also the ugly things signed in Dayton as a new historic challenge, in the belief that the attempts to solve things through war has not brought a solution, and that at the moment it is better to accept a kind of negotiated reality—with the arrest of war criminals, of course, to prove that things cannot be solved through war—and then to create a kind of functioning future for Bosnia-Herzegovina out of this reality. Regardless of how noble it may seem—this attempt, sometimes aggressive, of new integration in Bosnia-Herzegovina—we are afraid that this aggressive Bosnian-Sarajevo integralism might be the additional element for those who do not want a unified Bosnia to partition it even further. So we can achieve a counter-result from the noblest of motives. We are for a civic state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and we once wrote that as a proposal for the constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

At the moment, however, I am for a civic state only if it can be achieved through peaceful means. This is the truth, which you will not get from anyone else. We are not for a civic state of Bosnia-Herzegovina that will be imposed by someone on someone else as an obligatory model. The fact is that it cannot function like that at the moment. This can be our ideal, and it certainly is, but as realistic people, if we have to pay for the gain of a civic state with hundreds of lives then we are against it. At the moment I am not for a civic state of Bosnia-Herzegovina as I believe that it is unrealistic and could cause a catastrophe for me, my child, and all of us. [passage omitted]

B-H: Mostar Mayor, Deputy Discuss Future Cooperation

AU2008150496 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 20 Aug 96

[Report by Mirsad Behram from Mostar—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Behram] The first working meeting between the two leading men of Mostar lasted about an hour behind closed doors in the EU mission headquarters in Mostar. After the meeting Mayor Prskalo addressed journalists. Explaining that this was an informative meeting with Deputy Mayor Orucevic, Prskalo said:

[Prskalo] We were informed of what has roughly happened so far. We conveyed our wishes and views. This was actually a voluntary meeting at which we discussed further work, [words indistinct] we will meet, how often we will meet—namely, twice a week on Tuesday and Thursday, and we will probably hold joint news conference and report in a timely fashion on everything that is happening in the town.

[Behram] Answering a journalist's question, Mostar Mayor Ivan Prskalo said he also discussed the formation of the municipal government with his deputy Orucevic. Asked whether Mostar was also discussed in the course of the Brijuni meeting between Croatian President Tudjman and Croatian officials from the Federation, which he also attended, the Mostar mayor replied:

[Prskalo] Naturally, Mostar was also mentioned in connection with the overall situation in the federation, it was not omitted; however, nothing special [word indistinct].

B-H: Croatia To Charge B-H Officer With War Crimes

AU2008154196 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 20 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Representatives of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Embassy and Consulate in Zagreb are visiting Zadar today, where they will visit detained Bosnia-Herzegovina Army member Mirsad Catic, on the basis of permission granted from the Croatian Foreign Ministry. Croatia media, however, citing official sources, are already announcing that an indictment bill will soon be filed against Catic. B-H PRESS correspondent Nada al-Issa reports from Zagreb:

[Begin recording] Representatives of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Embassy and Consulate will talk with the detained Catic and representatives of the Zadar county court, we have been told in our embassy in Zagreb, as the journalists were unable to accompany the delegation on the way to Zadar. It is not possible to obtain any sort of official statement from the Croatian Foreign and Interior Ministries.

The Croatian state paper VJESNIK, which is always well-informed, claims today that Croatian jurisdiction will soon issue an indictment bill against the detained Catic on the basis of Article 120 of the Croatian Penal Code, pursuant to which he is charged with war crimes against civilians. The paper even publishes the contents of the criminal charges, which it claims it obtained in the Zadar county court, and which state that Catic reportedly committed war crimes in Zadar 1991, when as First Class Captain of the Yugoslav Peoples Party he personally opened machine gun fire on the town, ordered soldiers to attack the town with mortars and similar arms, and allegedly also threatened soldiers with death if they failed to obey his orders. The Zadar county court has allegedly already gathered witnesses to support this.

The publication of the contents of the indictment bill in VJESNIK came as a surprise to the Bosnia-Herzegovina Embassy in Zagreb, because nobody officially informed the embassy about the contents of this indictment bill yet. It is truly strange and unprecedented in international diplomatic relations, and perhaps also very indicative, that the state authorities first deliver such a document to a daily newspaper rather than to the embassy of the country whose citizen is involved. [end recording]

B-H: Society Launches War Crimes Indictment Against Milosevic

LD2008201996 Sarajevo Televizija Bosne i Hercegovine in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 20 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Professor Zvonimir Separovic [president of the World Victimological Society and a professor at Zagreb University] has informed President Izetbegovic about the launching of an indictment against [Serbian President] Slobodan Milosevic. This has been presented to Judge Antonio Cassese. The basic points of the indictment were announced to journalists in Sarajevo today.

On behalf of millions of victims of Serbian aggression against Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Institute for Criminal Research and the Victimological Society of Croatia have launched the Popularis [as heard] action, a national indictment against Slobodan Milosevic for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and the crime of genocide, especially against Bosniaks [Bosnian Muslims].

According to victimologists Zvonimir Separovic, Smail Cekic, John Dusic, and Muharem Kresa, there is irrefutable evidence that on coming to power Milosevic began preparations for war and violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia and in the process organized or supported the murder of over 300,000 and the wounding of over 1 million people, the mass rape of over 100,000 people, the exile of over 4 million people, and the destruction of over 2,000 religious buildings and cultural monuments.

The indictment, it was said, against the person most to blame for the crimes in our country and Croatia, Slobodan Milosevic, has been presented to the international tribunal in the Hague. Most of the evidence was also presented. It is based on documents belonging to people in Slobodan Milosevic's entourage. Milosevic's main operational role in Serbian aggression is discernible from these documents.

Documents on the dispatch of the Serbian Army and police to Bosnia-Herzegovina, something which was decided on in Belgrade, as well as many other pieces of evidence also exist.

The candidacy of people in the upcoming elections who have committed crimes, Separovic said, is an unprecedented legal and political crime, aided and abetted by the international community.

Great responsibility for the acts of the genocide committed was ascribed by Dr. Smail Cekic to Momcilo Krajisnik [chairman of the Bosnian Serb Assembly]. Cekic provided documents on his active participation in ordering and carrying out crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

B-H: Pale's Ostojic Demands Border Changes

AU2108092296 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian Serb) in Serbo-Croatian 15 Aug 96 p 3

[Interview with Velibor Ostojic, "deputy prime minister" of the Serb entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina, by Zeljka Domazet; place and date not given: "Bad Logistics of Dayton"]

[FBIS Translated Text] By signing the Dayton peace agreement the Serb side has been drastically damaged, because it had to give back territories where Serbs had lived for hundreds of years. After this, territories were lost because of mistakes that were made in drawing the maps, actually, in drawing the borders on maps of two different scales.

These and other problems that ensued as the result of the division between the two entities were the topic of our interview with Velibor Ostojic, deputy prime minister of the Serb Republic, who was the most directly involved in the negotiations on the division between the Serb Republic and the Federation.

[Domazet] Mr. Ostojic, when discussing interethnic division, what has Dayton given to the Serb Republic and what has it taken away?

[Ostojic] At Dayton a dividing line was determined between the Serb Republic and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The division was marked on a 1:600,000 scale map and, according to that division, the Serb Republic received 49 percent of the territory of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina. Later it was determined that the so-called outline map had to be brought down to an operational map scale of 1:50,000. During that scaling down process, the Serb Republic lost half a percent of territory, which means around 170 square kilometers along the entire border from the Una River to Popovo polje. Territory was also drastically lost in Herzegovina, in the Gorazde corridor and in the Sava River valley. That was, and still is, an issue of contention. In an endeavor to retrieve what had literally been [words indistinct] Clark, on 14 December last year, before the formal signing of the agreement in Paris, requesting that the mistakes be corrected and indicating the places where the mistakes had been made.

Mistakes were also made on the right bank of the Sana River, Lake Pliva, territory east of Samac, the Sava River, around Gradacac, along the entire length of the border from Mojmilo to the Famos factory [in Sarajevo], the territory near Trnovo, Mt. Jahorina, and the area from the mouth of the Jezernica River into the Neretva River all the way to Popovo polje.

We emphasized that all these mistakes had to be corrected, that the Serb Republic had to be compensated in a huge percentage for not having territory that would give it access to the sea in the zone of Prevlaka, and for the arbitration in the zone of Brcko.

[Domazet] How many of these Serb Republic requests have been accepted?

[Ostojic] So far the requests of the Serb Republic have not been fulfilled. The Serb Republic will engage bar associations and teams of attorneys, both local and international, including U.S. attorneys, to sue the U.S. Department of Defense and other officials responsible for the damage to the Serb Republic. At the very beginning of this lawsuit, we met with Gen. Clark in Paris and drew his attention to all the places where we had been damaged, reminding him of the document that had been submitted to him before Paris, telling him once more that our claims had to be accepted and that the maps had to be corrected. In Paris Gen. Clark gave his word as a gentleman that the maps would be corrected and with that proviso it was agreed that the agreement could be signed. However, everyone changed their views, including Gen. Clark. At the same time, we began long and exhaustive talks on correcting the borders in keeping with the Annex of the two Dayton agreements, where it says that borders can be changed only with the mutual consent of both sides involved, in which case there are commissions that determine the proposals and forward them to the governments, and then the governments give their approval in writing. Then the mutually approved transaction goes to the IFOR for ratification and only after the IFOR commander has ratified it can border corrections be effected. Since January we have had 30 meetings in three phases. The first phase was the D+91, which lasted until 21 March of this year. The second phase was D+120, which was concluded on 19 April, the date of the implementation of the military package, because Annex 2 and the correction of borders were an integral part of Annex 1, that is, the military package. The third phase will last for the duration of the mandate of IFOR on this territory. The negotiations are open and will be continued. So far, we have exchanged 106 square kilometers of territory. The Serb Republic got 58.5 square kilometers of territory that, according to the 1991 census, had been populated by about 3,000 Serbs who lived in around 800 residential units. The Federation got 48.5 square kilometers with about 6,000 inhabitants living in 1200 residential units. This disproportion in residential infrastructure and number of inhabitants is the result of a different way of life, because the Serbs mostly lived in scattered mountain settlements, while the Muslims lived in very densely populated villages on a relatively small area. This correction does not include the earlier mentioned mistakes in drawing the ethnic borders. It is an entirely different activity and is not connected to the main problem of defining the borders.

[Domazet] Is there a possibility that no agreement on the interethnic borders is reached by the end of the IFOR mandate?

[Ostojic] Such a possibility is very unlikely when we are talking about corrections of borders that have been clearly defined by the Dayton agreement. The borders will be corrected if both sides express interest and reach an agreement. If there is no agreement, then the borders will remain, as defined by Dayton. However, the issue of mistakes in the maps, where the Serb Republic has been damaged, still remains open. In that sense, we still have unresolved borders in the settlements of Dobrinja One and Four [Sarajevo suburbs]. From Mojmilo to the Famos factory we have been damaged by the entire width of the Famos factory complex and the boundary that was determined according to the factual situation has now moved from the northern gate to the southern, which affects the entire length of the border to Mojmilo. In correcting the border, we have managed to define the border from Famos to the settlement of Ikici and the chances are that we will correct the border from Dobrinja Four, that is, from the highway northward toward Dobrinja Four to Mojmilo, so that the settlement of Trapare falls completely within the Serb Republic, while on the slopes of Mojmilo the border would be corrected in favor of the Federation. However, from the intersection of the highway beside the airport, and the intersection of the road that turns into Dobrinja One, is the avenue along which the settlements of Dobrinja One and Four are separated from Dobrinja Three. We will not accept any other solution.

[Domazet] How many interethnic borders have been approved, and what are the current percentages of interethnic division?

[Ostojic] After this phase of work in correcting the borders, the commission has determined only the area of the territory with the infrastructure and population that has been returned to the Serb Republic. This corrected territory and these exchanged borders are not part of the percentage that we were supposed to get according to Dayton. So far, in this exchange of territory, the commission has increased the territory by 10 square kilometers in favor of the Serb Republic, but that is negligible, so the fact remains that the area of the Serb Republic is 48.52 percent of the territory of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina and we are still 0.48 percent short of territory that belongs to us. Soon the talks will continue between us and the Federation commission and we expect, in conjunction with the Croatian part of the commission, to correct the boundary in the Sava River valley, which is in our mutual interest. This primarily concerns the villages of Mala Brusnica, Potocani, Srnava, the south of Vukosavlje, that is, Odzak, east of [Bosanski] Samac, around Ostra Luka, in Savulje, on Grebnice, and Vucilovac. This will be a very good correction of the borders between the Serb Republic and the Federation in areas where the Serb and Croatian ethnic space comes together. After that, we will talk with the Croatian representatives about correcting the border in Popovo polje and in that respect we already have conformed our views, which we are now analyzing and showing to the local authorities where the agreement will be implemented. The minimum correction is the border on the Trebisnica River. This would only minimally suit the Serb Republic, because in this area we had requested that the Serb villages of Cavas, Drvenica, Cvaljina, Zacala, and the Zavala monastery be returned to the Serb Republic and in return we have offered a large area of Scepan krst, northwest of Stolac. We will also make another attempt to correct the border on Lake Pliva, while some other negotiations on border corrections have ended without results.

We have talked with the Muslim [Bosnia-Herzegovina Government] representatives about adjusting the border north of Sarajevo, in the municipality of Stari Grad, as well as in some smaller areas near Trnovo. The issue on correcting the border on Mt. Ozren and in the Bosna River valley still remains open, but I am not at all certain that we will agree on that. Parallel with this, there is an ongoing operation of marking and describing the border between the Serb Republic and the Federation, which is being done by IFOR. This will be done with the most modern equipment and up-to-date methods. A large part of the border has been marked in this way and by the end of the year we expect the entire border between the Serb Republic and the Federation to be marked.

[Domazet] Brcko is in the center of public attention. Talking about interethnic borders, what is Brcko and to whom does it belong?

[Ostojic] This was agreed in Dayton, and incorporated into the general agreement, Annex Two, supplement on the Arbitration for Brcko in five articles of that arbitration. In that supplement it is categorically written that the subject of arbitration is a part of the interethnic border in the zone of Brcko. It is precisely stated that there is no arbitration until the sides agree on what exactly is the subject of arbitration and, if the two sides cannot agree, there will be no arbitration and, if there is no arbitration, the present situation will remain. From this we can draw the following conclusion: The town of Brcko is not a subject for arbitration. The subject of arbitration is a part of the interethnic border, in other words, not even the entire border in the zone of Brcko, but only a part of that border. On the basis of a statement given by Carl Bildt and on the basis of collected data, there is no map where the drawn border is controversial. The crucial conclusion that stems from the Dayton agreement is that the town of Brcko is not a subject for arbitration.

[Domazet] We are always being charged of misinterpreting the Dayton agreement. Why?

[Ostojic] Because even though we neither accepted nor signed the Dayton agreement, we have now undertaken to implement it very precisely and consistently, while the other side loosely interprets the Dayton agreement and, even though it applauded the agreement, it now wants additionally to profit from it by claiming that the Serb side is refusing the Dayton agreement or is not interpreting it properly. As far as the town of Brcko and the arbitration are concerned, we must say the following: Even though the basic principle of territorial division has been violated, and looking at this from a purely formal and legal point of view, the border cannot be moved further into Serb Republic territory without its consent, because that would mean the violation of the territorial division of 51:49 percent as stipulated by the Dayton agreement.

B-H: Serb Foreign Minister, Assembly Chairman Visit Brcko

LD2008172496 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1625 GMT 20 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Brcko, 20 Aug (SRNA)—Momcilo Krajisnik, chairman of the Assembly of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic, and Aleksa Buha, foreign minister of the Serb Republic, said during today's visit to Brcko: "This town is a metaphor for the Serb Republic and the key to the statehood of Serbs in the Bosnia of Dayton."

"According to the letter of Dayton, international law and all post-Dayton contacts and events, Brcko as a town is not being brought into question, because the arbitration commission will be dealing with the dispute over part of the interentity boundary line in the vicinity of Brcko," Krajisnik said.

Stressing the importance of the rapid and precise explanation of attempts to deceive people over the status of the town, the assembly chairman announced the direct involvement of the United States and all the creators of the Dayton agreement in the problem "so that the subject and purpose of arbitration might finally be determined."

Minister Buha in this context announced an imminent meeting with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic so that he, as a direct participant in the Dayton agreement, might tell the truth to the Serb people loud and clear.

According to him, "the map of Brcko created by Dayton has not yet been discovered and work is under way on the whole 1:50,000 scale map of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina."

Announcing his return to Brcko and participation in a rally by the [ruling] Serb Democratic Party (SDS), Krajisnik, as candidate for member of the joint presidency, said that Dayton's Bosnia-Herzegovina would in future be "a thin roof over the Serb Republic and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation."

"The most important task today is to see that people turn out to vote in the elections. Whoever represents the Serb Republic in the joint authorities will be a mere conveyor of the policies and will of the assembly, which represents the people," he believes.

At the end of their talks with Brcko municipal leaders, the chairman of the people's assembly and the foreign minister chatted to families of killed soldiers who do not yet have conditional accommodation in this town.

B-H: Serb Negotiator Says Status of Brcko Beyond Dispute

LD2008170296 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1650 GMT 20 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Brcko, 20 Aug (SRNA)—A consistent implementation of the Dayton agreement does not cast doubt on the status of Brcko in the [Bosnian] Serb Republic, Vladimir Lukic, a member of the arbitration commission [for Brcko] and head of the [Bosnian Serb] expert group, said in Brcko today.

"We have enough arguments that are so strong that the status of Brcko cannot be disputed, but if the world's power wielders respect force and not arguments, then everything can be brought into question," Lukic said.

As one of the experts who took part in the drawing up of the Dayton maps, Lukic reiterated the stance that "Brcko guarantees the integrity of the Serb Republic, the territorial link between the country's eastern and western parts and it is an indivisible part in the construction of infrastructure facilities important for the whole state."

B-H: Serb Official Meets EU Observer Mission Head

LD2008141496 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1230 GMT 20 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 20 Aug (SRNA)—Biljana Plavsic, vice president of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic and acting president, and [Antoin] MacUnfraidh, Irish ambassador and chairman of the EU observer mission, agreed in Banja Luka today that the September elections are an indispensable step toward stabilization and the establishment of permanent peace in the areas of the Serb Republic and the Muslim-Croat federation.

"I told Mr. MacUnfraidh that, after the elections, our side will not put any obstacles on the path to establishing institutions at the level of the union, whose main aim is economic cooperation and a higher standard of living for the people," Biljana Plavsic said after an hour of talks with the chairman of the EU observer mission.

According to her, Mr. MacUnfraidth was informed that it is expected that in their work the representatives of the EU observer mission will not discriminate against the Serb people and that they will objectively approach problems which are in the sphere of their activities and interests.

After the meeting with Biljana Plavsic, MacUnfraidth said that there is exceptional interest in holding the elections among the senior Serb Republic officials. According to him, the elections are a necessary step toward overall prosperity of the Serb Republic and the Croat-Muslim federation.

B-H: Serb Republic Government Protests Destruction of Arsenal

LD2008143996 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1240 GMT 20 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] In a letter to IFOR commander General Joseph Lopez and land forces commander General Michael Walker, the Serb Republic government notes that IFOR's decision "to ignore and show intolerance toward representatives of the Army of the Serb Republic is in contrast with the successfully completed phase in separating the warring sides and is not conducive to the efforts to return soldiers to barracks, to demobilization, or the new period of peace."

"It is our duty, respected gentlemen, to warn you that our people, who until recently were the mainstay of our army, have been taken by surprise and are displeased with the latest decision by the peace forces to side with the people who were our enemies not long ago," the Serb Republic government says.

The letter adds that the Serb people "are too well aware" that some countries contributing to IFOR "are arming and training the joint Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation force openly and that IFOR is persistently demonstrating force on our destroyed roads, is frightening our children by pointing its tank guns at them and is preventing everyday life and the economy from starting to function normally in the Serb Republic."

"You have recently been undertaking many serious actions and issuing leaflets telling people not to be afraid of detonations from 'some several hundred tonnes of explosives.' As if the fact that the walls of their homes and churches are cracked and that their beautiful homeland is encircled with extra quantities of gunpowder does not count," the letter says and adds:

"Dear sirs, believe that our people have never given in to force and that we have almost no arguments left to persuade them that what has been happening is not just another page in their century-long struggle.

"You must understand that we have many problems in persuading our people that your soldiers are not the same soldiers who destroyed their homes and bridges, their factories and television transmitters."

The letter appeals to commanders Lopez and Walker to help diffuse the situation so that the anger felt by the Serb people does not manifest itself through mass gatherings, which can happen, as reliable reports indicate. The [Bosnian Serb] government then says: "The people are ready to lie in front of the wheels of the IFOR war machinery in order to have peace ahead of the elections, at which they will prove that they are for democracy and not force."

"Only if you do not secure the minimum conditions and only if your senseless actions prevent this, will they then again use even farming tools in order to defend their children and country. We want to see you as friends, and we are asking you, the gentlemen of IFOR, to help us in this," the letter of the Serb Republic government to generals Lopez and Walker concludes.

B-H: SNS Claims IFOR Actions Violate Dayton Agreement

AU2008172996 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1237 GMT 20 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 20 Aug (BETA)—The Congregational People's Party [SNS] said today that the way the arms depot of the Army of the Serb Republic [RS] in Margetici was taken was a "demonstration of force and an attempt to frighten the Serbs."

"For the umpteenth time, IFOR has behaved like an occupation force in the RS. There was no reason to confiscate the Serb arms as the depot had been properly registered," says an SNS statement, which concludes that the whole operation was in contravention of the Dayton agreement. [passage omitted]

B-H: IFOR Suspends Destroying Munitions From Serb Army Dump

LD2108101996 Belgrade TANJUG in English 0958 GMT 21 Aug 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Banja Luka, Aug. 20 (TANJUG)—Spokesman for the multi-national division in the IFOR [Implementation Force] Sector Southwest Paul Brook said Tuesday the first batch of planned 90 tonnes of munitions from a Republika Srpska (R.S.) army dump in the village of Margetici was destroyed on Monday and that the destroying schedule for Tuesday afternoon was suspended for investigation purposes.

Explosions were heard five kilometers away, Brook told a press conference in Banja Luka, the largest town in the R.S.

The general staff of the R.S. army sent letters Monday to NATO and IFOR commands, seeking a suspension of destroying 500 tonnes of munitions from a dump in the village of Margetici, in eastern Republika Srpska, and said this operation represented a dangerous provocation and could cause environmental disaster.

The site had been declared to IFOR on March 19, which had never asked for its dislocation.

Brook denied a R.S. TV broadcast on Monday evening that IFOR intended to hide toxic materials in craters which will remain after the explosions.

B-H: Pale Source Expects IFOR To Arrest Karadzic, Mladic

AU2108132196 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 20 Aug 96 p 3

[Article by V. Djordjevic: "Arresting Karadzic and Mladic—IFOR's Next Step"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade—"Everything that happened in Sokolac yesterday, particularly the way in which it was done, was not a result of our agreement with IFOR," a representative of the Pale authorities who wished to remain anonymous has told NASA BORBA. According to him, "the events at Han Pijesak belong to the past, but what is happening now is really going beyond the permitted limits." Unlike Han Pijesak, a "significant" quantity of armaments was confiscated in Margetici (300 metric tons of ammunition), which has considerably weakened the VRS's [army of the Serb Republic] military power.

The VRS should use that same ammunition to defend the Serb nation if the nation is attacked. I do not think that anybody will attack the nation, particularly as it is known what may happen to the aggressor, but our leadership may be attacked. When I say that, I mean Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic. The opinion prevails within our government that everything done in Margetici was with that aim. I am afraid that, after weakening us completely, their next step will be to "tighten the noose" around the two men, our interlocutor said. In his opinion, the question is only if the arrest will be before or after the September elections.

That the situation among the Serb Republic leadership is "alarming" is proven by the fact that Serb Republic acting president Dr. Biljana Plavsic convened an urgent meeting with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic. The meeting was held, as NASA BORBA has learned, behind closed doors (and not in the Serbian Presidency building) "owing to the new situation." The course of the talks also remained "behind closed doors."

However, according to our interlocutor, "Biljana was very displeased after a telephone conversation with Milosevic on Sunday afternoon [18 August]!" Perhaps in this "displeasure" one should seek an explanation for the acting Serb Republic president's "mild" reaction to the Margetici events.

Had she called this assault an attack against our people, everybody would have taken to arms and anything could have happened. She acted wisely and diplomatically to the maximum, particularly as it is known that we no longer enjoy Milosevic's support. However, exactly because we do not enjoy it, I am afraid that the next step is the arrest of Karadzic and Mladic, our interlocutor said at the end.

B-H: Gen Lisica Criticizes Serb Republic, SDS Leadership

AU2008173196 Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI in Serbo-Croatian 18 Aug 96 p 7

[Interview with General Slavko Lisica, candidate for president of the Serb Republic, by Boro Maric; place and date not given: "Long War—Long Thievery"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "If the children of all the politicians, generals, and other distinguished leaders of the Serb Republic had been in the trenches, the war in the former Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina would have been short, and would have ended with victory by the Serb armed forces," Slavko Lisica, retired general of the Serb Republic and candidate of the Serb Patriotic Party for president of the Serb Republic, told NOVOSTI.

"Thus unburdened by worry for their children, the members of the state leadership, the supreme military command, and the party leadership of the Serb Democratic Party [SDS] chose to wage a long war that suited only them and their war-profiteering clique. With time, war profiteering was raised to the level of state policy," Lisica added. If this were not so, the Bihac region would not have been converted into a Mecca of economic prostitution, and the surrounded 5th Corps of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina would not have endured for four years.

Making a Nation of Criminals

[Maric] Is the blade of your criticism so sharp because you were forced to retire during the war?

[Lisica] On the contrary. What they did by forcing many officers, teachers, engineers, into retirement confirms that the authorities in the Serb Republic are shortsighted and incapable. In all normal countries in a state of war, all human resources are mobilized. Retired teachers and workers go into schools and factories so that their younger colleagues can defend their country with rifle in hand. In times of war, an officer can be degraded, replaced, imprisoned, and possibly even shot. He can be retired only if he is mentally unsound. In the Serb Republic, this did not happen. Commanding officers were forced into retirement because they were proclaimed morally and politically unreliable.

[Maric] Why did they retire you?

[Lisica] I said that if we waged a long war, we would pay a high price at the end. They said I was a defeatist and retired me. They were all in favor of a protracted war, because it allowed them to rob their own destitute people for a long time. The government and the supreme command allowed a situation in which everyone felt that they could abuse and mismanage the state and the abandoned property. An environment was created in which everyone was a thief to a certain extent. How, then, can you criticize the main thief when you also stole a television set? Such a policy leads to creating a nation of criminals.

Half for You, Half for the Army

[Maric] What was the relationship of the state toward the army?

[Lisica] The state "entrusted" the financing of the army to donors, in other words, war profiteers. They took half for themselves, and gave half to the army. One of them told me that he would donate 400 pairs of boots. I told him to bring just one pair, but on his own feet. After that he was gone, and so were the boots. A state must be even stronger in war than in peace. Unfortunately, to a great extent, the Serb Republic was not a state, but a training center for profiteering. Had we used so much cement to make bunkers instead of gasoline stations, the borders of the Serb Republic would have been far more favorable than they are now.

[Maric] What was the Serb Republic supposed to be like?

[Lisica] There can be no stable and lawful state without democracy. The SDS has created a single-party state, and that means a treacherous state. In principle, a single-party state serves only a small group of people who proclaim their own interests as national interests. That is why it was possible in the Serb Republic for a military commander whose brigade had to defend Kupres, but instead let it fall to the enemy, to be promoted, and the mayor of the fallen town to be employed in the government. In other words, the fall of Kupres suited the interests of a small group of people, but the people paid for it dearly. The Serb Patriotic Party, whose members are mainly veterans, is in favor of a state of the majority.

[Maric] Why do you keep repeating that what the Serb people in the Serb Republic need most is a revival of morals?

[Lisica] While I was in command of various army units in the former JNA [Yugoslav People's Army], the Serb Army of the Krajina, and the Serb Republic Army, I became convinced that our people respect neither religious laws nor government laws; and that they have no faith in their brother, their friend, their neighbor. If we want to survive we must return to our tradition in which human relations were sacred, just as someone else's property, be it private or state, was sacred.

The Experience of Voyvoda Misic

[Maric] Can the Serb Republic survive if the whole world is against it, as the present leadership claims?

[Lisica] This leadership is intimidating the people with, among other things, Germany, and then they go driving around in "Mercedes" limousines. This leadership has not made a single friend in the world, and it has managed to turn away those few that were friendly toward us.

It is easier to rule over people who have been intimidated and told that the whole world is against them. Then you can proceed to create a state like Albania was in the period under Enver Hoxha. The Serb Patriotic Party has the will and is capable of finding friends in the world... We want the Serb Republic to have good relations with Germany, the United States, Great Britain, and of course, Yugoslavia, without which we would not even exist.

[Maric] The government and the ruling party in the Serb Republic are claiming that they are the ones that created this state and that they alone can preserve it. To what extent are these claims realistic?

[Lisica] Voyvoda Zivojin Misic [Serb military leader] used to say that poor policy leads to defeat in war. The SDS had conducted a poor policy, and that is why, toward the end, we even drew NATO into the war. The people, fighting for their survival, they created this state. If wisely led, only the people can preserve the Serb Republic, whose existence the present government and the SDS have brought to the edge.

The people of the Serb Republic get up every morning feeling miserable, and that means that the state in which they live is also miserable. The war stopped eight months ago, and during that time the government did not even attempt to resolve a single vital issue, such as supplying electric power, employment, repairing damaged homes, sowing crops, etc. The government is only capable of destroying what little we have left.

[Box, p 7]

Under a Losing Banner

[Maric] Why do you claim that the Supreme Command of the Serb Republic Army was not capable of conducting the war?

[Lisica] You do not go to a war with the assertion that your aim is not to vanquish your opponent, which is a thesis that Dr. Radovan Karadzic, the commander in chief of the Serb Republic Army, kept repeating over and over again. Number two, small nations do not have the potential to fight a protracted war. They can only fight a fast, lightning war, such as Israel fought. Also, you do not go to war under the banner of an army such as the chetniks were in World War II, an army that lost its war. Because if losers are your model, you yourself can only be a loser.

B-H: Friends' Critical Comments on Karadzic's Character

96BA0424A Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian
1 Aug 96 p 4

[Article by Zoran Milanovic: "Radovan Karadzic—A Racist Made of Soft Clay"]

[FBIS Translated Text] When exactly six years ago a tall and somewhat hunched man with a squarish face and thick wavy gray hair came into the office of a Sarajevo weekly and asked them to publish the news that the Serbian Democratic Party [SDS] had been formed in Bosnia-Herzegovina, who would have thought that they were dealing with the future "biggest war criminal since the Nazis," as THE NEW YORK TIMES called him. Especially because on that occasion he spoke the following words in the style of a great peacemaker: "We have established a Serbian ethnic party because we were forced to do so by the SDA [Democratic Action Party] and HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union]. Had we not done so, then the Serbian extremists would have taken matters into their own hands, and that would not have been good for peace in the country."

Montenegrin Femur

Not long after the visit, the peaceful visitor made the move from peaceful words to specific deeds. He immediately dealt with the extremist wing of his party, Young Bosnia, which was led by the writer Vladimir Srebrov, who later was imprisoned by the Pale regime. He also called upon the other parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina to deal with hawks in their own ranks, because "extremism," as he said in one interview at the time, meant nothing good for anyone. He was the only party leader at that time who did not have personal bodyguards, because, he said, "I would not even want to live in a country, much less be an active politician, where my private police had to protect me from my people, neighbors, and acquaintances." Probably no one at that time, not even his closest friends, could have imagined that this "peaceful" visitor could degenerate into the greatest murderer in the Balkans—Radovan Karadzic.

"But he was not the one who began to sing the melody of criminal Serbian chauvinism, but rather it was the Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic," says Marko Vesovic, prestigious Sarajevo writer who comes from Montenegro and is the person most familiar with Karadzic's character and deeds. In his opinion, Karadzic was rather a Montenegrin nationalist than a Serbian fanatic. "He continually assured me that we Montenegrins belong to the royal line. He had a theory that the Montenegrins have the longest femur in the world and that that was a sign of superiority. I would tell him that he was talking nonsense," Vesovic says. Jevrem Brkovic, one of the best-known Montenegrin writers, also says that Radovan Karadzic was at one time a fanatic Montenegrin nationalist, even a Montenegrin racist. "At some points, he became so flushed in the face with his Montenegrin ideas that I had to step in and assure him that his racial theory about the Montenegrins as a chosen people was invalid and that such analogies are very vulnerable and, of course, also untenable," Brkovic said.

Although in this terrible war in Bosnia-Herzegovina Dr. Radovan Karadzic probably did not kill anyone by his own hand, unless it happened by chance when he was showing the Russian poet Limonov how to shoot unprotected people from a hilltop, Brkovic believes that he is the kind of criminal that is born perhaps once in a century. His neighbors, closest friends from childhood and youth, and also former fellow writers are asking themselves how such a man could have imposed himself as a leader on the Bosnian Serbs, a man who essentially is not a Serb, who is a Montenegrin mythomaniac with a heavy burden of fictitious Montenegrin Serbism in the form of super-Serbism? "It has been that way down through the centuries, ever since Karadjordje and Milos Obrenovic. At that time, we gave them leaders, but also criminals since that Punisa Racic who killed Stjepan Radic and Basaricek in the parliament," says Ante Radovic, pensioner in Niksic and a friend of Karadzic's since childhood.

"When he came to the Writers Society in Sarajevo in the seventies, he was no one and nothing. They laughed at him and his poems. He dressed like a parrot. All kinds of loud colors which did not go together: red, yellow," says the poet Vladimir Srebrov, who spent two years in Karadzic's prison. Probably for revenge, because they laughed at him at the poetry readings and marginalized him as a Montenegrin, even in his poems from that period Karadzic reveals his passion for murders, and in one line "he hurries to throw the morning bomb on the isolated man." His poem "Sarajevo," which dates from 1971, prophetically portrays the capital of Bosnia-Herzegovina "burning like a pile of incense," and all his scorn for a city which did not admire him was expressed in a delirious death rattle of murderous lines: "Vuk, Vuksan, your name is beautiful/come down into the cities and we will kill the scum!?" Nineteen years later, Karadzic began with the highest-caliber shells from Pale to realize the lines of his poem by systematically destroying over a period of four years the city which did not admire his poems. They say in the West that Radovan Karadzic set out to destroy Sarajevo for revenge because at parties they marginalized him as a Montenegrin, while his wife Ljiljana says that the poem "Sarajevo" is not an expression of intention, but only "Radovan's passing dejection."

The Shame of His Father Vuksan

Few people recognized in his poems at that time the powerful desire of the son Radovan to console his unhappy father Vuksan, who carried on his back a terrible crime—the savage rape of a relative whom he murdered and threw in a pit when he learned that she was pregnant. Karadzic's father was sentenced to 12 years in prison for that cruel murder, but in 1941 he was saved by the war, and Vuksan joined the chetniks. But even in the chetniks he did not succeed in becoming anything more than an ordinary chicken peddler, and on one occasion the chetnik leader Nikola Bojovic said in front of everyone: "You, Vuksan Karadzic, cannot join the regular chetnik units for moral reasons, but stick around to fetch things and peddle chickens in the rear!" His father's destiny so affected Radovan Karadzic that he began to wet his pants from the terrible shock. It was with that burden on his shoulders that the son of the Durmitor [mountain in Montenegro] monster Vuksan Karadzic arrived to attend the university in Sarajevo, perhaps even himself not suspecting that soon he would with his crimes surpass not only his father, but also the greatest murderers of the 20th century. Karadzic was in Sarajevo during the student unrest in 1968, when the UDBA [State Security Administration] of that time picked him out of the crowd of other "faceless" university students and took him in for an interview. According to the Sarajevo poet Abdulah Sidran, UDBA detained Karadzic, who was not a participant in the demonstrations, but a mere observer, only because he had the "face of a leader." They were afraid that with his "face" he would carry with him the angry student body. Mindful of all these "virtues" of Karadzic, Vesovic and Srebrov hypothesize that Milosevic managed to make use of Karadzic to break up Bosnia, because he held him in the palm of his hand, perhaps precisely because of his UDBA past. "He is made of soft clay, he can be shaped by anyone who wants to do it," Vesovic says. But it seems that now that shaping has finally been completed. From Montenegrin racist to horrible Serbian expansionist and murderer in Pale, Radovan Karadzic is today a firmly shaped war criminal.

Croatia: Normalization Will Boost Reintegration

AU2008143296 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1005 GMT 20 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Zagreb, 20 August (BETA)—Mate Granic, Croatian deputy prime minister and foreign minister, said that the signing of the agreement on normalization of relations and mutual diplomatic recondition with the FRY would be the biggest boost to the peaceful reintegration of eastern Slavonia.

At the meeting with the representatives of the Association of Expellees of Croatia, he said that "nobody any longer questions Croatia's territorial integrity," as well as that it is important for the international community that the reintegration occur peacefully.

At the meeting with the representatives of the expellees, Croatian Deputy Prime Minister Ivica Kostovic said that the issue of normalization of relations with the FRY was of key importance for the process of peaceful reintegration.

Croatia: Stanimirovic: Croat Media Try To Create 'Fear'

AU2108070096 Beli Manastir Radio-Televizija Republike Srpske Krajine Television in Serbo-Croatian 1852 GMT 14 Aug 96

[FBIS Summary] Beli Manastir Television carries a 25-minute special program hosting Dr. Vojislav Stanimirovic, "prime minister of the Serb Province of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem," in which he views Vladimir Fulgosi's "Skitam se i Snimam" program shown on Croatian Television Channel 1 on 12 August. There is no video reception; audio reception is fair to poor.

The program starts with music being played. It seems that an excerpt from the Channel 1 program is being shown. The host in the studio then states that the Beli Manastir TV crew visited the Stanimirovic house in Tovarnik, since "one of the main subjects in the program shown the night before last was Dr. Stanimirovic," and asks Stanimirovic "the first of the crucial questions that arose after we saw excerpts from the program that was shown on Channel 1 of the Croatian state television," which regards the "syntagm 'occupied territory,' from which premise some people who are insufficiently informed may conclude that the United Nations is the occupier here, since it represents the executive authority."

Stanimirovic says: "We know that our territory has been demilitarized, which means that it cannot be occupied. The UNTAES [UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia] forces are on our territory, as are the transitional police forces, which means that the people here are not bearing arms, and the area cannot be called an occupied area." He adds that "the Croatian media often use this term" and that "it is probably deliberate," but that he thinks "the blade is pointed towards the UNTAES."

The host then asks the second question, that concerning "I, quote, 'the irresistible need the Serbs have for psychiatrists.' Raskovic, Karadzic, and Stanimirovic—is this a coincidence?"

Stanimirovic says "history will show the greatness of Dr. Raskovic, the psychiatrist, who was a (?visionary) of the situation that was going to happen on the territory of Yugoslavia, including Croatia; history will also show what Mr. Karadzic did in Bosnia. I am one of the coincidences that occurred here; I am one of the few intellectuals who stayed on this territory and took up something [words indistinct] interests of the Serb people. I think it is a coincidence, and that psychiatrists should not be viewed in the context of a Serb necessity. They probably stated this in connection with Dr. Raskovic's statement in a book, in which he said that the Serbs are a mad people—this was meant figuratively."

In an indistinct passage, the host then asks him about his property, and Stanimirovic confirms that he has as much as he did before the war, and what was shown in the Croatian TV program was "aimed to cause mistrust, insecurity, and fear among the Serb people in the province, since people usually think that if the president of the Executive Council (?sells) his house and thinks about leaving, what should an ordinary person do?" He adds that "Croatia is not serious about consistently implementing the Erdut Agreement, since it is using lies and trying to disqualify the person who is currently prime minister."

The host then says that "the program showed, as is unfortunately the case in Banija, Kordun, Lika, western Slavonia, and northern Dalmatia, the striking example of Croatian hatred towards the Serbs," after which an excerpt is shown, in which a person can be heard saying "One must continue to live, but no longer with them." He then asks Stanimirovic to comment on "the extent to which the national monolithism that Croatia seems to advocate prevents Croatia from becoming a truly democratic country in accordance with Western principles," adding that "in this program, the hatred was not directed only towards the Serbs, but towards the multiethnic province that it is now, which includes other peoples who live with the Serbs in the province now." There follows an indistinct excerpt from the program, in which one could only discern a person saying "It would be best for them to pick up their things and leave, and everyone knows what will happen if they do not," and another person saying "God forbid that we should have to get used to them."

The host then says that "part of the program was aimed directly against the UNTAES mission, the main declared goal of which is to preserve the multiethnic and multicultural character of the province as the only one in Croatia—for the time being, at least." Stanimirovic says that "the desire for national monolithism is certainly not good; nowhere in the world was it possible for a state to be a one-nation state, and the same will probably be the case in Croatia; [words indistinct] the consequences of this desire on the part of the international community, and I hope that our territory, our province, must remain multiethnic and multinational—this is supported by the Erdut Agreement and by the UN Security Council resolutions—this is in fact the (?task) of the UNTAES."

The host then raises the subject of displaced persons, saying that "it was evident from the program that Croatia—and, unfortunately, the displaced population too—believes that Serbs are displaced as well as the Croats, but that the Serbs are a little less displaced," and that "there are about 60,000 displaced persons from Kordun, Lika, Dalmatia, and western Slavonia in the province." He then asks what is going to happen to these people. Stanimirovic answers that "they do indeed live in the province; they have been living in and repairing apartments and houses that do not belong to them. People are aware of the fact that the right to ownership and private property is inaliable, and they do not claim them as their own. However, they also ask the justified question about their property in western Slavonia and in the western parts of the Krajina." He adds that "in accordance with the Erdut Agreement, we support the return of our refugees to their homes, or else demand compensation for their private property," and that "if this principle is not observed, it will not be realistic to believe that a significant migration will occur to this part of the province." This is why "we believe that the UNTAES and the UNHCR will have to bear this in mind; it is also necessary to bear in mind that there are between 500,000 and 600,000 refugees from Croatia, as well as that reprocity in return is crucial. People will have the right to receive—and will demand—compensation if they do not want to live in what is at present the Republic of Croatia, that is, within the borders of the Republic of Croatia. It is possible to demand the safety of (?joint) return, and no one can deny them that."

Another excerpt is then shown from the Channel 1 program, in which a person is heard saying that "If their houses are damaged and they want to be in Croatia, there are refugee villages." The host then asks Stanimirovic to give a more specific statement on his view of the resolution to the problem of the displaced persons. Stanimirovic says that "the problem is very complex," as the displaced persons from western Slavonia and "the western parts of the Krajina" are "living in our province, while people who are displaced persons from our province or are Bosnian Croats live in their houses. There are also cases of our territories being populated with Vojvodina or Kosovo Croats," and "the solution that your colleague [Fulgosi] had in mind, which is refugee villages, is not possible; it is one-sided, tendentious, and unfair, both to the international community and the signed agreements."

There is a further excerpt from the Channel 1 program; a person can be heard asking another whether, since telephone communications have been reestablished, they would phone someone. They respond by saying they will "call Serb Radio Mirkovci and ask them to play 'Ferryman, Take Me Across,' which is their old song about [passage indistinct]." The host tells Stanimirovic: "The author of the program said this is also your favorite song. How musical are psychiatrists?" Stanimirovic says "This is unfair; it is taken out of context. Namely, Mr. Klein, Mr. Hadzic, and I were once guests of Radio Beli Manastir. I said there was a problem and that we have to bridge this river, because we cannot (?swim across it), as the Croatian side would not allow that since it would be slow and also that we will not bridge it with the help of a speedboat but rather with a row-boat—meaning we must find the (?middle) speed in implementing the Erdut Agreement." He adds that the author of the program misused the abovementioned song and "influenced the people in a way aimed to encourage them to move out of this territory and across the Danube River."

The host says, as an introduction to the next Channel 1 excerpt, that "the author intended the illustrations to give particular weight to the program." This is followed by an indistinct excerpt, in which the only discernible sound is that of a person saying that "someone has to be blamed." Stanimirovic says that "there is a great deal of sarcasm in this program, particularly in connection with the missing and killed." He adds that he thinks the problem has to be discussed and that the problem is that "in this program there were caricatures shown regarding Mr. Butrus-Ghali; a tree asks him whether he knows where the missing and killed persons are. I think this is unfair, and I do not know what it is for," and so "UNTAES will have to take this into account."

To round up the interview, the host asks Stanimirovic to state his view, "from the point of view of a psychiatrist, of the ultimate goal of this program." Stanimirovic says that the goals were "to disqualify an individual, to influence the masses through an individual, to create fear and panic, and to arouse the feeling that one needs to leave the territory—across the Danube, as the song they mentioned says." He adds: "We are very surprised that Channel 1 of Croatian TV should broadcast such programs if the Croatian Government intends to fully implement the Erdut-Dayton accord [as heard]. We believe that this program will have to be scrutinized by the Croatian Government and judged by the public." He also says he thinks "that the people who watch Croatian TV will be able to recognize the propaganda aimed towards getting people to move out.

Our suggestion remains the same—all the people should stay; this is the only way out. Selective moving out—30, 40, or 50 percent, as some have decided would be optimal for this region—is not good, and we must know that, if this happens, there will be no room for the remaining 30 or 40 percent who [word indistinct] they could stay here either. Our goals are for the maximum possible number of people to stay and fight for human rights within the Erdut Agreement. It is with our numbers, as well as through international organizations and [word indistinct] organizations, that we will secure our rights. We believe that people will realize such programs should not be seen as a reason to panic; they are something that happens every day, both in the press and on TV. The Croatian Government and their media should think about this."

Croatia: Dom Association Protests Seizure of Serb Apartments

AU1708173696 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1040 GMT 17 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Zagreb, 17 August (BETA)—Slavko Kuljanac, president of the "Dom" [Home] Association, today informed the Croatian public about the unlawful seizure of primarily Serbian apartments in Kutina and Popovaca.

He said that more than 150 apartments have been seized unlawfully in the territory of these municipalities over the past four years and that the majority of the people evicted from these homes were ethnic Serbs.

The municipal commissions seized these apartments with the justification that they were abandoned, but "the true reason was that they were inhabited by Serbs who were systematically expelled," Kuljanac stressed.

Emphasizing that the state authorities' bodies, to which numerous complaints were addressed in connection with these cases, failed to undertake any measures to protect legality and fundamental human rights, Kuljanac announced that the "Dom" Association would seek the legal revision of these cases.

Kuljanac added that if the state turns a deaf ear to all this, the association will turn to the European Human Rights Court in Strasbourg.

Croatia: Background on Croatian Social Liberal Party

96BA0408A Split NEDJELJNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 7 Jun 96 p 10

[Article by Vuk Djuricic: "From Goldstein to Gotovac"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *"The HSLS [Croatian Social-Liberal Party] is faced with a great responsibility, and we have to justify it by fighting for a democratic, modern, and prosperous Croatia, together with all those who want that kind of state. Others also believe, and I do too, that we will succeed in that," the current president, Vlado Gotovac, assesses the party's goals.*

Last week, at a formal meeting of its Grand Council, the HSLS celebrated its seventh anniversary. It was an occasion for many people to recall the events since a little over seven years ago, more precisely since the HSLS founding assembly, which was held on 20 May 1989. That was the first founding assembly of any party in Croatia, and some say even in the former Yugoslavia, after almost half a century of communist rule! Who had the idea of founding the party, and when? "Sometime around the middle of 1989, in talking with Slavko Goldstein, I said to him that we could oppose the indications of Milosevic's aggression. He told me that he and Vlado Gotovac had been in Ljubljana and had spoken with Dimitrij Rupel about that danger, and that after returning to Zagreb, they had decided to gather some people and work on founding the party. That was what happened, and I immediately joined that small group of people who were prepared the materials for the founding of the Croatian Social-Democratic Party. We used to meet in Goldstein's apartment, and since we wanted to expand the number of people, we decided to hold the first public meeting of the steering committee for founding the party at the University Instructors' Club. Since I was working at the university then, I reserved the hall for that meeting," as Bozo Kovacevic, an Assembly deputy and until recently the HSLS chief secretary, recalled those initial days.

Long List of Liberals

Among the present Liberals, Slavko Goldstein, Bozo Kovacevic, Dr. Franjo Zenko, and Vlado Gotovac, along with the present chief editor of GLOBUS, Davor Butkovic, participated in those first meetings. It is interesting that those preparations to found the party were attended, along with those who later founded the HSLS, by some people who are today prominent members of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community], such as Vladimir Seks, Academician Dalibor Brozovic, Neven Jurica, and several others, and some meetings were even attended by the well-known Christian Democrat, the late Prof. Ivan Cesar. There was soon a change in the name of the proposed party, i.e., the idea of trying to found the HSLS crystallized, and the one deserving the most credit for that name is Prof. Zvonko Lerotic, who at one time was also the Liberals' chief ideologue, but left the party and switched to the HDZ, and at one time was President Tudjman's adviser. Another member of the HSLS was Croatian UN Ambassador Mario Nobilo, and our representative to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Dr. Darko Bekic, was elected as a member of the HSLS Executive committee at the founding assembly. The first president of the council or party was Slavko Goldstein, and the vice presidents were Vlado Gotovac and Dr. Franjo Zenko. Prof. Zvonko Lerotic was elected chairman of the Executive Committee, and Bozo Kovacevic vice chairman. Other members of the top leadership of the HSLS at that time, among others, were reporters Maja Freundlich and Milan Ivkosic!

After the HSLS broke the ice, other parties also began to be formed, but all of them only received approval to register at the beginning of 1990, because of delays by the regime at that time. During those six or seven months of semilegality, the HSLS worked at full steam, and the biggest and most successful campaign was organized in September 1989, when signatures were collected in what was then Republic Square for the return of the monument to Ban Jelacic. The originator of that idea was Goran Jukic, and about 80,000 signatures were collected in just one day! That was the HSLS's first big public promotion, and the first political gathering of that size by Zagreb residents since 1971!

During 1990, the most important events were the first multiparty elections. The HSLS, as one of the parties in the Coalition for National Agreement, suffered a complete failure. As we know, the HDZ won. The communists, i.e., today's SDP [Party of Democratic Changes], were in second place in terms of the number of votes received, and the Coalition was only in third place. The HSLS only received three seats in the Assembly, and many people considered that a big failure, but there were also estimates that the HSLS could have done much better if it had gone into the elections alone. In the fall of 1990, there was a replacement, that is, Drazen Budisa was elected as the party's president at the second HSLS Congress. A new structure for the party was also approved at the congress, and the bodies were renamed as the Small and Grand Councils.

Rises and Falls

The fact the HSLS was on a serious rise and was the biggest threat to the ruling HDZ was confirmed by the zupanija [county] elections in 1993, in which the Liberals received 28.19 percent of the votes, which brought them 16 seats in the Chamber of Zupanijas. They won in many cities, but the best-known Liberal mayor is the head of Osijek for many years, Assembly deputy, and vice president of the HSLS, Dr. Zlatko Kramaric. The Split mayor, Nikola Grabic, was also a Liberal, but switched to the HDZ last year. In addition to Split, the Liberals lost power in one way or another in Varazdin, Trogir, Omis, and Rijeka as well, but in addition to Osijek, they also have mayors in Crikvenica, Nasice, Kutina, Koprivnica, Zabok, and Ivanic Grad. They were also left without their only governor. Specifically, the governor of the Coastal-Mountain Zupanija, Dr. Josip Roje, crossed over to the HDZ. Last year the number of their deputies in the Assembly's Chamber of Zupanijas was also reduced when Damir Zoric and Dr. Mate Mestrovic went over to the HDZ. Along with some old disagreements and conflicts within the party leadership itself, there was also more and more talk about a division between "populists" and "elitists," which was a serious threat to the party at one time. Many people said that party president Drazen Budisa was the one most to blame for that kind of situation in the party, because he was allegedly too indecisive and conciliatory. After the party was abandoned by some of the "populists," the situation was nevertheless "patched up" somehow, and the HSLS focused on the elections for the Chamber of Deputies, which were held in the fall of 1995. In many people's opinion, the Liberals suffered a great failure in those elections because they only won 11.55 percent of the votes, i.e., 12 seats.

As for the elections in Zagreb, the HSLS did somewhat better there, winning 20 percent of the votes, which brought it 10 seats in the City Assembly, and 10 percent of the votes, or three seats, in the Zagreb Zupanija. What will be remembered in the history of the HSLS as a unique case will certainly be the fact that within a few months four mayors of Zagreb came from their ranks, Dr. Goran Granic, Jozo Rados, Ivo Skrabalo, M.A., and Drazen Budisa. They were all elected by the City Assembly, but President Tudjman refused to confirm all of them. The situation within the HSLS did not stabilize after the elections either, and on the contrary, the failure in the elections intensified new disagreements, and even public mutual accusations and denunciations. Many people think that the situation in the party could only have been resolved through an electoral congress. When Drazen Budisa was elected vice president of the Assembly from the ranks of the opposition, many people were convinced that he would not be a candidate for HSLS president again. That was the case, and Vlado Gotovac was elected president at the party congress in March 1996, along with Dr. Zlatko Kramaric, Dr. Goran Granic, Jozo Rados, and Ivo Skrabalo as vice presidents. Karlo Gorinsek was elected chief secretary. The members of the Grand Council elected Drazen Budisa as the president of that body. According to the new leadership, there are no more conflicts, and the HSLS will fundamentally change its activity, turn over a new leaf, and try to recover its shaken reputation and the lost confidence of the citizens. How successful it will be in doing so will best be shown by the elections, perhaps as early as this September?

Two More Goals

What do the party's former and current presidents, Slavko Goldstein, Drazen Budisa, and Vlado Gotovac, say about the HSLS's seven years and about its future tasks?

"I would like to see a replacement in the state leadership take place in as smooth, human, and friendly a manner as the replacement among the three of us. As far as the HSLS is concerned, it was founded with three goals: Croatia, liberal democracy, and social justice. Croatia has been achieved, but the other two goals are left, and I hope that the HSLS will be the leader in achieving those goals," Slavko Goldstein stated briefly and clearly. Drazen Budisa, started by emphasizing in particular that he would like to have a photograph published as soon as possible in the newspapers in which three presidents of the HDZ appeared together! Regarding the future activity of the HSLS, he said: "We have been active in a concentrated period of Croatian history. There has been virtually no period in Croatian history in which so many major things have happened as in these last seven years. I am convinced that the members of our party fulfilled their patriotic and democratic duties during that period, and that we have been an essential political factor in the process of creating the Croatian state and a pluralist Croatian society."

"The HSLS is faced with a great responsibility, and we have to justify it by fighting for a democratic, modern, and prosperous Croatia, naturally together with all those who want that kind of Croatia. I can calmly say that others believe, we also believe, and in that common belief, I hope that we will succeed!" concluded the HSLS's current president, Vlado Gotovac.

FYROM: Government Reviews Law on Local Elections

AU2008170796 Skopje MIC in English 20 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Yesterday, the government reviewed the Law on local elections and it is expected, after the notes made at yesterday's debate are added, to send the law to parliamentary procedure. The law entirely regulates the election of committees which will be elected according to the proportional system and the election of mayors who will be elected according to the majority system.

The law prescribes that the first elections for bodies of the local self-government and the bodies of the city of Skopje be scheduled by the chairman of the Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] Assembly, and that the regular elections be scheduled by the mayors of the municipalities and the city of Skopje.

The government also reviewed the Law on territorial division of the state and the delineation of the regions of the units of local self-government.

FYROM: Possible Coalitions for Local Elections

AU2008161196 Skopje MIC in English 20 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Petar Gosev, Stojan Andov, and Ljupco Georgievski have met a couple of times in the last three months, DNEVNIK writes. The Skopje daily adds that all three leaders say the possibilities of forming some kind of coalition in the wake of the local elections is still only at the level of examining the field before the final passing of the Law on local self-government and the insight into whether the remarks of the opposition, as promised, will be built into the law.

To the Liberal Party (LP), without a Law on local self-government, there is not point to discussing some kind of coalition, except a coalition whose aim will be to adopt a legal project of higher quality.

"There are some limitations in terms of the discussions for cooperation with other parties for the local elections," the Liberals say. "First, it is still not known when the elections will be held. The rules for the local elections have to be a result of the acceptance of the decrees of all the political subjects who will be running at the elections, and not the vote of the parliamentary majority. A second limitation are the decrees of the proposed law, according to which, provided they are adopted (the enactments for mayor and the proportional election of members of local assemblies) then there will be no need for forming coalitions. The other limiting factors are the lack of electoral rolls and the on-going activities for forming coalitions in the western part of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], of SDSM [Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia], with PDP [Party for Democratic Propserity], and with VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity]," the vice-president of LP said.

The last remark of the vice-president of LP deals with how the SDSM will act in coalition with the Socialist Party and PDP. The Socialist Party (SP) expects the local elections to be held in the first half of November. This, among the rest, was stated by a high party official for the Macedonian Radio. According to SP, an appropriate law on the pre-election campaign is currently in preparatory procedure, i.e. an act that will regulate where and to what extent the representation of the parties will go in public. In addition, the SP is becoming more and more critical of the authorities, DNEVNIK writes, adding that the president of SP, Ljubisav Ivanov, "does not chose his words in criticizing the moves of the current authorities" at various party gatherings across the towns in the country.

As regards the coalition between PDP and SDSM, the newspaper says that judging by their to-date cooperation, their coalition always comes after the elections.

The newspaper says it was told by the SDSM that a coalition was possible with everyone except the Liberals.

In relation to eventual coalitions for the local elections, the newspaper NOVA MAKEDONIJA quotes the leader of the Democratic Party (DP) Petar Gosev, according to whom his party has still not agreed anything specific with any other party in terms of forming coalitions, however, he stressed that "there is a positive climate in the party for something like." He also told that newspaper that initial talks had been held with MAAK-CP [Party for all-Macedonian Action-Conservative Party] and VMRO-DPMNE, where all the sides agreed that "cooperation will be necessary," but that it was still to early to think about the ways in which it will be realized.

"What interests us the most now is not with whom we will go to the local elections, but what kind of a law on local elections will be passed," Gosev says.

The same leader told the daily VECER that "the idea of making a joint appearance at the local elections is maturing and there is pressure from all sides to make a joint appearance against the current authorities." Gosev also says that if at the parliamentary elections in 1994 the atmosphere pro and con a joint appearance was

50:50, today, the percentage of those who are in favour of a coalition is much higher.

The leader of MAAK-CP Straso Angeloski, who stated that a coalition under the name Fatherland Union will be founded, told VECER that "if this Fatherland Union is not founded, which should take place around September 8, we will appear at the local elections together with the VMRO-DPMNE." He adds that the agreement on joint participation will be signed in a couple of days, and that, in his opinion, they would nominate joint candidates for mayors and members of the Councils in all municipalities. VECER writes that, according to VMRO-DPMNE sources, the idea about a coalition with MAAK-CP has been described as "interesting."

FYROM: VMRO-DPMNE Head on Party Conflicts

AU2008171796 Skopje VECER in Macedonian 17-18 Aug 96 pp 6-7

[Interview with VMRO-DPMNE leader Ljubco Georgievski by Sonja Kramarska; place and date not given: "Many Open Doors Ahead of Us"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The leader of the VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity] is probably one of the most controversial politicians in the period following Macedonia's [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] independence. From the outset, Ljubco Georgievski was labeled young and inexperienced, a recently graduated writer who decided to form a party in 1990 out of pure caprice. But slowly he grew into a serious politician who is becoming increasingly pragmatic. The "I Am Waiting for You to Come" [lyrics of a Bulgarian song that appeared in DELO in which the young members of his party accuse the leadership of close links with Bulgaria] affair was the impetus behind this interview with the leader of VMRO-DPMNE, which our publishing house had been planning for some time.

Short Stop

[Kramarska] We are awaiting local elections. What is the opinion of VMRO-DPMNE about these elections, and does it view them as a chance to return to the political scene?

[Georgievski] VMRO-DPMNE is focusing on the parliamentary, not the local elections, so all our party preparations are for the new parliamentary elections. Nevertheless, if local elections are placed "on the agenda," VMRO-DPMNE will not miss the chance, provided that a law on these elections is adopted. Nevertheless, I will point out that the local elections are just a short stop on our party's road to the republican elections. That does not mean we are not going to fight for as many places in the municipalities as possible. Local elections express the views of the people before the parliamentary elections.

[Kramarska] What alternatives does VMRO-DPMNE offer the citizens who will decide the outcome of this fall's local elections.

[Georgievski] VMRO-DPMNE's alternative is contained in everything we have been saying in the six years since the party was formed. As for the possibility of implementing this alternative, it will depend on the Macedonian citizen and who he chooses in the elections. I cannot give a short answer to your question about VMRO-DPMNE's alternatives. This is something you talk about at preelection rallies, multiparty dialogues, meetings, or showdowns with political opponents.

[Kramarska] There are some different opinions in your party that, because of the present law on local elections, the opposition has to think it over before entering the election race. Considering the nearly two years of experience since the boycott of the 1994 elections, would Ljubco Georgievski support such a decision again?

[Georgievski] Our experience with the boycott in 1994 was very bad. As a party, we lost a lot of ground in achieving our goals because we were not part of the establishment. On the other hand, a principle is a principle, and if the elections were fraudulent at that time, it was normal for us to retreat. Now we really want to participate in the local elections. Nevertheless, there is another principle: The proposed law on local elections is not viable to us. We forwarded our remarks and, as we could see, they coincided with the remarks of the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs.

[Kramarska] Mr. Georgievski, have all ideological differences in VMRO-DPMNE been overcome?

[Georgievski] There have not been any particular ideological differences within the VMRO-DPMNE so far! All previous conflicts in the party occurred because of personal struggles for power, for position, for changing the situation with the aim of making personnel shuffles.

[Kramarksa] Can you give a concrete answer to the question of whether you ever felt during your leadership that there was a plot against you and, if there was such a thing, what your reactions were?

[Georgievski] Well, you see, there are always some conflicts in the party, and the first position to come into the "line of fire" is the presidential function. But this has not always been the case. There were some struggles for lower positions in the party that always ended in division. I always had to decide for one side or the other. But in such a turmoil, the president must remain above the situation....

[Kramarska] ...And rely on his associates? Mr. Georgievski, do you trust your associates?

[Georgievski] I do not see any reason why I should not. Everyone changes with the passage of time, and that goes for associates as well. Every one of them can change in a certain situation. I do not see any reason why we should not trust each other, being together and being party associates. There are many situations when some people join a party with a certain political background but end up with a completely different one. I do not want to comment on the reasons and the motives for this, but it is a fact that people are changing.

Unnecessary Enemies

[Kramarska] What is your comment on "I Am Waiting for You to Come," which is believed to have been supported by the younger generation in VMRO-DPMNE and which sparked a lot of reaction in the party, confusing the public about internal events within VMRO-DPMNE?

[Georgievski] I can tell you that for all the commentaries published in the Macedonian media over the past few days, this was certainly the biggest unnecessary affair involving VMRO-DPMNE since its 10th Congress. Everything we have done since the last congress was with the intention of promoting ourselves into a "new" political party. I believe we managed in this. Most of all, we used the mistakes of the present Government, we have a lot of open doors ahead of us, and we are ready for the local and parliamentary elections. So, amid all the political activities of this period, this was the only turmoil that could damage VMRO-DPMNE to a certain extent. The authors are hoping to strengthen some positions and weaken others within the party itself. However, it is necessary to add that the media are doing their best to encourage the affair for as long as possible in the absence of any other mistakes in VMRO-DPMNE policy from the Congress until today.

[Kramarska] However, you yourself said that this has been the biggest affair since the last congress. Do you know who triggered this affair? It was published by the mass media only after the disputed text was published in the paper of the young members of VMRO-DPMNE.

[Georgievski] It is certain that the affair was created with internal and external help, because a worthless text was given more play than was necessary. I am sure that if the mass media paid as much attention to the country's financial affairs, we would be in a much better financial situation today. Anyway, I do not believe a political party depends on a text, and it was unnecessarily transformed into a problem.

[Kramarska] Nevertheless, the public is interested in whether the VMRO-DPMNE leadership has taken a political view of the theories expressed in the text.

[Georgievski] We as a leadership have not discussed the text. My evaluation is that this text is creating a lot of unnecessary enemies for VMRO-DPMNE. At this moment, somebody is trying to present it as an official view of VMRO-DPMNE. I do not think so, and I am not familiar with the author of the text. He is apparently not a member of our party. He is a free person, and in a way I could call this an assassination attempt against a person.

[Kramarska] Well, under such circumstances, do you feel as if you are not in control of the party you head?

[Georgievski] Well, VMRO-DPMNE is always being accused of something. When we are in control of the party, they say we are strictly controlling it and that there is no democracy within the party. At other times when such things occur, they say we are not controlling it. In the end, we do not know who to defend ourselves from. In any case, I will point out something that is of great importance: As president of the party, I do not control texts that are published either in the party paper GLAS or in ZAVET of the Union of the young forces. So, the people who are publishing the papers have full freedom.

[Kramarska] Nevertheless, you said damage has been done to the party....

[Georgievski] You see, the moment itself can be taken as an act of democracy.

Which Positions

[Kramarska] We have witnessed an unpleasant situation: For the entire six years, Bulgaria has been claiming that you are a pro-Bulgarian party....

[Georgievski] I do not know why we always have to go back to this question and why journalists always have to ask it. They probably believe it is a good provocation. I can say that those in authority currently did not decide until 1993 whether they wanted an independent Macedonia. Now the government wants a customs union with the FRY, and nobody is asking them whether they are pro-Serbian or not. As far as the question on Bulgaria is concerned, our answer is very straight and decisive: VMRO-DPMNE is for an autonomous, independent Macedonia. The matter on which we have a totally different opinion from the present government is this: We believe that among Macedonia's four neighbors, Bulgaria is the most correct state, although there are many weaknesses in its policy toward Macedonia. In spite of all this, the Macedonian government has always led the most restrained policy toward Bulgaria, despite all the problems it had with the other sides.

[Kramarska] Let us go back to policy: Some believe that VMRO-DPMNE and DP [Democratic Party] weakened their positions after the Liberal Party came on the scene as an opposition party.

[Georgievski] The question of whether we have become weaker or stronger needs to be analyzed. On the one hand, we are weakened because there is an increasing number of parties in opposition. However, I believe we are stronger in that the ruling structure now has to fight three parties instead of one. One of them, the Liberal Party, is an obstacle for them in management, and even in the mass media and state administration.... In this sense, the other two political parties can "breathe more easily" now.

[Kramarska] In your opinion, who is the top opposition leader in Macedonia: Mr. Stojan Andov, Mr. Ljubco Georgievski, or Mr. Petar Gosev?

[Georgievski] I do not consider it a very important matter. You all know that VMRO-DPMNE was the first party to be labeled opposition. According to some parameters, we believe we are the largest opposition party. The other opposition parties must certainly think the same about themselves, but this is not the time to prove who is what!

[Kramarska] What is your opinion about the possibility of a strategic unity of the opposition?

[Georgievski] I have always been in favor of a strategic unity of the opposition. I presented this idea at the 1994 elections as well, but I do not know whether it will come true now because it depends on a lot of things. It is important to make such a coalition, and there is a positive energy in this sense.

[Kramarska] If such an assumed unity occurs, will there be room for opposition PDPA [Party for Democratic Prosperity of Albanians] of Taci's and Dzaferi's radicals?

[Georgievski] If there is such a need in some municipalities, we will certainly discuss it either with the PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity] or the PDPA. We renounced power in Tetovo, Kicevo, and Gostivar because of their presence there, after which the power was taken over by the SDSM [Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia]. Even worse, we renounced power in government for the same reasons, but I do not believe we have any such prejudices now.

FYROM: Aliti on Link Between University, Parties

AU2008161796 Skopje MIC in English 20 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] "PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity] and its president have never been against the university in Albanian language. We, however, noted on a couple of occasions that the university cannot develop with many faculties and the uncontrolled enrollment of new students," PDP president Abdurahman Aliti told the newspaper FLAKA.

He emphasized that his party's perception is for the university to have 5-6 faculties and to receive 30-40 new students per year. "The way things are developing, 15-16 faculties are being created and 1,200-1,300 students are being enrolled, which leads to erosion," Aliti said.

In this interview, Aliti also noted the impermissible link between the representatives of the university and the political parties. He says that, in itself, this represents a nonsense and that the participation, much less the statements of a representative of the university at an Assembly of the PDPA [Party for Democratic Prosperity of Albanians] branch, that "there should be autonomy and care should be taken that the university is kept aside from the political parties and the authorities is without precedent," is without any precedent whatsoever. [sentence as received]

Aliti insists to sit down and to see who did what for the university, adding that: "No one has the right to hold a monopoly over the rights of the Albanians."

FYROM: Tetovo University Official on PDP Attacks

AU2108105996 Skopje FLAKA E VELLAZERIMIT in Albanian 13 Aug 96 p 3

["Text" of communique signed by Dr. Agni Dika, deputy rector of ethnic Albanian Tetovo "university": "Tetovo University Has Not Received Any Reaction From the PDP"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 8 August 1996, the public was acquainted with a confusing and historic communique by the Party for Democratic Prosperity [PDP—PPD in Albanian], which launched unrealistic accusations against Tetovo university. As the communique was addressed to the public and not to Tetovo university, we are obliged to inform the public as follows:

The Tetovo university authorities have not received any reaction from the PDP, which has recently been communicating with the public about various phenomena occurring on Albanian territory by issuing communiques, launching insults, plotting intrigues, and making refutations, but it could not manage to hide a mass of facts and their political own responsibility. The yells of the pack of wolves and the caves [reference to earlier PDP statement] are found among those who are using arguments of force instead of force of arguments against Tetovo university. The Marxist-Leninist concept no longer exists and is a product of SDB [Yugoslav term—State Security Service] laboratories. Tetovo university is made up of students who are eager to acquire an education, humble professors ready to lay down their lives for the education of Albanians, as well as other idealists.

The Government of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] is trying to ruin Tetovo university. Some Albanian-speaking people, who take part in the Macedonian Government as supernumeraries and who are hiding themselves behind the PDP's signature, are trying by hook and by crook tragically to defraud their innocent electorate. The Macedonian Government is carrying out political, national, and religious splits by favoring a certain handful of people who agree with the idea that Albanians in Macedonia should be second-class citizens falling under the category of a minority. They agree with bogus pedagogical faculties, limited bilingualism, the exodus of Albanians, corruption, fictitious enrollments, rigged elections, massive unemployment among Albanians, and a constitution that strips Albanians of their defense mechanisms. Tetovo university and the Albanian people are conscious of where the bullets are coming from and any attempt to make the public infantile by using the ghosts of the SDB time will end in failure.

(Signed) Dr. Agni Dika, vice-rector.

FYROM: Commentary on Consequences of Albanian 'Threat'

AU2108090996 Skopje DNEVNIK in Macedonian 19 Aug 96 p 6

[Commentary by Slobodan Casule: "Legislation or War"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Has the "Albanian political subject" completed his or her job? With a persistent campaign, including the boycott of the Constitution, the census, and the referendum; the proclamation of Ilirida [autonomous Albanian region in Macedonia] the organization of a parallel army; and the Albanian-language university, the "political subject" has now come to the point at which an ultimatum—which cannot be made without destroying the whole order that has been based on an easily promised but empty coexistence—has been put on the agenda: Either legislation or war! Such an outcome is the result of the irresponsible practice of flirting with the Albanian audience in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM]; (and at large), with the goal of keeping power. This, along with creating division among the "political subjects," has brought the situation to the point where it is impossible to make further concessions!

Albanian political parties, in their quest for political power, have promoted blackmail as a means of achieving this power, in spite of all their attempts to show that their strife is a struggle for a more efficient achievement of the "interests of the nation." At the same time, their insistence on deciding "for or against" Tetovo university has deeply radicalized the views of the opposition and the attitude toward the "Macedonian political subject." With each passing year, with every "activity" of the Albanian political subject, with every gesture that is associated with the university in Tetovo—imprisonments, protests, demonstrations, and meetings—the Albanian side is faced with (a required) radicalization of the views, no matter how much it tries to present itself as a moderate and constituent protagonist of the interests of the Albanian minority in Macedonia.

What else can you conclude when a political protagonist says "legislation or state of emergency"? Does it mean a rebellion—a call to disobedience, revolt against the authority? If this actor is ethnically pure and represents a minority, does this sedition not have the dimension of a call to interethnic civil war? How else are you to understand all this if the political actor is ethnically pure, represents a national minority, and is in power?

Is this a postcommunist social pathology? I do not know.

The scenario of the revolt is as follows: If there is no legislation, then there will be a rebellion; the rebellion will impose resistance, and the resistance will grow into war. The Albanian component will leave the interethnic coalition in power, and it will have to stand up in front of the nation in order to prevent accusations of a "phony Albanian spirit." The comparison with Kosovo becomes unavoidable, regardless of the fact that the crisis there has stopped on the level of occupation and passive resistance.

Whichever way it goes, one thing is for sure: It seems that the danger has not been properly understood, whether it is in the form of a warning or direct threat.

If it is a warning, then it is nothing but blackmail to reveal the dangers of the dissatisfaction of a group of citizens who are ready to resist, to rebel, and to cause reprisals, a siege, a police and military occupation. The attempt is to make up for the absence of majority in Parliament by endangering the state with a veiled sedition.

If it is a threat, does it not mean that the sedition has already started? Does it mean that the differences among the Albanian parties have been erased and that the rebellion will be headed by the party in power?

Third, it can also be a bluff!

In the first or second case, including the third as well, the improperly established legal order is being destroyed. The scarce confidence in the parliamentary and legal system is destroyed. Blackmail is promoted as a means for achieving political goals. The rule of law becomes the rule of the powerful, even if it is smaller in number. The elections are annulled as an expression of the will of the citizens, as is control over the adoption and implementation of the laws.

When a society has suffered such a blow, the road to total destruction of the state is opened. This is true particularly if it is a society in transition, in which mistrust is stronger than confidence, in which the authority itself validates the laws, in which there is not a system of value, in which indifference rules with an extremely low level of articulated civil reaction. A society such as this can only react to national passions.

So, the main question that needs to be answered before the start of the hot political autumn is: Are there not any other solutions?

Has coexistence shared the destiny of brotherhood and unity? Can brotherhood be contained in blood and unity in ethnic cleansing?

Poland: Commission Resumes Investigation of Oleksy

LD2108124396 Warsaw PAP in Polish 0920 GMT 21 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 21 Aug—The three-member editorial team that is to prepare a final report by the commission investigating the Interior Ministry's activities with regard to the allegations that [former Prime Minister] Jozef Oleksy collaborated with the Russian intelligence service resumed its work on 21 August.

Lucyna Pietrzyk of the Polish Peasant Party [PSL], who is chairing the commission, said it is not yet known when the team will complete its work on the final version of the report. She added that the entire commission is to meet this week. On Tuesday evening the commission adjourned a meeting to sum up its work of almost eight months. The last witness, former Internal Affairs Minister Andrzej Milczanowski, was questioned yesterday.

The commission's chairwoman said that the team decided to postpone the date for the completion of its work because of the enormous amount of collected evidence. However, according to Jerzy Ciemniewski of the Freedom Union [UW], the reason was a "fundamental difference of opinion with regard to the assessment of the facts."

The commission's initial report, which said that the State Protection Office [UOP] did not break the law while collecting evidence on Oleksy, was approved by the Sejm on 1 February.

Poland: Daily Says Republic To Buy Hellfire Missiles

WS2108112496 Warsaw SZTANDAR in Polish 21 Aug 96 p 1

[Article by Wojciech Luczak: "Hellfire Missiles Will Go to Skarzysko"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It looks like we are about to witness another phase of the fight between the Israeli companies of Rafael, ELOP, and ELBIT and the American concerns of Rockwell and Boeing; the rival firms are out to win a contract to supply our armed forces with a few thousand antitank missiles. As many as 2,000 missiles, along with homing and aiming systems, are to be "integrated" with the new Polish Huzar assault helicopter. Our infantry is also to receive 3,000 missiles mounted on ground launchers. The National Defense Ministry predicts that the first missiles, assembled in Poland, will be delivered to the Polish Armed Forces in 1999. The value of the entire "Polish missile package" is estimated at $500 million.

Poland: Warsaw Plant Reveals Updated Aircraft Model

LD2008191196 Warsaw TVP Television First Program Network in Polish 1730 GMT 20 Aug 96

[Relayed by TV Polonia Network]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Warsaw-Okecie State Aviation Works [PZL] has for the first time revealed an improved Wilga [general purpose light aircraft]. Its modernization became a necessity because there were no takers for the old model of the aircraft. According to specialists, Wilga 2000 is second to none in the world in its class. Of its 1,000 predecessors, 800 are flying in 32 countries.

[Begin recording] [Correspondent Jacek Krzywanski] The characteristic shape has remained. Apart from that, almost everything has been changed. The work on the new Wilga lasted a year.

[Ryszard Lejk, director, PZL Warsaw-Okecie SA] The world is demanding new products, and Okecie had to adapt to this—hence, this aircraft.

[Krzywanski] The Wilga with the new engine looks like the first models from 1962. At that time, the Polish engine proved to be too weak, so it was replaced with Soviet engines, which did not fit well with Wilga's shape. Because the engines often broke down and there was a shortage of spares for them, Western customers preferred to buy other planes.

The new engine, this time American, has increased the speed and payload capacity by 50 percent. The range has also increased, from 500 to 1,500 km. A more streamlined wing and stronger undercarriage were also developed. An on-board computer, which collaborates with seven satellites, makes it possible to reach the target even without maps.

[Maciej Aksler, test pilot] Piloting the aircraft is more comfortable. It could be compared to driving a very good car.

[Krzywanski] In the fall of next year, the new Wilga is to enter series production. In accordance with the latest trends, it will be painted brown. [end recording]

Poland: Five-Year Economic Forecast

96EP0088A Warsaw PRZEGLAD RZADOWY in Polish 1 Jun 96 No 6, pp 77-81

[Official document accepted by Council of Ministers in April 1996]

[FBIS Translated Text]

1. Point of Departure

Following several years of recession due to the shock, Poland's economy has rallied, and for the second year in a row it is attaining a GDP [gross domestic product] growth rate of more than 5 percent; for 1995 that rate is estimated to be about 6.5 percent. Industrial output in 1995 has increased by about 10 percent, and construction and installation output have increased by about 12 percent, which is due to the marked energizing of most branches of the economy and the progressive adaptation of enterprises to the requirements of the market economy. The prime mover in this growth has been, in accordance with the assumptions of economic policy, the increase in investments and exports.

Investment outlays in 1995 increased by about 11 percent, and their structure is changing favorably in the sense that the share of machinery and equipment is rising. The revival of investment processes is occurring chiefly in industrial enterprises, and is principally being financed with their own resources.

Foreign trade is growing. In 1995 exports (in dollars, in payment terms) increased by about 37 percent, and imports by about 39 percent. The share of producer goods in imports is rising. Trade with developed countries continues to account for a major share of foreign trade; at the same time, trade with developing countries is declining while trade with Central and Eastern European countries and the CIS is rising.

The marked upswing of the business cycle not only has halted the rise in enterprise bankruptcies and group layoffs but also is making it possible at present to create new jobs (and as a result, to reduce unemployment). This also is the principal source of rising enterprise revenues, real wages, and social services. As a result, consumption is increasing for another year in a row, though at a lower rate than the increase in the domestically consumed GDP, which points to progrowth trends in the economy and an increase in both corporate and personal savings.

The ratio of the employed population to the total number of pensioners and persons collecting unemployment benefits has stopped deteriorating.

The growing corporate and personal incomes and the decline in unemployment are resulting in some improvement in the situation of public finance. Receipts of the state budget have exceeded the level envisaged in the 1995 Budget Law. The fact that budgetary spending was somewhat less than envisaged has caused the budget deficit to decline to 2.7 percent of GDP (as compared with the 3.4 percent envisaged in the Budget Law).

Even so, the situation of the state budget remains difficult, which is chiefly due to the need to service foreign and domestic debt and the growing share of spending on social protection.

The deep crisis in housing construction still persists. The amount of housing released for occupancy in 1995 barely corresponds to the level of the first 50 years. This is due to the marked disproportion between personal incomes and the cost of that construction, as well as to the absence of a correspondingly adapted financing and loan system that would serve to meet the housing needs of the middle- and low-income population.

Explicit protectionist and monopolist tendencies on the part of various pressure groups, large enterprises, and branches of the economy still persist. This interferes in some domains with the influence of market mechanisms on economic processes.

The continuing low level of corporate utilization of investment-financing credit is disturbing, this being due chiefly to the interest rates levied, in real terms as well, on such credit.

Inflation remains high, although its level is sinking every year. In 1995 the mean annual increase in the prices of consumer goods and services was 27.8 percent or, from December to December, 21.6 percent.

Of major importance in continuing transformation is the attitude of the public to the changes, as reflected in the reaction to high structural unemployment in some of the country's regions, the differentiation in incomes, the low opinion of public security, and the feeling of threat to social entitlements.

2. Purpose and Premises of Development Scenarios for 1996-2000

The starting premises for the selection of an economic policy oriented toward vigorous growth remain topical. These premises include: the still persistent high level of depreciation of manufacturing resources, the inadequately developed services sector, the underdeveloped infrastructure, an inefficient and overpopulated agriculture which accounts for about 26 percent of total employment in this country, the growing installment payments of foreign debt, the high inflation, the high unemployment rate, a marked lag in living standards (compared with EU countries), and the low level of enrollment at universities.

Overcoming the above limitations and the attendant perils appears feasible only through a rapid and balanced growth. Owing to the faster growth achieved over the last two years, the dilemma of whether to promote investment or consumption has ceased to be acute. This economic growth is also reflected in the gradual improvements in the living standards of society.

When drafting growth scenarios up to the year 2000 it was assumed that, pursuant to the government's programs, the principal objectives of socioeconomic policy will be:

—Maintaining a high economic growth rate and effecting improvements in living standards, while at the same time reducing to a minimum the social cost of building a market economy; continuing the processes of investing in human capital; conducting social reforms.

—Improving the competitiveness of the Polish economy on the international market by means of further systemic and institutional reforms; intensifying modernization processes with the object of bringing the Polish economy closer to the requirements ensuing from future economic integration with the European Union.

The purpose of the drafting and analysis of scenarios of socioeconomic growth during 1996-2000 is to determine the external and internal conditions that must be met in order to accomplish these objectives, as well as the consequences of failure to meet these conditions.

When drafting the scenarios, the following starting premises were adopted:

—The decisive factor in the growth and improved competitiveness of our economy (and hence also in increasing its share in international trade) is, in real terms, the speediest possible structural and technological reconstruction.

—From the standpoint of economic growth the most important decisions—on savings rates, directions of investment, choice of technology, and directions and dynamics of export expansion—will be made by enterprises and households.

—In broad terms, the activities of the government—legislative, organizational, and its declining direct participation in economic activity—will be intended to provide the conditions for an efficient functioning of market mechanisms, to encourage businesses to maximize savings and investments, and to provide businesses with the information needed to make rational decisions.

The ultimate course of socioeconomic processes will be affected by a great many diverse factors. Some of them are predetermined, such as the initial state of the economy, the binding system of regulations, the population increase, the increase in manpower resources, the adopted international obligations as regards debt servicing, liberalization of foreign trade, environmental protection, etc. But others can be manipulated, in the sense that they can be adapted to needs, such as the monetary and exchange rate policy, the level and structure of budgetary spending, reforms of the old-age pension system, health care, education, etc. But these can be manipulated only to a limited extent, because this requires reconciling the often contradictory—especially in the short run—interests of different social groups.

In addition, there are the factors that are decisive to economic processes and can be neither guided nor foreseen. These include: the limits of social acceptance for the reforms underway; the stability of governments and their ability to formulate and pursue a rational economic policy; and, though to a lesser extent in terms of predictability, the downswings and upswings in the world economy and the economies of the principal partners.

The above situation (the unpredictability and total or partial inability to manipulate some of the factors affecting socioeconomic processes) results in that the prediction of these processes, and especially the quantification of their selected aspects, such as size and structure of the generation and distribution of the GDP, volume of foreign trade, level of employment, scale of inflation, etc., should be based on an analysis of scenarios rather than on classic forecasts.

3. Principles and Logic of Scenario Design

Considering the context, purpose, and premises for drafting the scenarios, it was assumed that, from among the various possibilities for the evolution of the factors influencing the course of socioeconomic processes, the consequences of the following three scenarios will be investigated:

—An extremely favorable unfolding of a situation in both international and domestic terms.

—A fairly favorable unfolding of that situation.

—An extremely unfavorable unfolding of events.

The first of these scenarios is based upon the assumption of:

—An improving world economy as compared with present expectations, which will facilitate maintaining a high growth rate of exports; this improvement is to encompass both the European Union and the CIS countries.

—Inflation at a mean annual level of 10.5 percent (or in December to December terms, 8.8 percent) in the year 2000.

—Lower interest rates on investment credit, inclusive of housing construction loans.

—Stabilization of tax policy and, in particular, assurance of its greater predictability.

—Implementation of a reform of the social insurance system and the health service.

—A proper course for privatization processes.

—Concentration of budget spending on the domains which promote growth (education, infrastructure, public safety and security).

—Stabilization of the political and social situation.

Given such an unfolding of events, a high growth rate of investment can be maintained and hence also a high rate of the growth and reproduction of manufacturing capacities and structural changes, improvements in competitiveness, a greater number of direct foreign investments, improved efficiency as reflected in, among other things, a relative decrease in indirect depreciation (materials-intensiveness), high indicators of flexibility of exports and imports in relation to the increase in GDP, along with continued rapid growth in labor productivity and wages combined with greater personal savings.

Under the second scenario the attendant circumstances would be as follows:

—The world economy would grow at about 2-3 percent annually (with growth of our biggest partners to be on the same scale), but fluctuations in that growth rate, as well as in demand for Polish exports, would be possible.

—Loan interest rates would be the same as under the first scenario.

—Reforms of the social insurance system and the health service would not be completely carried out, and as a consequence this would be reflected in the scope of public finance only after the year 2000.

—Various changes in tax policy, as dictated by sporadic needs, would be necessary.

—Privatization would meet with resistance.

—Changes in the structure of budgetary spending would be less consistent; the share of spending on the direct promotion of growth would increase only slightly.

—Inflation could reach, in the year 2000, the same level as under the first scenario.

—The political and social situation would be variable.

In general it can be said that with the above factors we would be dealing with a continuation of the trends and growth rates of the processes observed over the last two or three years.

Given the above, it can be assumed that the growth rate of investment outlays would remain high, although it would decline somewhat below the recent rate. Correspondingly, structural and technological changes would occur somewhat more slowly, which could result in an increase in the utilization of the existing, relatively inefficient, manufacturing potential, which in its turn would unfavorably affect the level of indirect depreciation (materials-intensiveness). The coefficients of flexibility of imports and exports relative to the GDP would be high, but lower than under the first scenario, and the ratio of wage growth to labor productivity would worsen, but the latter would increase more rapidly.

Under the third scenario, the conditioning factors would definitely be unfavorable:

—The state of the world economy would worsen, or even temporarily stagnate.

—Systemic reforms would not be feasible, and hence, on the one hand, the structure of budgetary spending would not improve and, on the other, the taxation system would be unstable.

—Privatization would be halted.

—Political and social tensions would persist.

Under these circumstances it would have to be assumed that the influx of direct foreign investments would be limited and, throughout the period in question, investments would remain at the current level, thus allowing only minor structural and technological changes. The utilization of existing potential (in the form of a relative increase in indirect depreciation) would increase. Owing to continuing social tensions, wage growth would be faster than growth in labor productivity, and inflationary processes would intensify. Personal savings would increase only slightly compared with the present rate.

The basic numerical assumptions adopted in simulation models and concerning the principal determinants of the growth and distribution of the GDP are presented in the table below:

Set of Starting Premises

Subject	Scenarios		
	Dynamic	Base	Warning
Mean Annual Change in Percent			
1. Growth rate of investment	12	9	0
2. Productivity of fixed assets	0.0	0.23	0.34
3. Coefficient of indirect depreciation	- 0.76	0.59	1.80
4. Collective consumption per capita	3.23	2.26	2.26
5. Average pension and annuity, in real terms	2.6	2.0	2.6
Mean Annual Value			
6. Mean coefficient of flexibility of exports	2.13	1.96	1.56
7. Mean coefficient of flexibility of imports	1.68	1.60	1.81
8. Mean rate of personal savings	13.8	13.3	12.6
9. Remuneration of increase in labor productivity	0.59	0.66	1.44

Results of Simulation

Dynamic Scenario

For the first (dynamic) scenario the results of simulation indicate that by the year 2000 GDP may increase at the rate of 7.7 percent annually, which would mean an average annual increase of 7.5 percent per capita.

Exports (in GDP calculations, at constant prices) may increase at a mean annual rate of more than 16 percent, but their growth rate would slow down in successive years. Revenues from goods exports in payment terms may reach about $53 billion in 2000 compared with $23.2 billion in 1995, which means that they would more than double over that period. Exports per capita in 2000 would be $1,360, as compared with $601 in 1995.

Imports (in GDP calculations) would increase more slowly than exports, i.e., by about 13 percent annually. Payments for goods imports would amount to $48.8 billion in 2000, as compared with $24.7 billion in 1995. The share of investment goods and producer goods in the structure of imports would increase.

The balance of payments would be positive, and would reach $4.2 billion in 2000, as compared with the estimated negative balance of $1.5 billion in 1995. Achieving a positive balance of foreign trade would mean a slower mean annual growth rate, 6.3 percent, of the domestically consumed GDP, compared with the generated GDP.

The growth rate of investments would increase to about 23 percent in 2000, as compared with 18 percent in 1995. This means that more than 25 percent of the increase in the generated GDP would be allocated annually for investment.

Fixed assets would increase by about 39 percent in 2000, and the share of new fixed assets (i.e., released for use after 1995) in 2000 would be about 32 percent. Under these circumstances plant equipment would increase by about 4.6 percent annually.

Attaining this scenario would require that over the five-year period the share of foreign investments in total investment outlays reach about 30 percent (at 1993 prices). Should this prove impossible, higher postulated savings rates would be necessary, along with, as a consequence, a lower increase in consumption.

The increase in consumption would be about 5 percent annually, with personal consumption amounting to 5.5 percent and collective consumption 3.4 percent. On the other hand, the share of consumption in the generated GDP would decline from 80.5 percent in 1995 to 77.0 percent in 2000.

A high growth rate of investment processes would contribute to creating new jobs and, in effect, total national employment would increase to 16.4 million in 2000, as compared with 14.8 million in 1995, i.e., by 1.6 million persons. Unemployment would decline by about 780,000, to 1,850,000 in 2000.

The unemployment rate would drop from 14.9 percent in 1995 to about 10 percent in the last year of the forecast.

Social productivity of labor would increase by 5.5 percent annually; in 2000 it would be more than 30 percent higher than in 1995. Real wages may increase by 3.2 percent annually, and social protection by 2.6 percent. The coefficient of remuneration for increased labor productivity during that period would increase by 0.6.

The high economic growth rate, dynamic changes in manufacturing, the decline in unemployment, and improvements in the ratio of the employed population to those relying on social protection would cause incomes to grow at a faster rate than budgetary spending. In effect, the budget deficit could shrink further, and its relation to GDP could decline from 2.7 percent in 1995 to 1.8 percent in 2000.

Base Scenario

Under the second (base) scenario the results of the simulation indicate that GDP could increase by about 5.7 percent annually, which would mean a 5.5 percent growth of GDP per capita.

Exports (in GDP calculations, at constant prices) would increase at the rate of 11.2 percent annually. In payment terms, export revenues in the year 2000 could increase by more than 80 percent (as compared with 1995) and reach the level of $42.5 billion, i.e., about $1,092 per capita, as compared with $601 per capita at present.

The trend toward a more rapid growth in imports of investment goods, which contribute to the growth of investment, and of producer goods, which contribute to an increase in output, would persist. Imports (in GDP calculations, at constant prices) would increase at a lower pace than exports (9.1 percent annually). Payments for imports in 2000 would reach $41.7 billion, or about 70 percent more than in 1995.

The high growth rate of exports would improve the balance of trade, which would be positive in 2000 to the extent of $800 million, whereas at present it is negative to the extent of $1.5 billion; this would facilitate servicing the foreign debt.

Owing to a positive foreign trade balance, the growth rate of distributed GDP (final demand) would be lower than that of generated GDP, and would amount to 4.9 percent annually.

The growth rate of investments would reach about 21 percent in 2000, as compared with 18 percent in 1995.

Owing to the increasing investment outlays, fixed assets would increase at an average annual rate of 6.2 percent. Compared with their state as of 1995, fixed assets would be renovated, with new fixed assets accounting for about 30 percent of the total in 2000. Plant equipment could increase by 4.4 percent annually, and social productivity of labor could increase by about 3.9 percent annually.

Achieving this scenario would require roughly a 20-percent share of foreign investments in overall investment outlays over the five-year period (at 1993 prices).

Consumer demand would increase at a lower rate (4.0 percent annually) than generated GDP and GDP utilized domestically. The increase in personal consumption would be estimated at 4.4 percent annually, and the increase in collective consumption at 2.8 percent. Real wages would increase by 2.6 percent annually, and old-age pensions and annuities by 2.0 percent. The coefficient of remuneration of the increase in labor productivity would be 0.7.

Employment would increase to 16.1 million, i.e., by about 1.3 million as compared with 1995.

Unemployment would drop to 2,150,000 in 2000, i.e., by about 480,000 as compared with 1995, and the unemployment rate would decline to 11.5 percent, as compared with 14.9 percent in 1995.

Budget receipts from indirect and direct taxes, including the personal income tax, would increase owing to the increase in personal incomes and the favorable changes on the labor market.

With the growth rate of receipts being faster than that of spending, the relation of the budget deficit to GDP would gradually improve until in the year 2000 it would be about 2.5 percent of GDP.

Warning Scenario

Simulation of the third (warning) scenario leads to the conclusion that, given the attendant unfavorable circumstances, the growth rate of the GDP could drop to 2.7 percent annually. Consolidation of that trend could result in a deeper decline in output and the return of economic recession. GDP per capita would increase by 2.5 percent annually.

Exports would increase (in GDP calculations, at constant prices) by 4.2 percent annually, but in the last years of the forecast their growth rate would plummet steeply. In payment terms, exports in the year 2000 would amount to about $31 billion, or $809 per capita.

The imports-intensiveness of GDP would increase. Imports (in GDP calculations, at constant prices) would increase by 4.8 percent annually. Import payments would reach $34.2 billion, thus markedly aggravating the negative balance of payments, which in 2000 would reach $2.7 billion. In the structure of imports, consumer goods would be a major item.

The growth rate of domestically distributed GDP would be 2.8 percent annually, and would exceed the growth rate of generated GDP. The growth rate of investment in

2000 would be 15 percent, as compared with 18 percent in 1995. Fixed assets would increase by about 26 percent (i.e., at 4.7 percent annually) and the share of new fixed assets in 2000 would be about 25 percent.

The average annual growth in average real wages could amount to 3.2 percent, and in average retirement pensions, in real terms, 2.6 percent. This would bring about an increase in consumption at the expense of investment and a worsening of the balance of foreign trade. Given a 2.2-percent annual increase in labor productivity, the coefficient of remuneration of labor would be 1.4.

The increase in consumption could be maintained at the level of about 3.4 percent annually, chiefly at the expense of a marked deterioration in the balance of payments. Personal consumption would increase by 3.7 percent, and collective consumption by 2.8 percent, annually. The share of aggregate consumption in the GDP would rise to 85 percent.

The results of the simulation indicate that maintaining the increase in consumption during the period in question would adversely affect the economy. The low rate of economic growth would cause unemployment to increase to 3,150,000 in 2000, with the unemployment rate rising to about 17 percent, as compared with 14.9 percent in 1995.

The attendant economic slowdown would result in lower tax revenues. The growth of unemployment, the pressures for raising the salaries of civil servants, and the growing inefficiency of the social insurance system due to the failure to reform it would cause an increase in budgetary spending. As a consequence, the public would be adversely affected. Savings would be increasingly absorbed by the budget at the expense of lower possibilities for granting credit to the corporate sector. The share of the budget deficit relative to GDP could reach 6 percent in the last year of the forecast period.

Rising costs of production, a faster increase in wages than in labor productivity, an increase in the number of recipients of social protection, and a growing budget deficit would make it impossible to slow down inflationary processes. It is estimated that under such circumstances inflation in 2000 could be at a mean annual level of 23 percent or, counting from December to December, 22 percent.

The unfolding of the economic situation under this third scenario would not only adversely affect the domestic situation but also cause problems with the balance of payments and weaken the credibility of Poland on the international scene. That would reduce the chances for Poland's integration with the Western European structures.

Summing Up

The actual course of socioeconomic processes in the years 1996-2000 need not fit any of the scenarios presented. It follows that the decisive factor may not fit the hypotheses adopted but may represent their combination in one way or another. The presented results of the simulations and analyses are intended to draw attention to what may happen and what may be the consequences of particular events, undertakings, or failures to act.

At the same time, analysis of the results of these simulations serves in formulating the following general conclusions:

—For the next few years the Polish economy has a chance to maintain its relatively high growth rate and adapt its structure and competitiveness more closely to the European Union. The GDP level per capita in the year 2000, as compared with its current level ($2,992 in 1995) would be, depending upon the version of the scenario: for the dynamic scenario, $5,863; for the base scenario, $5,388; and for the warning scenario, $4,887; as compared with the average of $18,55 per capita in the EU countries in 1993.

—A possibility exists for reconciling the indispensable increase in investment outlays (and hence also the renovation of manufacturing potential) with improvements in living standards, i.e., with an increase in both personal and collective consumption.

—A high growth rate can be reconciled with maintaining the macroeconomic equilibrium, and hence it does not have to spur inflation. But for this to happen the stability and permanence of growth processes have to be maintained. Disturbances in these processes may, regardless of their cause, upset that equilibrium and unleash inflation.

—Settling the obligations to foreign creditors will require a faster growth rate of exports than of imports. That will be possible only in the event of a high growth rate and improved competitiveness of our economy.

—For the entire period in question, regardless of which scenario comes true, unemployment will remain a difficult problem. Hence the conclusion that reducing it substantially would require implementing special measures to absorb manpower resources. These measures should be of a type that would not involve excessive capital outlays.

—A major complement to domestic savings should be direct foreign investments. Their share in investment outlays should be at the level of 20-30 percent over the five-year period as a whole. To accomplish this, the related legal and organizational regulations will have to be adapted as soon as possible to those binding in the European Union.

Romania: Health, Culture Ministers Resign for 'Personal Reasons'

AU2108085496 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 0800 GMT 21 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] In a statement made to our reporters this morning, following the announcement of the resignation of Romanian Health Minister Iulian Mincu, Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu confirmed that another member of his cabinet, Culture Minister Viorel Marginean has also decided to step down. Similarly to Professor Dr. Mincu, Mr. Marginean cited personal reasons, specifically his wish to return to his former profession as a painter, which so far he has neglected due to his duties as minister.

The prime minister added that a decision regarding the two aforementioned ministers, as well as a cabinet reshuffle, will be made in the next few days.

Romania: Nastase Confirms Possible Cabinet Reshuffle in Aug

AU2108110196 Bucharest JURNALUL NATIONAL in Romanian 15 Aug 96 pp 15-17

[Interview with Adrian Nastase, executive president of the Social Democracy Party of Romania, by Florin Condurateanu; place and date not given]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Condurateanu] Mr. Executive President of the Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR], is it true what the rumors say that the Raducanoiu [dismissed prefect of Dolj County] affair has been a bone of contention between you and Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu?

[Nastase] As usual, the lack of clarity and maybe the postponement of a decision has led to ambiguous commentaries. [passage omitted]

The PDSR Permanent Delegation decided to have the prefect, Raducanoiu, replaced, but the prime minister had gone on leave for a few days at the time and the decision could not be implemented immediately. Therefore, there is no reason for a dispute between me and Prime Minister Vacaroiu.

[Condurateanu] Is Prime Minister Vacaroiu going to be a scapegoat? There are rumors that the PDSR will try to unburden itself of the entire governmental policy—for a fresh start and to cut a better figure in the elections.

[Nastase] Maybe there are several things in our party that need mending. But, I must frankly tell you that we do not have the cynicism of some parties with a longer history in Romania. Therefore, we do not play like that. We believe that the prime minister has worked very hard in the past four years, made the best of his opportunities, given the conditions prevailing in our country. It is true that we might have done more and paid more attention to social problems, instead of concentrating so much on economic problems and macroeconmic stabilization.

[Condurateanu] An opposition leader has forecast a serious economic collapse in the fall, when the price hikes will painfully hurt the population, something which may lead to social unrest. Is there any truth in that?

[Nastase] The opposition is very strong on forecasts. This is a field that you do not challenge, since you cannot deny anyone the right to have an idea about the future. However instead of attending to its problems, the opposition is tackling the global problems of humanity, the situation with the PDSR, and all kinds of other collateral matters. [passage omitted]

The opposition would be better advised to clarify its own political spectrum. In practical terms, all the ideological messages of the opposition combine in the struggle for power. Thus, the liberal, social democratic, or Christian-democratic messages no longer count. In the past, those from the opposition had the fight against communism as their common denominator; now, they have the struggle against the government and the takeover of power. They are lacking a clear ideological program and a definite vision. [passage omitted]

But to come back to your question, of course, the opposition is trying to resort to little diversions, like the one with the imminent collapse of the economy and the installation of the dictatorship. For the past six years, it kept telling us about the coming dictatorship. But, here comes the big surprise: Unlike the forecasts of many people from the opposition, Romania probably has the most free and democratic situation in Central Europe. We have created and maintained political stability. [passage omitted]

As for economic hardship, the people know that this was not due to the government's ill intentions, but rather the price we must pay for finding a better course for the future. [passage omitted]

[Condurateanu] Mr. Adrian Nastase, some people claim that you are a president without power in the PDSR and that the party is actually led by Mr. Iliescu. Is that true?

[Nastase] These are only stereotype claims launched here and there. Mr. Iliescu's role in the formation of the PDSR is very great, indeed. On the other hand, he never interfered in the actual running of the party. Of course, it is only natural to consult him occasionally. [passage omitted]

Nobody is infallible, but I think it is quite extraordinary that we have the possibility of occasionally calling upon his thinking, wisdom, and advice. [passage omitted]

[Condurateanu] Some people claim that the West, particularly the United States would prefer—and even suggested—an alliance between the PDSR, the Democratic Convention of Romania [CDR], and the Social-Democratic Union [USD]. Is such a thing possible and desirable?

[Nastase] I believe it is too soon to talk about post-electoral alliances. We aim for a result that entitles us to form a government alone, even a minority one, provided that we obtain a sufficient number of votes. If this is not possible, then we will try to enter into negotiations with the parties to our left and right, depending on the results that they score.

[Condurateanu] Will there be a governmental reshuffle before the elections?

[Nastase] In my opinion, this would be quite normal. Reshuffles happen in the life of a government and I think that the next one will be in August.

[Condurateanu] Will the reshuffle affect many portfolios?

[Nastase] I do not think so. [passage omitted]

Romania: PDSR Figures Said To Force Employees To Support Iliescu

AU1908131596 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 17 Aug 96 p 3

[Article by A.M. Press: "Those Who Refuse To Sign for Iliescu Are Threatened With Dismissal"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Three directors of government-run public corporations and companies, who are also members of the PDSR [Social Democracy Party of Romania] have been given orders to begin a signature-collecting campaign in favor of Ion Iliescu's candidacy for a third presidential term. For instance, sources from the TMC Ltd. company in Filiasi (manufacturing small electric transformers), told our reporters that Ion Stoiculescu, the manager, is in charge of gathering the signature. This spring he ran on the PDSR slate for the office of county councilor. The sources revealed that those who refuse to sign for Iliescu are threatened with being laid off.

Romania: Funar Invites Iliescu To Debate Hungarian Treaty

AU1908130096 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1000 GMT 19 Aug 96

["Text" of statement by Gheorghe Funar, head of Romanian National Unity Party, PUNR, in Bucharest on 19 August—read by announcer]

[FBIS Translated Text] Considering that in Romania the text of the Romanian-Hungarian understanding, cooperation, and good neighborliness draft treaty is still being held secret, and that the mass media has been vividly commenting on this draft, which has not been made available to the government, the political parties, political alliances, the Foreign Policy Commission of the Romanian Parliament, or to the press, in my capacity as PUNR president I take the liberty of inviting Romanian President Ion Iliescu to a public radio and television debate on the issue and text of the aforementioned document. I suggest that this dialogue should take place at the end of August 1996, before the presidents of the two countries sign the treaty in Budapest.

Romania: Dinu Discusses Status of Treaty With Hungary

AU2008184296 Bucharest JURNALUL NATIONAL in Romanian 16, 17 Aug 96

[Interview in two installments with Marcel Dinu, secretary of state at the Foreign Affairs Ministry, by Florin Condurateanu; place and date not given: "Romania and Hungary Do Not Have Territorial Claims and Will Support Each Other in Entering NATO and Other European Structures"]

[16 Aug p 4]

[FBIS Translated Text]

"Marcel Dinu, Secretary of State at the Foreign Affairs Ministry, Says Two Additional Important Provisions Have Been Included in the Treaty"

[Condurateanu] Mr. Secretary of State Marcel Dinu, does the finalization of negotiations on the basic bilateral treaty between Romania and Hungary and the imminent signing of this treaty, which has been delayed for years, really represent a great success for Romanian diplomacy? If so, why?

[Dinu] Indeed, the negotiations on this treaty started during the 1991-92 government. The negotiations stopped at one point but resumed when Gyula Horn's government came to power. Now we are very close to concluding. Before assessing whether it is a success of Romanian diplomacy, I could say that we are indeed in the stage of finalizing the text of the treaty at the expert level and that it is a treaty that corresponds to our country's interests and to European standards. I could add that the content has been much anticipated in other chancelleries of the world. Certainly, this can also be put on the list of achievements of Romanian diplomacy, given the fact that the negotiations held an important place in Romania's foreign policy priorities and in the government program. It has been the permanent focus of the foreign minister's attention, who was personally involved in numerous discussions with his Hungarian counterpart, but also with a large team of experts at the Foreign Ministry.

[Condurateanu] Mr. Secretary of State Marcel Dinu, you have been the major coordinator of the negotiations. Could you describe, so that everybody can understand, what is included in this treaty and what the major agreements are regarding the controversial Recommendation 1201?

[Dinu] This is a standard treaty, the provisions of which can be found in the vast majority of similar treaties. What is specific to this treaty is the Romanian-Hungarian relationship. First of all, there is an article that we mentioned less because lately we have been confronted with provisions regarding minorities. I am talking about an article referring to borders, a very important article. Still, it is not the issue of borders that is important in Romania's relations with Hungary. The borders exist and are recognized through international treaties bearing heavy signatures. Thus we did not want to be recognizing something that has been recognized for a long time. However, there is a clear provision in the treaty by which the two countries declare they have no territorial claims each other now or in the future. This provision was included because many Romanians have the idea that Hungary has territorial claims. And to my great surprise, I noticed that some Hungarian politicians had the feeling that Romania had territorial claims on Hungary. A few years ago, Hungary's ambassador in Bucharest left the Parliament Hall during the 1 December National Day celebrations because the lines from a poem by [Romanian poet] Eminescu: "From Dniester to Tisa [Rivers] every Romanian cried to me" were quoted there. The ambassador regarded this and the fact that this act was applauded as Romania's territorial claim on Hungary. Therefore, I think this article is a key article, because it clarifies the issue and eliminates a huge psychological obstacle. A second important provision in the context of specific issues in Romanian-Hungarian relations, which has been regulated now, is the attitude of the two countries towards integration in Euro-Atlantic structures; that is, NATO, the EU, and Western European Union. We have worked out a text according to which the two countries support each other in their integration efforts. Thus it is a cooperative rather than a competitive approach to the issue.

[Conduratianu] Will this provision slow down the Hungarian lobby, especially in the United States, in its effort to ontinuously obstruct Romania's demarches?

[Dinu] It is difficult to tell. No treaty includes obligations for political circles outside the country. I would rather use the expression "influence" than "slow down." I hope this provision will influence the attitude of the Hungarian lobby, and I want to tell you that such an attitude was already evident in the recent U.S. Congress vote to grant most favored nation status to Romania. The best known leader of the Hungarian diaspora, Tom Lantos, not only voted in favor but actually lobbied to have the status granted to us. So the process has begun and will surely develop; not evenly, there will be ups and downs, but I believe this is a good start.

And now I wish to refer to the third element that is specific to this treaty; namely, the issues referring to minorities. First I would like to note something: In certain political circles, also in Romania, within the Romanian National Unity Party and the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania, and other parties too, there is this feeling that the treaty will grant some rights to minorities.

This is not a correct assumption. Minorities are granted rights through the constitution, through the country's laws, and through international conventions on the issue. This is a truth valid for all countries, and it does not specifically refer to Romania and Hungary. The treaty we have prepared does nothing but put together the rules and rights granted in other documents, particularly the constitution. I must emphasize that the treaty does not in any way go beyond the provisions of the Constitution because that was the limit of the negotiator's mandate. Nobody in the Foreign Affairs Ministry has ever imagined that the negotiations could go beyond the provisions of the Constitution. I even explained to my Hungarian colleagues that Romania's Constitution can only be modified by other means. The two last articles in the Constitution include provisions for amendments, but these changes cannot be made through bilateral treaties. Being very good lawyers, our Hungarian colleagues understood this.

[Conduratianu] But what happens in the treaty with the famous Recommendation 1201?

[Dinu] This "marker" 1201 has been raised here in Romania and maybe in Hungary. In other countries in Europe, even when you talk with a very knowledgeable person, when you say 1201, you have to tell him what you are talking about because he does not know exactly. We had such discussions often, also with distinguished foreign ministers in the EU or Council of Europe member countries and from other countries. In 1993, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted Recommendation 1201 regarding the individual rights of persons who belong to national minorities. The natural problem arises is determining to whom this recommendation was addressed. The recommendation was made to the Council of Ministers in the Council of Europe. The Council of Europe is a two-headed structure. One is the Parliamentary Assembly, and the other is the Council of Ministers. The Council of Ministers makes decisions that are obligatory for states. Well, the respective recommendation was made by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. The issue was also discussed at the Council of Europe summit conference in Vienna in October 1994, when Recommendation 1201 was taken over through an intergovernmental document adopted by the Council of Ministers and which is called the Framework Convention regarding the protection of persons who belong to national minorities. This document was the result of lengthy negotiations, and it took over the largest part of the provisions of Recommendation 1201, but not all of them. It did not take over all the provisions, not because of the opposition of the Romanian delegation but because they are not in line with European standards. European states, especially those in West Europe, did not regard them as premises for regulations on this issue. We cannot assume merits regarding the famous Article 11 in the Recommendation, which was not taken over and included in the Framework Convention. If we had been the only ones who opposed it, it probably would have appeared in the Framework Convention, but Germany, France, England, and states that have been members of the Council of Europe for a long time also opposed it. The Framework Convention did not take over the provisions of the Recommendation that refer to the protection of persons who belong to national minorities, neither those that might be interpreted in favor of collective rights nor those that referred to special status or territorial autonomies on ethnic criteria. Romania was among the first states to sign the Framework Convention. The Framework Convention was ratified by Romania's Parliament. When assessing Recommendation 1201, nobody can say a definite YES to the Recommendation, but nobody can say a definite NO to the Recommendation either. If I say a definite YES to the Recommendation, then I also say YES to the article that refers to possible autonomy on an ethnic basis, while if I say NO, it means NO to the entire Recommendation, including the Framework Convention of which I am a part. Then the logical formula that results is for us to say YES, BUT...

[17 Aug pp 8-9]

[FBIS Translated Text]

"The Treaty Is the Only Text at the European Level That Clearly and Categorically Settles the Issue of Territorial Autonomy and Collective Rights"

[Condurateanu] Mr. Secretary of State Marcel Dinu, in your capacity as coordinator of the negotiations on the treaty with Hungary, you firmly said that the latest formula of the treaty fully serves Romania's interests. Regarding the much discussed Recommendation 1201, you pointed out that the treaty says "YES, BUT..." Would you be so kind as to elaborate?

[Dinu] Most of the Recommendation is good and has been accepted by many countries. Had it been different, we would have said NO to it. However, proceeding from this matter and realizing that it would have been difficult for the Hungarian side—after Recommendation 1201 was included in the treaty with Slovakia—to have a text without a reference to that "fatidic" figure, we suggested that we have a joint interpretation of the recommendation. We set out from the idea that we should draft a treaty that solves problems rather than creates new ones. We suggested that this joint interpretation should emphasize that, in the interpretation of the Romanian and Hungarian sides, Recommendation 1201 does not refer to collective rights and does not oblige the sides to offer a special autonomy status on ethnic criteria to persons belonging to national minorities. We made such a proposal last year. The discussions continued this year, and a new meeting of experts took place last June. In a letter sent by Hungarian Foreign Minister Mr. Laszlo Kovacs to our Foreign Minister Melescanu on 3 August, Mr. Kovacs told us that the Hungarian ministry accepts the interpretation suggested by us. The Hungarian acceptance of the interpretation submitted to them by the Romanian side has created the necessary conditions for finalizing the text of the treaty.

[Condurateanu] How does the treaty express this denial of claims to territorial autonomy and collective rights?

[Dinu] The treaty page that refers to Recommendation 1201 specifies that the recommendation does not refer to the collective rights of the minorities and does not oblige the state to grant territorial autonomy on ethnic criteria. Thus we have practically reduced the recommendation to the level of the Framework Convention. Therefore, the treaty contains the Framework Convention as the key document plus the Recommendation 1201, but excluding the points which run counter to our position and European standards. This treaty is the only text I know at the European level which deals with this issue in a categorical and clear way, without leaving room for any other possible interpretation. The problem of observing the principles of Recommendation 1201 is a general matter, but the Hungarian side insisted that we include this recommendation in the list of legally obligatory documents. Their insistence has also made us ask for clarifications. If things proceed as agreed, the treaty will have an annex containing the list of documents of an obligatory legal nature, which the two countries pledge to observe as such, including Recommendation 1201/1993, with the respective clarifications.

[Condurateanu] What concessions were made by the Hungarian side, and what concessions were made by the Romanian side?

[Dinu] I do not like to talk about concessions during the course of negotiations. I believe both sides made efforts to find a formula which conceptually corresponds to their circumstances and interests and with the European standards. The Hungarian side, beginning with the prime minister and at various other levels, officially maintains that it does not insist on autonomy on ethnic criteria only in relations with Romania but in relations with all neighboring countries where Hungarian minorities live. According to Gyula Horn's explanations, the Budapest Declaration of 5 July, which was received with great concern by neighboring countries, does not express the desire to promote the principle of autonomy on ethnic criteria, which is not the position of the Hungarian Government, anyhow. Basically, I would say the step taken by the Hungarian side is from the "spoken" word to the "written" one. Until now, they have made statements to this effect, but now they also agreed to put them in writing.

[Condurateanu] Do you believe the firm position of the United States, which has seriously undermined such claims by stressing that the U.S. Administration opposes territorial autonomy, has made Hungary's position more malleable?

[Dinu] In my capacity as coordinator of the negotiations, I can say that I noted a great interest from the international community in the successful conclusion of this treaty. If I were to say that various signals were received, that would be an understatement. After all, it was clearly said that the process of integration in the European structures is not certain for the countries that have not yet concluded bilateral treaties. This was no mere signal; it was much more than that. The core of the matter has not been touched. Nobody said what the solution should be. Still, I do not know how the positions of the Hungarian Government were affected by all this.

[Condurateanu] The Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR] refused to make any statements on this stage of the negotiations until it knows the text of the treaty. How do you view this stance?

[Dinu] I have heard of other rather negative UDMR statements about the treaty negotiations. During the negotiations, I also heard statements to the effect that the UDMR does not work against Romania's territorial integrity. The UDMR's basic position is in favor of preserving Romania's territorial integrity. However, this proceeds from the promotion of territorial autonomy on ethnic bases and the negation of Romania's united state character, with all its inherent dangerous consequences. I believe Romania's Constitution has established a clear principle referring to local administration; namely, the administrative autonomy of the localities. This is a right stipulated by the Constitution, which refers to all the country's localities. It is an achievement of the democratic process, since local autonomy and the decentralization of the state services is a basic characteristic of any advanced democracy. Within the framework of this administrative autonomy of the localities, all the country's citizens, whether they belong to a national minority or to the majority, can fully exert their rights. I have made this distinction because, generally speaking the formula put to us—"we do not have anything against Romania's territorial integrity"—could camouflage some hidden goals. Therefore, we remain faithful to the principles included in the Constitution to the extent that administrative autonomy is granted to localities, not to persons belonging to a given ethnic group. The issue was regulated pretty well in the law on the local administration. Regarding the UDMR's reaction, I believe that we have not yet received the UDMR's last answer.

[Condurateanu] On the other hand, Gheorghe Funar [leader of the Romanian National Unity Party-PUNR] said that one should hold a referendum on the signing of the treaty. What is your opinion on that?

[Dinu] Mr. Funar's statement contains many points which ensue from a lack of full knowledge of the situation. The matter of the referendum is a problem which is not necessarily stipulated in the Constitution, and the referendum was used in the European practice only with regard to integration or nonintegration in the EU! This matter is less of the competence of the Foreign Affairs Ministry, but since we have signed a lot of treaties so far—and I am convinced that the treaty that can be signed with Hungary corresponds to Romania's interests—I do not see why this treaty should be treated any differently.

[Condurateanu] Do you believe the continuation of negotiations in the following days could bring up some surprises capable of changing certain positions or formulations?

[Dinu] Normally, as I and Mr. Somogyi [Ferenc Somogyi, secretary of state of the Hungarian Foreign Affairs Ministry] said, next week's Budapest meeting at the expert level is meant to "polish" the text of the treaty, which is in the Hungarian and Romanian languages—we do not have a referent text in a language of international circulation. The experience of the negotiating process has shown that the greatest experts in the Hungarian language are the Romanians, and the greatest experts in the Romanian language are the Hungarians. One of the difficulties of the negotiating process was the use of languages. We have now made an exchange of texts and will compare them so as to remove any possibility of different interpretation. The matter is absolutely technical. Normally, there should be no question marks. I am encouraged by the fact that even before the last round of negotiations in Bucharest, Mr. Horn said that the treaty can be signed in the near future. This proved that we can overcome this last stage. I cannot see this statement as indicative of an attempt to raise further obstacles.

[Condurateanu] What are the other two documents on the reconciliation between Romania and Hungary?

[Dinu] As is known, at the end of August last year, President Iliescu came up with this initiative of a reconciliation between Romania and Hungary, setting out from the historic reconciliation between France and Germany. The idea was accepted by the Hungarian partners, who were presented with three draft texts—two inspired from the French-German reconciliation and one of our own. The first two were a draft joint political statement and a draft agreement on reconciliation and partnership between Romania and Hungary. The political statement is a short, declarative text that emphasizes the desire for reconciliation in the name of good-neighborly relations between us. The other agreement is a document with two important parts—mechanisms and program, as the French-German reconciliation accord was—which stipulates that the prime ministers and presidents of the two countries should meet at least once a year; the two foreign ministers at least twice a year, and so forth. Other officials may meet as often as needed to immediately solve whatever crops up.

This was the spirit of that reconciliation, and we tried to borrow from it. We have a list of possible actions in the political, economic, cultural, scientific, and military spheres that give substance to this reconciliation. We have also proposed a code of behavior for our countries in problems pertaining to national minorities. The political statement is practically ready: From a technical viewpoint, it is in a stage similar to the political treaty. The agreement on reconciliation and partnership has been negotiated to a large extent, but certain points remain to be solved. As for the code of behavior, it is still in an incipient stage. We agreed to make efforts to ensure that at least two of these documents—the political statement and the reconciliation agreement—can be signed at the same time as the treaty since all three documents make up a whole. They complement one another and lend substance to the treaty. The code of behavior can be left for further discussion later.

[Condurateanu] Will this code also be signed in the future?

[Dinu] We will have to see how things develop in this respect. Our concepts differed on this code. We proceeded from the idea of a document that establishes the behavior of the countries in the matter of minorities, while our Hungarian colleagues proceeded from a concept of minority rights. Nevertheless, since the issue of minority rights is covered in the treaty, we must review the concept and see whether such a code is necessary at all as a function of the future evolution of our bilateral relations.

[Condurateanu] Do you believe the signing of the basic bilateral treaty will facilitate the concurrent adherence of Romania and Hungary to NATO?

[Dinu] Of course, this is our goal. Unfortunately, the rules of the game are not fixed by us. Nevertheless, I can guarantee you that the failure to sign this treaty would block Romania's entrance into NATO! The signing of the treaty gives good marks to both countries, while failure to sign would only block Romania's access, since Hungary maintains that it has no border problems. The treaty with Slovakia has a clear point that stipulates there are no such problems, and treaty with Romania has a similar article. The conditions imposed by the European structures on Romania's and Hungary's integration require that there should be no problems between the two countries. If we do not proceed with the signing of the treaty, this may be construed as proof of the fact that we are the "producers" of problems. We must display our political will to develop good-neighborly relations and prove that we are a European country that agrees to apply European standards. This will increase our credibility.

[Condurateanu] Mr. Marcel Dinu, you are a veteran worker in this difficult and delicate sphere of diplomacy.

What interesting memories do you have from meetings with various political figures of this world?

[Dinu] I have many recollections, but since we are in the sphere of Romanian-Hungarian relations, I would like to say that I had the opportunity to accompany Hungary's Geza Jeszenszky on a visit to Romania. He is a former foreign minister from the previous Antall government, a distinguished historian, and a prominent member of the current opposition party. In Targu Mures, we went together into a Catholic church. We began a discussion with the priest. We asked him how many people are Catholic or Protestant and what is the relationship between the Catholic and Protestant churches in Targu Mures. The priest listened to me and asked me to have some patience. He said he was going to call his wife as his Romanian was not so good. His wife came, but we still could not understand each other. In the end, the former Hungarian ambassador to Bucharest, who spoke Romanian very well, helped us and we got along. At a dinner later that evening, Mr. Jeszenszky firmly spoke out against trends to assimilate the Hungarian minority in Romania. I felt obliged to answer him by reminding him of that instance and telling him: "Mr. Minister, I was not embarrassed at all by the fact that the priest could not talk to me in Romanian. But this clearly proves that there is no policy of assimilation in Romania, because if such a policy existed, he would have been able to speak Romanian."

I recall another scene. When Mr. Richard Holbrooke was here, I participated in a protocol occasion with the discussion focusing on the continuation of negotiations on a treaty with Hungary. The discussion was also attended by a distinguished representative of the UDMR leadership. The UDMR leader asked Mr. Holbrooke how the issue of collective minority rights is dealt with in the United States. Mr. Holbrooke said that, given the conglomerate structure of its population, the United States cannot offer collective rights to the minorities and that the only expression of such collective rights may be the Indian reservations.

Federal

FRY: Government Approves Draft Agreements With Macedonia

LD2108133096 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1318 GMT 21 Aug 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Aug. 21 (TANJUG)—The Yugoslav Government approved Wednesday eight draft inter-state agreements with Macedonia, which will create legal conditions for the development and promotion of economic cooperation between the two neighbouring countries.

The eight draft agreements are on trade, on customs, on mutual stimulation and protection of investments, on international road transportation, on air transportation, on border railway transportation, on cooperation in the veterinary domain, in the quarantine for plants and the protection of plants.

The government took a positive view of the hitherto negotiations on the conclusion of the eight agreements and underscored their importance for the development of relations and cooperation between the two countries, a government statement said.

The bulk of the agreements are expected to be ready to be signed during Yugoslav Prime Minister Radoje Kontic's visit to Macedonia in early September, the statement said.

FRY: Hopes for Refugees From Croatia, Bosnia 'Deflate'

LD1808133196 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1312 GMT 18 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Aug. 18 (TANJUG)—Difficulties in implementing the Dayton accord, and Croatia's policy toward the return of Serbs deflate hopes for about 700,000 refugees in Yugoslavia.

U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR] has since the beginning of this year assisted in the return of about 320 refugees, of whom 252 returned to Bosnia and only 68 to Croatia.

Only several thousand of some 30,000 applications to return, submitted by Serbs to the Croatian bureau in Belgrade, have been approved, with the "aim of reuniting families."

UNHCR helped 252 Muslims who had fled Srebrenica and Zepa to return to Bosnia.

The total number of refugees from Yugoslavia that have returned home is 476, much lesser than the original plan, which envisaged hundreds of thousands of refugees being repatriated.

Their plight has been further aggravated by the drastic reduction of humanitarian aid to Yugoslavia, with fall and winter ahead.

All leading humanitarian organizations had planned aid programs on the basis of a mass return of refugees, which has not occurred.

FRY: Croatian, Yugoslav Missing Persons Teams To Meet

LD1908195196 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1854 GMT 19 Aug 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Aug 19 (TANJUG)—Expert teams of the Yugoslav and Croatian Government Commissions for Humanitarian Issues and Missing Persons will meet Tuesday and Wednesday [20-21 August] the Yugoslav Commission announced Monday in a statement.

The teams will meet in line with the agreement reached by Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and Croatian President Franjo Tudjman on August 7 in Athens on the immediate acceleration of the process of resolving the missing persons issue.

According to this agreement, both sides are committed to immediately exchange all available information on the issue, the statement says.

The Zagreb meeting is also in line with the commitments contained in the protocol on cooperation signed last April 17 by the Yugoslav Government Commission for Humanitarian Issues and Missing Persons and the Croatian Government Commission for Prisoners and Missing Persons.

The teams are expected to present all available information on missing persons whose names are included on lists submitted by both sides in line with the minutes signed by the teams of experts at their meeting last July 5 and 6 in Belgrade, the statement says.

FRY: Refugee Official on Cooperation in Bosnia Election

LD2008185696 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1839 GMT 20 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Aug 20 (TANJUG)—Serbian Commissioner for Refugees Bratislava Morina said Tuesday in Belgrade that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia would do everything to ensure the success of Bosnian elections which should contribute to the implementation of the Dayton agreement and help resolve the problem of refugees.

Meeting 30 international observers who arrived in Yugoslavia to monitor the voting of refugees who are unable to travel to Bosnia and will consequently vote in FRY, Morina promised full cooperation of Yugoslav authorities.

Morina, who also chairs the Yugoslav commission for assisting refugees in the exercise of their right to vote in Bosnian elections, said that out of the 220,000 refugees registered as eligible to vote, about 98,000 would vote in Yugoslavia.

The remaining 122,000 will travel to Republika Srpska or the Muslim-Croat Federation to vote in person on September 14.

Voting in Yugoslavia will take place between August 28 and September 3 at 60 polling stations to be monitored by observers from Sweden, Italy, Bulgaria, France and Poland.

FRY: SDU Head on 'Problems' in Talks With Croatia

AU2008171396 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1307 GMT 20 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 20 August (BETA)—Zarko Korac, acting president of the Social Democratic Union (SDU) stated today that the problems in the negotiations between the FRY and Croatia were caused by the Yugoslav side's insistence on succession.

Korac cited "information that the SDU obtained."

Speaking at a news conference, he expressed "optimism in principle" with regard to the success of the negotiations, since, as he said, the normalization of relations between the FRY and Croatia represents "the backbone of stability in the Balkans." [passage omitted]

FRY: 4 Receive Jail Terms in Espionage Trial

LD2108114296 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1104 GMT 21 Aug 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Nis, Yugoslavia, Aug 20 (TANJUG)—The military court in Nis, southern Serbia, sentenced four Yugoslavs to prison terms totalling ten years for espionage and for revealing military secrets.

The court sentenced Ankica Brckovic, aged 21, a civilian working in the Army, to five years in prison, Marjan Cop, 55, of Nis, to 1.5 years, and Zeljko Medic, 36, from Belgrade, to 2.5 years for espionage.

It sentenced Major Josip Baric, 39, of Nis, to a year in prison for revealing military secrets.

The court found that the defendants had for the past three years been collecting classified information about the Nis garrison and passing it on to a foreign power.

It found that Ankica Brckovic had been collecting classified military information and passing it on to Medic and Cop and to Father Zvonko Blasko, a Roman Catholic priest in Nis, who is in hiding and is being sought by the police.

Serbia

Serbia: Economics Official Ready for Cooperation With Germany

LD2108141896 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1340 GMT 21 Aug 96

["Ecopool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Aug. 21 (TANJUG)—Deputy Premier of Serbia Svetozar Krstic said Wednesday that Serbia's economy was fully open to cooperation with German partners, as part of its links with the rest of the world.

Krstic made the statement in a meeting with a German economic delegation, headed by President of the Wiesbaden Company Oms Reimund Bach, a government statement said.

Krstic told the guests that the government and other state bodies in Serbia were taking concrete measures to stimulate cooperation with foreign partners.

Bach showed special interest in possibilities for the promotion of the municipal infrastructure and expressed readiness for participation in the financing of different ecological programs.

Serbia's Minister of Ecology Jordan Aleksic also attended the meeting.

Serbia: Local Elections in Serbia Scheduled for 3 Nov

LD2108131596 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1222 GMT 21 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Aug. 21 (TANJUG)—The local elections in Serbia will be held on Nov. 3, the same day as the federal parliamentary elections, the Assembly of Serbia announced Wednesday.

The elections for the municipal councils and the Belgrade, Kragujevac, Nis, Novi Sad and Pristina city councils have been called by Assembly of Serbia Speaker Dragan Tomic, a released statement said.

The election-campaign period begins on Thursday, Aug. 22, as announced.

Serbia: SPO Calls Meeting on Media Election Coverage

AU2008130896 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1135 GMT 19 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 19 August (BETA)—Ivan Kovacevic, spokesman of the Serbian Renewal Movement [SPO], said today that the Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS] "signed with itself the would-be agreement on the presentation of political parties in its own media during the election campaign."

At a news conference, Kovacevic said that SPS spokesman Ivica Dacic had signed the agreement "with 30 or so others, who claim to represent parties."

Kovacevic repeated the demand by SPO that the Law on Political Parties be amended in such a way that, in order to found a party, one needs to collect at least 5,000 signatures, because in such a way it could be prevented that parties "that can be described as a one-man, one-room, and one-fax machine party, pollute the political scene."

Kovacevic said that the "moderator" of yesterday's meeting on the presentation of parties in the state-run media during the election campaign, namely Federal Information Minister Dragutin Brcin, had refused to put on the agenda a proposal of the Together [Zajedno] coalition regarding the media presentation of parties before the elections.

"We submitted a meticulously devised proposal to the chairman before the meeting began, demanding that it be placed on the agenda. After his introductory address, Brcin touched off the farce by immediately asking one of the creatures present there to take the floor," Kovacevic said, adding that the representatives of the Together coalition assessed then that their further presence at the meeting was senseless.

Serbia: Opposition Parties Refuse To Sign Media Accord

LD2008145996 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1319 GMT 20 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 20 Aug (SRNA)—Ivan Kovacevic, a spokesman of the Serbian Renewal Movement [SPO], said today that the ruling Socialist Party of Serbia yesterday signed the agreement on the presentation of parties in the media with itself.

"Representatives of the Zajedno [Together] coalition as well as a representative of the Democratic Party of Serbia walked out of the meeting because federal Information Minister Dragutin Brcin did not want to include our coalition's proposal in the agenda," Kovacevic told a news conference in Belgrade. [passage omitted]

He added that representatives of the Zajedno coalition would not sign the agreement proposed by the federal government and that the coalition members would reach an agreement about details of their presentation.

Serbia: Arms Plant Workers Demonstrate Over Unpaid Bonuses

AU2008174596 Paris AFP in English 1729 GMT 20 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Aug 20 (AFP)—Some 5,000 workers at an armaments plant in southern Serbia have begun a series of protest demonstrations for back pay holiday bonuses owed them, local journalists said Tuesday.

The strikers at the Zastava-Namenska armaments plant in Kragujevac, 150 kilometres (90 miles) south of Belgrade are also demanding that the management ensures their jobs by getting military contracts and making the Yugoslav army pay back $68 million of debts owed to the state enterprise, local press reports said.

Journalists in Kragujevac say the workers will demonstrate every day in front of the local town hall until their demands are met.

Zastava, with a total of 40,000 employees, is a major Yugoslav state industrial group with some 20 subsidiaries headed by automobile and armaments production units.

Unrest has been brewing for some time at the Kragujevac works, where many of the workers, with nothing to do, have been technically on strike while inflation eats away at their meagre income.

The Zastava-Namenska armaments workers have also launched an appeal for solidarity with staff at the Zastava automobile works, and also the country's teacher, medical staff and police.

Zoran Nedeljkovic, a union leader at Zastava, was quoted in a press report Monday as accusing Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and his government of seeking to break up the state-owned enteprise into small bits and sell them off under cover of a privatisation policy.

Kosovo

Kosovo: SSJ Head Calls For Halt to Terrorist Actions

LD1608144696 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1243 GMT 16 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 16 Aug (TANJUG)—Zeljko Raznjatovic Arkan, chairman of the Party of Serb Unity [SSJ], today accused Ibrahim Rugova, chairman of the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo, of being behind the recent terrorist attacks in Kosovo-Metohija.

At a news conference in the international press center, Raznjatovic appealed to Rugova to halt the terrorist actions and urged the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to "take more resolute steps."

He said he hoped that the terrorist attacks would stop in Kosmet [Kosovo-Metohija], which he visited over the past few days, and that it was necessary to explain to the Albanians through a dialogue that Kosmet is an indivisible part of Serbia and the FRY.

Speaking about the elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Ljilja Peric, SSJ candidate for the president of the Serb Republic, described as successful the election campaign conducted by the party, which will run in the elections independently.

SSJ Chairman for Montenegro Dragan Sisovic said that "the separatist forces that threaten to hold a referendum" must not be allowed to win the elections in Montenegro. He added that any referendum would usher in a period of great uncertainty.

Kosovo: Council Reports on 'Human Rights Abuses'

AU1608183496 Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT in English 14 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] "Albanians are, as usual, victims, whereas Serbian police, military and other organs of the Serbian regime are the perpetrators," the Prishtina-based Council for the Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms [KMLDNj] says at the outset of its report on the violation of human rights in Kosova in July 1996.

The KMLDNj notes the campaign of violence against Albanians "has stepped up" recently. The raids on Albanian households on alleged arms searches pretext, plundering of the people, arbitrary arrests, physical torture, ransacks, and demolition of Albanians house have become daily occurrences, the Kosova leading human rights organization remarked.

The KMLDNj said 429 individuals were ill-treated in diverse forms in July alone, adding that a Kosova Albanian (Agron Talushaj) was shot dead in mysterious circumstances in Serbia.

The KMLDNj, giving more specific information about the reported human rights abuses, said there were 108 cases of arbitrary arrests, 86 people summoned to police/security interrogation (so-called "informative conversations"), 198 Albanians maltreated during police raids and searches on Albanian houses. "Fourteen people received body injuries," the KMLDNj said, adding that 96 others were tortured. 365 persons were intimidated, whereas 65 Albanian families raided on by the police, the KMLDNj said, noting that four Albanian families were evicted from their apartments. "Eighteen women and seven children were among those ill-treated by the police."

Fifty Albanian political and educational activists were among those targeted by the Serb regime in July, KMLDNj said.

Citing the now common practice of Serbian police seal-offs of market-places in Kosova, the KMLDNj singled out the 24 July 1996 seal-off of the Prishtina market by huge Serb police troops.

"Policemen beat women, old men and children," the Council said, adding that a 40-year-old woman was beaten up unconscious.

The amount of confiscated goods is hard to evaluate, as people do not even report them, apparently feeling they can do nothing about it. The Prishtina Human Rights Council notes with concern the increasing number of Albanian guest-workers abroad who have had their passports seized by the Serbian police during their visits back home in Kosova. "Serbian police go after such people at their homes and intimidate and threaten them in a bid to procure money. When they refuse to give money, the Serb policemen take them to police stations, interrogating and torturing them," the KMLDNj said, noting 42 Albanians had their passports seized in July in such a manner.

The three-page KMLDNj report condemns the Serbian regime's continued violent practices against Albanians, giving illustrations of some of the most characteristic cases of human rights violations in the hands of the Serbian police in Kosova.

Kosovo: Serb Troops Parade in Malisevo, Incite Albanians

AU1608200896 Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT in English 16 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Yesterday (Thursday), Serbian soldiers paraded on the streets of Malisheva [Malisevo] town, LDK [Democratic League of Kosova] sources reported.

The Serb troops were comprised of heavy armored vehicles, cannons and lorries. The Serbian troops had recently been settled in Ostrozub village in Malisheva. Albanian residents of this area had reported several cases of provocations during their stay.

Kosovo: Serb Unit Provokes Albanians in Petrove

AU1708155996 Tirana ATA in English
1057 GMT 17 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Prishtina, August 17 (ATA)—A Serbian Army tank unit, equipped with four tanks and a number of soldiers, was installed in the vicinity of Petrove, a village near Prizren, on August 14, the Kosova Information Center reports.

The military troops are carrying out exercises, provoking Albanian citizens of Petrove and damaging crops with their armoured cars.

Kosovo: UN Resolution on Kosovo Human Rights Assailed

LD1908231596 Belgrade TANJUG in English
2253 GMT 19 Aug 96

["Pool" item by Stevan Cordas]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Geneva, Aug 19 (TANJUG)—The U.N. sub-commission against discrimination and for the protection of minorities adopted at its annual session in Geneva on Monday a resolution on Serbia's southern province of Kosovo-Metohija.

With the latest resolution on the human rights situation in Kosovo-Metohija, the sub-commission has set another precedent.

Without offering any evidence to substantiate its charges, it has accused a sovereign and democratic state of systematically practicing the worst of crimes—murder, ethnic cleansing, racial discrimination and torture—against part of its population.

The resolution was tabled by Belgium's expert, obviously quoting to the letter the charges voiced at the session by representatives of ethnic Albanian separatists from Kosovo-Metohija and by the Albanian regime.

What is surprising, however, is that such a resolution should have been upheld by experts from some Western European states at a time when these states are working to repatriate ethnic Albanians to Kosovo-Metohija, refusing to give them political asylum.

Judging from the resolution, Kosovo-Metohija is no better than a hell-hole.

It is to be wondered at how these western european states will explain to the world why ethnic Albanians must return to the province, while adopting a paper which makes it clear to one and all that there is no returning to the 'hell-hole'.

It is also strange that the resolution has been adopted at a time when nearly the whole world is admitting that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Federation of Serbia and Montenegro) is making efforts to open dialogue with the province's Albanians, and is being rebuffed.

Instead of bearing this in mind, the resolution was adopted out of inertia, on the basis of old stories put about at the time of anti-Yugoslav and anti-Serbian hysteria.

A strong ethnic Albanian separatist movement, which has been active in the province for decades, has illegally proclaimed Kosovo-Metohija a republic and is striving to detach it from Serbia and Yugoslavia and annexe it to neighbouring Albania.

In the pursuit of their dream, the separatists do not shy from terrorist attacks against the police and the populace.

As different from a similar resolution adopted by the sub-commission last year virtually without opposition, the Monday resolution was carried with 11 nayes or abstentions out of 26 votes cast.

A member, speaking privately after the session, said that it was becoming increasingly difficult to pass resolutions alleging human and minority rights violations in Yugoslavia.

The resolution has brought to light a potential danger to all U.N. members.

Viz., although the sub-commission members are experts and not official representatives of their countries, they have strayed dangerously deep into the political and politicking waters, and are propagating their states' official policy.

Kosovo: Serb Court Brings Charges Against Ex-Security Employee

AU2008135996 Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT in English 19 Aug 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Serbian-controlled Municipal Court in Prizren instigated charges against Bexhet Rama, former Kosova State Security employee, the municipal Commission for Judicial Affairs reported.

Mr. Rama is accused of "endangering the territorial integrity" of the so-called Yugoslavia, and that, since

1992 has allegedly been involved in spying the Serbian police and military forces.

The Serbian police were after Mr. Rama even during the trial of the so-called "Kosova Ministry of Defence" members, when the Serbian police round-up and brought to trail over 170 former employees of the former Kosova Ministry of Interiors and State Security.

Vojvodina

Vojvodina: Hungarian Parties To Stay 'Divided' in Elections

LD1708151196 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 0600 GMT 17 Aug 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The ethnic Hungarian parties in Yugoslavia will remain divided during the November elections. The Democratic Union of Vojvodina Hungarians [DZVM] has decided to run individually and not to enter into an alliance with any other party, the organization's chairman announced. Andras Agoston stated that they want to measure support for the DZVM's autonomy plans by the number of votes they receive.

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